474. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Herter at Geneva0
Tocah 183. For the Secretary. Last evening we had a talk with the President1 regarding the Khrushchev visit. We found him affected by certain anxieties, part of which concerned his thought of replying to [Page 1046] Khrushchev’s letter and in effect saying that both the summit meeting as well as the personal visit are conditioned on “noticeable progress” at the Foreign Ministers Meeting. We had to point out that the invitation extended to Mr. Khrushchev via Kozlov did not specify such a condition for the personal visit. The President was surprised and insisted at first that he had understood that it was so conditioned. We referred to the talking paper2 which he had approved and in which he had in fact made some changes at the time in the language. After reviewing the paper it was evident to him that no such condition had been stated, although obviously there is a relationship between the personal visit and an eventual summit conference. He seemed to feel that under the circumstances, such a personal visit by Khrushchev to this country without minimum progress at Geneva might be badly received.
After threshing this about for a time, a calmer view prevailed. It was agreed that we would take a few days in which to prepare a reply on the understanding that the invitation to exchange personal visits had been extended and has been accepted.
It seems to us that if the Geneva talks collapse or end futilely and the President has not taken an initiative such as this, a most awkward situation arises. If the talks collapse and he can show he has taken this initiative, his worst enemies would be obliged to admit that he has exhausted every possible means to promote a peaceful solution. Furthermore, the invitation must be viewed in the context of the Geneva talks. We cannot see but what the invitation would have some favorable influence on the Soviet attitude. It is certainly not to be excluded that the invitation might promote the development of a formula in the days ahead which would be considered sufficient progress to justify a summit meeting. Then there is the additional factor of sentiment in this country and in Europe, which has been increasingly vocal in urging that Khrushchev be exposed to a greater knowledge of the power and resources of this country. In a way, we are inclined to consider a Khrushchev visit to this country of greater importance than a 4-power summit meeting. The President could do an effective job on Khrushchev. There is the added feature that all of this—that is, Khrushchev’s visit here and the President’s visit to the Soviet Union—would take the remaining edge off the crisis created by the Berlin issue, stretching it out and absorbing it in the context of these talks. Khrushchev would also become more conscious of public opinion in this country and its insistence on progress toward solutions, and perhaps be brought around to understanding the necessity of creating a better atmosphere by permitting a reasonable formula at Geneva prior to his visit to the United States. Against these considerations, [Page 1047] the prospect of a collapse of the Geneva talks without adequate results leaves nothing but a rather grim prospect.
The President, we believe, had a better feeling about this after our discussion. We certainly made it clear that the imposition of qualifications or conditions on the invitation to make a personal visit would hardly be wise under the circumstances.
At the close he fully and seemingly enthusiastically agreed to the concept that there should be no condition attached to reciprocal visits. He suggested instead that we find a way to make clear to Khrushchev that his reception in this country would be much better if there had been progress at Geneva. This is the line we are working on.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CD 1333. Top Secret; Niact; No Distribution.↩
- See Document 467.↩
- Not further identified.↩