Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

288. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, May 10, 1959, 1 p.m.

2530. Geneva for US Delegation. Following uncleared summary 90-minute conversation Secretary with Chancellor and Von Brentano Saturday afternoon May 9th.¹

Chancellor expressed his gratitude for opportunity give Secretary his views before Geneva Conference and, speaking from hand-written notes, held forth for over one hour on following topics:

1. Assurance that should there be changes in high offices this summer in Federal Republic, German foreign policy would remain unaltered.

2. Extensive review and analysis Soviet policy, objectives and methods which German particularly qualified to understand. Chancellor produced statistics on treaties and agreements violated by Soviet Union. He recalled his conversations with Khrushchev and Bulganin in 1955,² and went into great detail on significance Soviet seven year plan, and problems inherent in Soviet relations with Communist China as expressed by Khrushchev, and confirmed to him last year by Mikoyan in Bonn.³ Said Khrushchev wants consolidate gains in Europe without war, and proceed with attempt catch up with economy United States, in hope that by eventually adding industrial resources Western Europe to those Soviet Union he would achieve decisive advantage over United States and win cold war. This why Soviet Union wants relaxation tensions.

With regard Germany, Soviet Union aims incorporate Federal Republic economy into its own. Political road to this would consist of SPD victory at 1961 elections, or via confederation two Germanies, which would constitute substantial move this direction.

3. Chancellor discussed Geneva and commented ironically on working group’s exhaustive “even staggering” preparations. Said Berlin most immediate and urgent question. Stressed necessity of “untying package” proposals at right time, lest issue Berlin be somehow left behind and lost in mass proposals and counterproposals other issues. Warned against danger creation new legal basis Western rights on access which would involve destruction existing rights derived from occupation. Latter obligate Soviet Union bring about reunification Germany, and this obligation would be eliminated if fundamental basis present rights destroyed. Expressed strong gratitude United States reaffirmation necessity German reunification in freedom in recent public address by Secretary.⁴ Federal Republic prepared increase technical contacts with so-called GDR, but most important achieve free movement persons between two Germanies, and end to current persecution 15 million Protestants and 2 million Catholics East zone. Reunification Germany can be achieved only via free elections and not by mingling Communist and non-Communist regimes. Federal Government would consider any proposal latter course action completely unacceptable.

4. Mentioned recent talks with French⁵ only briefly because “had reached complete agreement on all points”.

5. Dwelt at length on his concern with regard British attitude connected with Macmillan ten-day visit Moscow. “Basic change British policy” not due solely to worry about Labour Party and elections. Stressed necessity for European unity including United Kingdom for its own sake and that of rest of Europe.

6. Polish boundary question must be settled by peace treaty and not by “unilateral occupation”. Right of human beings recognized by United Nations Declaration Human Rights to live in their own homes must be respected. Federal Republic wishes strive for reduction and removal tensions with Poland, and development mutually beneficial economic relations. This important because Poland eastern-most country whose civilization and culture Western origin.

7. Chancellor turned to European security which he termed “empty concept and empty word”, since security can only be global. Traditional Soviet pressure toward Mediterranean endangers Turkey, Greece, Italy and constitutes southern jaw of pincer movement combined with pressure on Germany in north, seeking pick off all of Europe. Concept European security outmoded because of modern weapons. Chancellor attacked concept narrow security zone in central Europe not so much because discriminating against Germany but because involving inspection Germany industry by Soviets which unacceptable German people. Federal Government could never accept such scheme, which aided by SPD victory, should this happen in 1961, liable wreck NATO. Chancellor asked we not forget merits general controlled disarmament which only real framework security and to which Khrushchev possibly receptive because he concerned with promotion his economic program requiring reduction armament expenditures.

In reply, Secretary stressed hope maintain same close relations with Chancellor as formerly the case with Dulles. Proposed we exchange data on Soviet treaty violations (Chancellor handed over his report to Merchant).⁶ Said we very conscious Soviet economic growth and informed Chancellor certain points discussion with Mikoyan⁷ which revealed latter’s inability reconcile statistics Soviet agricultural labor requirements and productivity with high hopes of Soviet Government in economic field.

Secretary discussed British Trade Mission Moscow and credit terms to Soviets envisaged by United Kingdom Government.⁸ He said we had made strong representations to British on this point. Van Scherpenberg here stated he had that same morning called in British Ambassador and has expressed strong German reservations. Secretary said it seemed French had not done so, and Von Brentano appeared [take] note of this.

With regard to package proposals and Berlin, Secretary said we had no desire undermine present legal basis our rights. Possibly some additional elements might be superimposed, but on no account substituted for present basis our rights, which must not be impaired. We believe British now convinced soundness this position.

Turning to British position generally, Secretary said he would not comment beyond saying he believed we had reached complete agreement that none of three powers would make any unilateral proposals without previous agreement, and consultation with Federal Government.

Final comment by Secretary concerned Algeria and fact we disturbed because we had reservations with regard present course events and how things would work out. French had tried commit us and NATO to support their policy Algeria and North Africa. Our analysis factors Algerian problem and trend nationalist sentiment in world, together with traditional United States sympathy aspiration peoples to independence combined create reservations as to wisdom present French course action, though we had officially abstained from injecting ourselves in problem which treated by United Nations as internal French problem in spite its manifest international implications. Secretary asked if Algeria discussed recently with French and if so was it among points on which complete agreement existed with Federal Government. Chancellor and Von Brentano stated no word was said about Algeria in recent talks with French. Chancellor added de Gaulle had brought up subject privately with him at Marly during Chancellor’s Paris visit⁹ and had spoken optimistically as to outcome, because of development FrancoMoroccan relations; but had not discussed NATO [Algeria?].

Secretary said Debre, probably speaking for de Gaulle, had told him France could not approve armament 9 United States squadrons each of 25 planes unless we changed our position and agreed on certain things with French.¹⁰ Secretary said he had told Debre he could see no link between these problems. French attitude this respect had been surprise and created difficulties for us. Chancellor said French had said nothing of all this to him.

Secretary concluded by assuring Chancellor our awareness complexity and urgency Berlin problem, and need not to lose sight of Berlin if “package” had to be untied. He added he appreciated Chancellor’s words with regard United States position on reunification.

Chancellor said he hoped we would exact as high a price as possible for summit meeting and give nothing away. He thought Macmillan was being too generous in offering Soviets two hundred fifty million pounds in credits and summit conference for nothing.

Bruce

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1343. Secret; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to Geneva, London, Paris, and Moscow.
1. A memorandum of the conversation, US/MC/unn., which is almost identical with the record transmitted here, is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. During the quadripartite Foreign Ministers meeting at Paris, April 29–30, Herter had arranged to see the Chancellor before going to Geneva. Herter departed Washington on May 8 and arrived at Bonn shortly after noon on May 9 for this meeting at 1:15 p.m. with the Chancellor. Following the meeting Herter flew to Geneva.
2. For documentation on Adenauer’s visit to the Soviet Union in September 1955, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. V, pp. 573 ff.
3. Mikoyan visited Bonn April 23–26, 1958.
4. See Document 286.
5. See Document 287.
6. Not found.
7. Documentation on Mikoyan’s discussions in the United States in January on economic matters is in volume X, Part 1.
8. It was announced in April that a British Trade Mission headed by Sir David Eccles, President of the Board of Trade, would visit the Soviet Union. Eccles arrived in Moscow on May 13 and a 5-year trade agreement was signed on May 24.
9. See Document 203.
10. A memorandum of Herter’s conversation with debré on May 1 is printed in vol. VII, Part 2, Document 109.