Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

380. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, June 10, 1959, 2 p.m.

Cahto 99. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. I am most grateful for message from President contained Tocah 90.¹

I met this morning with Couve and Selwyn² and read them paraphrase your cable and then read draft statement I had prepared overnight³ totally rejecting Gromyko’s proposal if he repeats it as expected at this afternoon’s plenary.

We three agreed:

(1) Best not to break off conference but propose recess until July 15.

(2) Request no meeting tomorrow but plenary Friday, at which time one of us (supported by other two) would make statement persuasively presenting and explaining five-point proposal given Gromyko in private session June 8,⁴ thus leaving public record in best possible condition should conference in fact be terminated by Gromyko refusal to agree resumption date.

(3) At session today we would give no hint of any request for month’s recess. This would be done at Friday’s plenary.

(4) Meanwhile it was agreed that I should see Gromyko alone tomorrow afternoon when both Couve and Lloyd will have received as they expect their governments’ authority to propose recess.

We recognized this delay may enable Gromyko to fuel his proposal sufficiently to make its unacceptability less clearcut but believe this risk outweighed by desirability obtaining opportunity to deliver well prepared statement Friday re West interim solution for Berlin. Importance latter accentuated by recognition Soviets might move suddenly on DDR peace treaty thereby increasing likelihood reference Berlin to UN.

Von Brentano then joined us and we went over substantially same ground with his concurring in our conclusions. He stated positively that Gromyko proposal of yesterday would have no resonance in Germany even with SPD. He felt recess rather than end conference far best course since otherwise spotlight would be focused on possible summit which under present circumstances he considered would be fatal.

The four of us then agreed that we would each communicate to our own press correspondents terms of Gromyko’s proposal (which have been given out right and left by Gromyko and Bolz to Communist reporters who in turn have leaked to other members press corps) and characterize it as unacceptable as well as very possibly designed to break up conference. There was no dissent from expressed view that it would be worse than futile to continue conference on present basis. Choice was between termination and recess. Suggestion was made which found general favor but no definitive agreement that Deputies to Foreign Ministers be asked meet in Geneva July 8 to prepare ground for reopening Ministers meeting week thereafter.

Lloyd speculated on possibility Soviets genuinely thought yesterday’s proposal a concession. This view was not shared, Couve characterizing it in terms “Bolz won out over Gromyko”. We briefly discussed joint visit for few hours to Berlin en route home but no decision taken. I am hosting luncheon here Friday for Brandt with von Brentano, Lloyd and Couve attending.

I emphasized to my colleagues that overriding consideration was maintaining the unity of our alliance in face Soviet maneuvers and I mentioned possibility Gromyko might have been deceived into thinking us weak and potentially divided by reason of certain regrettable internal developments in some of our countries. I can honestly say that I do not believe my relations have ever been as good with my three colleagues as they are today. We are all in good spirit.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–HE/6–1059. Secret; Niact.
1. Document 378.
2. At 10:15 a.m.
3. See footnote 2, Document 379.
4. See Document 372.