Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

310. Telegram From the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, May 18, 1959, midnight.

Secto 68. Paris pass USRO. Sixth session Foreign Ministers Conference May 18 lasted three hours and devoted to East German outline objections to Western proposal and support Soviet views, US rebuttal Soviet Peace Treaty proposal, and lengthy (50 minutes) Soviet rejection Western peace plan.

Chairman Gromyko recognized East German representative Bolz who gave preliminary GDR views Western proposals at same time lauding Soviet views re peace treaty and Berlin.¹ Bolz regretted Western plan does not contain draft peace treaty and surprised that West Germans also failed mention this matter so urgently desired by German people, in order end consequences World War, normalize German relations and restore German sovereignty. Urgency heightened by efforts German militarists. Treaty would permit all Germany enter onto path democratic development, free West Berlin of occupation regime, make civil war impossible and help bring about German reunification.

Bolz admitted GDR had previously supported all-German elections before situation so complicated and division of Germany so deep as at present. He contrasted conflicting trends two parts Germany, with Hitlerite elements, revanchist attitudes, etc., Western Germany, and peaceful anti-Fascist army without atomic or rocket arms in GDR where all concentrating on building socialism. Therefore, impossible to “unify mechanically” now. Unification only possible through getting together of two Germanies, and to prepare GDR proposed confederation with all German council based parity principle. Unification not something this Conference can usefully tackle. Bolz also emphasized unity, economic and social growth GDR, plus its relations with other states which include one-half of mankind. Four powers could, however, help if they wish re peace treaty.

Berlin problem also urgent, with situation in West Berlin abnormal, danger to peace and only territory in Europe still constituting occupation regime. Attack being waged from West Berlin on GDR and also basis for cold war against other countries. Dangerous situation could lead to war. Hence, GDR proposal for “free city” West Berlin, which GDR prepared to accept even though West Berlin “on territory of GDR”. GDR could not accept Western proposal to submit democratic sector of Berlin to occupation regime once more, which would violate GDR territory and sovereignty.

Western proposals contain no appropriate basis for conclusion German treaty or solution West Berlin problem and Western plan contains artificial links between matters not properly related. Peace treaty conference should be convened soonest.

Secretary then criticized Soviet Peace Proposal tabled May 15 meeting (full text Secretary statement transmitted separately USIS—IPSP/181815).²

Gromyko’s attack Western peace plan followed.³ Soviets believe in solving separate problems separately and clear that Western plan unrealistically ties different problems together. Gromyko referred Khrushchev’s May 16 speech⁴ charging Adenauer real author Western plan, whose policies at variance interest peace.

Gromyko said Soviets unwilling discuss in detail section Western plan dealing German unification, since this subject not for conference to discuss or four powers to implement. United Germany only possible through agreement two German states. Referring all German committee, Gromyko admitted some all German body necessary but this must be decided by Germans themselves. Present four power contribution to German problem lies in conclusion peace treaty. Gromyko said wished correct Western misrepresentation re 1955 summit directive,⁵ when as matter of fact Heads of Government did not reach agreement German unification but only ordered study by Foreign Ministers. Gromyko claimed Soviet not against German elections as such but decision belongs to two German governments. Western plan not peace plan as claimed but attempt substitute German unification for necessary peace treaty discussions.

Therefore Western plan cannot in any way serve as basis discussion this conference. Clearly unacceptable and unrealistic. Soviets do not say Western plan contains elements that cannot be discussed, for example, disarmament and European security elements. Real objective Western plan clearly to delay peace treaty settlement indefinitely. And Western plan fails provide for elimination foreign military bases on German territory and lacks proposals to prevent resurgence German militarism.

Gromyko discussed Berlin in terms similar those used Bolz. West’s proposal completely unacceptable since designed maintain occupation regime West Berlin, spread same to all Berlin, destroy GDR’s capital and socialist system East Berlin, which intolerable in terms elementary sovereign rights GDR. Soviets hope West will show greater readiness consider Soviet proposals re Berlin.

Gromyko criticized West’s European security proposals since conditional on solution other problems above all German unification. Charged their main aim to maintain Western troops and occupation regimes Germany and other countries. Soviets ready to consider sound European security proposals at appropriate time including some of those in Western plan. Gromyko also criticized disarmament provision Western plan for being made dependent on solution other questions.

Gromyko closed by demanding that conference focus urgent problems peace treaty and Berlin, though hinting that forthcoming summit meeting might consider other security and disarmament ideas to lessen tension.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/5–1859. Official Use Only. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the session, US/VR/6, May 18, and the summary of the verbatim records, US/VRS/8 (rev 1), May 20, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1345 and 1349.
1. For text of Bolz’ statement, circulated as RM/DOC/A/2, June 4, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 565–570 or Cmd. 868, pp. 181–186.
2. Not found. For text of Herter’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/13, May 18, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 94–98; Cmd. 868, pp. 30–33; or Department of State Bulletin, June 8, 1959, pp. 819–821.
3. For text of Gromyko’s statement, circulated as RM/DOC/14, May 18, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 98–112 or Cmd. 868, pp. 300–301.
4. For text of this statement, see Foreign Ministers Meeting, pp. 300–301.
5. For text of the summit directive, July 23, 1955, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. V, pp. 527–528.