Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, November 17, 1958, 1 p.m.

1045. Reference Berlin’s 346¹ to Department and Department’s 1007.²

1. I tend agree view expressed USAREUR’S unn tel November 15³ that truck incident deliberately planned by Soviets as test firmness our position in light Khrushchev speech. I nevertheless concur final paragraph Berlin’s 346 that our prompt and strong reaction to November 14 incident amply demonstrated that we do not intend yield to Soviets on inspection issue. I moreover fully endorse Berlin’s view that at least for time being there more to be gained by remaining steadfast and reacting firmly to any Soviet or GDR pressures as they may develop than by seeking to probe their intentions by actions such as that proposed USCINCEUR’s EC 9–6071.⁴

2. If any such action envisaged I believe it should be coordinated with British and French and consideration given to “test” being made next by British or French truck instead of US, particularly in view Shilov allegation (USCINCEUR’s EC 9–6071) that only difficulties are with US, none with British or French. In any event, although I fully agree we should continue attempt sending covered trucks, it seems to me preferable for time being send only open or partially covered trucks which apparently go through without difficulty.

[1 paragraph (12–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Trimble

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11–1758. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Berlin.
1. Document 40.
2. Telegram 1007, November 17, approved briefing the North Atlantic Council on the November 14 incident, but stated that military action with regard to rescuing a convoy required “careful consideration and consultation” with the British and French. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11–1758)
3. See footnote 2, Document 40.
4. See footnote 5, Document 40.