Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

476. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, July 24, 1959, 11 p.m.

Secto 390. Moscow, London, Bonn, eyes only Ambs. Paris eyes only Ambs Houghton and Burgess. Berlin eyes only Gufler. Subject: Private Session.

At this afternoon’s private meeting the Western Foreign Ministers began by reaffirming the complete unacceptability of the Soviet proposal for an all-German committee and the Soviet effort to link this to an interim Berlin arrangement. But Gromyko succeeded fairly quickly in focusing the talk on the seven points of Lloyd’s July 20 speech.¹ The meeting was characterized by prolonged silences. At one point there was a warm exchange regarding procedure in which Gromyko, endeavoring to present himself as the victim of unfair treatment, demanded to be dealt with as an equal. It was quite apparent that he was in no hurry to go anywhere.

The Secretary started the discussion by underlining importance of clarifying relationship between question of all-German negotiations and interim Berlin solution, saying he saw little use in entering into detailed discussion of Berlin problem so long as Gromyko insisted on link. Couve, supporting Secretary, tried to focus attention on link problem by attempting to draw Gromyko into debate on question of duration of agreement.

Gromyko however would have none of this and insisted on proceeding with discussion on basis of order of items named in Lloyd speech of July 20 despite Lloyd’s pointing out that sequence he used was purely arbitrary and of no significance. Notwithstanding Gromyko’s repeated insistence on reaching understanding on troop levels (i.e., Lloyd’s first point) before proceeding to discussion of other points, West Foreign Ministers did succeed in focusing some attention on other aspects. As a result following points were brought out:

1. Troop Levels. Gromyko was told that West considers present troop strength in West Berlin to be symbolic (11–12, 999), but he violently disagreed stating that Soviet requirement for symbolic level could only be met by substantial reduction in present strength, at least 3–4,000 level. The Secretary pointed out that West agreement to limit Berlin troop strength to existing levels represents major concession since West has absolute right to raise troop strength to any level it feels appropriate or desirable.

2. Armaments. Gromyko could not agree with Lloyd’s impression that agreement already reached on formulation with regard to non-stationing of nuclear and missile weapons. Referring to language of June 16 proposal, Gromyko insisted that reference to type of armaments appears as separate point and be more precisely stated in order to indicate restriction applies to West Berlin only since no Soviet troops in East Berlin. Secretary insisted that if this to be separate item restriction must apply to Berlin as a whole. Gromyko made quite an issue of need for isolating armaments as separate item in Berlin agreement, and it was consensus of West Foreign Ministers who exchanged views after Gromyko left that Soviets intend to exploit West’s agreement to pilot Berlin atom-free zone as significant precedent for Rapacki, Balkan and Baltic zones.

3. Propaganda and Subversive Activities. Secretary vigorously asserted that West would never agree to restraints on activities in West Berlin except on terms of absolute reciprocity. Gromyko called this unacceptable approach since espionage and subversive activities to which ban would be applied are carried on only in West Berlin; he said agreement to prohibit such activities in East Berlin would simply misrepresent situation since no activity of this sort there. All Western Foreign Ministers sharply rebutted Gromyko by referring to Secretary’s detailed account in plenary session several weeks ago of espionage, sabotage and other diversionary activities carried on in East Berlin.² Despite Gromyko’s repeated insistence that there could be no mention of East Berlin, he expressed hope that language could be found which would be mutually acceptable, citing Soviet June 9 formula³ as model, but he took this attitude only after Secretary and Couve had reminded him that in discussions of this topic five weeks ago he had apparently agreed to reciprocity.

4. Access. The Secretary asked Gromyko if he would be prepared to accept idea of four-power commission for settlement access difficulties as recommended in Western June 16 proposal. Gromyko replied he saw no need for such commission since unlikely any difficulties would arise if agreement reached to maintain “present arrangements” with regard to access.

In sharp exchange with Gromyko on reasonableness of attitudes of two sides toward negotiations, Secretary criticized Gromyko for expecting West to make all the concessions while Soviets unwilling make any. He reminded Gromyko that Berlin crisis is of Soviet origin and since Soviets hold view, which West does not share, that Berlin is danger spot it was up to Soviets to make equal effort in removing source of tensions.

At one point in discussion Gromyko, responding to Secretary’s inquiry, said he had open mind on question of nature of document for possible Berlin agreement; communiqué, recommendations to governments, or formal agreement would be acceptable to him.

It was agreed that Foreign Ministers would meet at Lloyd’s Villa for private discussion Monday 5:30 pm. (Gromyko is lunching alone with Lloyd Monday.)

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2459. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. A 10-page detailed memorandum of the conversation at the meeting, US/MC/167, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1341.
1. For text of Lloyd’s statement on July 20, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 444–449 or Cmd. 868, pp. 280–283.
2. See footnote 1, Document 367.
3. See Document 377.