Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

398. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower⁰

Undated.

Dear Friend: Selwyn has told me of your message to Khrushchev.¹ I hope that it will be salutory and that the Foreign Ministers may be able to bring their meeting to a close with agreement on a Summit Meeting.

This, however, is the favourable view, and the discussions so far give small grounds for optimism. It is at least as likely that we shall find, after the next few days, that the Foreign Ministers can make no further progress on Berlin and are reaching a deadlock. What will happen then? Mr. Khrushchev may at once make a public declaration that, as the Foreign Ministers have failed to reach any agreement, the Summit Meeting should be held without delay. Indeed, it is likely that he will publicly propose a date and place for such a meeting. We shall then find that we are, in effect, summoned publicly to a Summit by Mr. Khrushchev—in circumstances in which we shall find it equally difficult to justify to public opinion either an acceptance or a refusal. This will present us with a very embarrassing dilemma.

We must, I think, avoid that situation. We could do so if we forestalled Mr. Khrushchev by ourselves proposing that the Heads of the four Governments should meet to consider the situation arising from the deadlock in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. What I have in mind is, not that we should have the formal Summit Meeting which has been envisaged, with a throng of official advisers, and assessors from the two Germanies, and arguments about the Poles, the Czechs and the Italians, or even with an elaborate agenda; but that the Heads of the four Governments should meet informally (with their Foreign Ministers and a minimum of advisers) to talk over the situation and try to find a way through the difficulties. If we want an agreement—and surely we do—this, I am convinced, is the way to do business with Mr. Khrushchev.

The Foreign Ministers cannot go on much longer at Geneva; and, if in the next few days deadlock on Berlin appears to be inevitable, I believe that the wisest course would be to suggest as a next step a meeting of the kind indicated above. If you were prepared to suggest this yourself, and to invite the other three to come to meet you in the United States, this would make a great impact and I am sure that your initiative would be widely welcomed and regarded as eminently justified. But, if for any reason you do not wish to take this initiative yourself at this stage, I would be willing to make the first move and to suggest a meeting in London—or, if there were a general preference for meeting on neutral ground, at Geneva or at any other suitable place.

We must be prepared for the possibility of a breakdown at Geneva; and I feel most strongly that, if this happens, we must be ready to make a fresh move and to do so without any delay. We have managed to maintain our public position so far but if after a breakdown we allow the initiative to pass to the other side our public position may rapidly deteriorate. Certainly in this country—and I believe in the free world generally—public opinion will expect the Western leaders to do something. It seems to me that an initiative either by you or by me is the least that we could do.

I feel that this may be an important turning-point in this long struggle, and I want to be sure that the free world by its clear demonstration of nobility and idealism is recognized as acting rightly, thus bringing the greatest influence on the uncommitted nations and on moderate opinion generally.

All except the first paragraph of this message was drafted before I knew of your message to Khrushchev. No doubt your answer will depend upon the answer you get from him but I thought it right to let you have my thoughts. Since, alas, we cannot talk it over as at Camp David,² this sort of message seems the only way.

With warm regard,

As ever

Harold³

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Top Secret. Attached to a June 16 note from Caccia to the President, which stated that he had been asked to deliver the message as soon as possible. It was received at the White House during the afternoon of June 16. According to the President Caccia came to the White House that evening and the President inquired about this note. For his account of this conversation, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 401–402. No other record of this conversation has been found.
1. See Document 395.
2. See Documents 234–241.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.