Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

260. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, April 11, 1959, 2 p.m.

2283. London for Hillenbrand. All reasons for Adenauer’s decision seek presidency¹ and for timing his action, and their relative importance can probably never be determined.

Macmillan’s trip Moscow gave Adenauer deep concern from start. To him fact of trip itself, quite apart from any results it might have, constituted dangerous and totally unnecessary step, which could only be interpreted by Khrushchev as evidence significant disunity in Western camp. The substantive by-products of trip can only have confirmed Adenauer’s fears and justified his apprehensions. That Macmillan and Khrushchev should have agreed officially explore further some form alteration of existing military and security arrangements Central Europe, undoubtedly added to his resentment and gloom.

Secretary Dulles’ visit to Bonn early February² was closely followed by announcement his illness. It not difficult imagine how deeply Chancellor must have been affected by possibility his relationship with Secretary Dulles which was epitome close collaboration and common policy with US, might now be coming to end. It would, in our view, be wrong underestimate effect upon Chancellor’s outlook on future, of coincidence of Secretary’s illness with what to him seemed to be venomous fruits of Macmillan’s trip Moscow and, in fact, of his overall posture thereafter.

Whether, and if so, to what extent Chancellor has formed impression of trend toward general abandonment basic positions held by West, and by him and Secretary Dulles in particular, we will probably never know. By “basic position” the Chancellor naturally means his own views on any subject, at heart of which lies his unshakeable conviction nothing must be allowed threaten presence US forces Germany. We know he has long felt there is practically nothing argue about as to what constitutes right and proper attitude of West toward the Soviet Union, and that all discussions such concepts as “flexibility” are to him not merely useless but pernicious. It not unreasonable suppose that in light his own convictions and suspicious nature, the Chancellor may have become increasingly fearful that West on way down slippery slope dangerous concessions under pressure from the Soviet Union.

In view of Chancellor’s political record and public comportment would doubtless be mistake attribute excessive weight to effect personal attacks upon him as one remaining obstacle to possibility reasonable accommodation Soviet Union. However he is in certain respects curiously and intensely emotional human being. While he has always publicly welcomed and prided himself upon Soviet attacks against him when Secretary Dulles was similar target, would be rash suppose his temperamental robustness has not been somewhat impaired of late by addition the British press onslaught of last few weeks at time when he no longer so sure US standing rock-like beside him. We feel that prominence he gave in his public address on April 8³ to Anglo-German relations indicative that he deeply troubled by this matter.

We do not know how Chancellor assessed implications recent discussions Washington, to what extent von Brentano’s report to him may have increased his doubts, and weighed on his mind at time when he was considering decision which he finally took that same day. However we feel one cannot reasonably exclude possibility that combination, or the mere culmination, of factors broadly discussed above may have played role precipitating his decision, at least at time and in form in which it was taken.

By virtue of very nature Adenauer’s reasoning as analyzed above, Chancellor would not wish to reveal it to public, and line given out by his closest advisers and picked up by all CDU naturally puts total emphasis on domestic political aspects his action. Furthermore, internal problems succession and continuity have undoubtedly been increasingly weighing upon Adenauer, and certainly uppermost in thoughts his closest advisers and friends. How decision, and events expected flow from it, are viewed politically in FedRep are discussed below without further reference to private worries of Chancellor which stemmed mostly from external sources.

It certainly not Adenauer’s intention leave helm during period conferences ahead and we have found no CDU politicians who sense any defeatism or resignation in Chancellor or in his party as result his action. Rather we and other observers find throughout CDU elation that good solution worrisome problem transition with which grim fact of Adenauer’s age faces party, has now been found. CDU believes Chancellor determined and politically able maintain his policies through critical months ahead, and has now taken steps which he hopes will assure their continuance for years and will promote future election prospects party and his chosen successor as Chancellor.

Problems leadership transition and policy continuity after Adenauer have long troubled CDU leaders and have, to our knowledge, been active in Chancellor’s mind at least for past three or four months as approaching end Heuss’ term⁴ presents opportunity do something about them. Chancellor’s tentative move January make Krone President was taken with these problems in mind, and in subsequent search for another candidate succession to Chancellorship has been first consideration. Chancellor’s closest party advisers have become convinced would be vastly preferable for Adenauer use his prestige and authority to direct changeover than have it settled in free-for-all under uncertain future circumstances. Globke and Krone have pressed these considerations on Chancellor, building up potential powers presidency and pointing out to him that despite his extraordinary vigor, he will increasingly have to save energies for great issues only, and forcing him consider that even he could not be sure leading 1961 campaign, as he wished to do, at 85. In this connection there are reports Adenauer’s family, physician, and close personal friends such as Pferdmenges have for some time been urging him consider giving up Chancellorship in order spare himself. With presidential elections set for July 1, Adenauer had to act before mid-June at latest, and meeting party committee to seek presidential candidate had been called for April 7.

Furthermore, present state international affairs certainly tends convince Adenauer his foreign policy can only be continued by one wholly dedicated to it. Although Economics Minister Erhard’s claims to succession have been steadily growing stronger, Adenauer’s preference is for Finance Minister Etzel. Present offers best chance make Etzel, who for years has been active supporter European integration, Chancellor and to have time build up his popularity and prestige to point where he can lead and win 1961 elections in order to stay in. Etzel’s name, highly respected in political circles but little known popularly, now frequently mentioned in press and parties; many CDU deputies have gone out their way to praise him to us as next Chancellor.

As regards implications and consequences of change, situation can perhaps be best summed up in phrase: “We are not in end but in beginning of end of Adenauer era”. Nature of German policy for next two years—(until 1961 elections) will to large extent depend on who succeeds Adenauer as Chancellor next September. This question already the big issue in Bonn political circles especially among CDU/CSU deputies, and there is general agreement that either Etzel or Erhard will be next Chancellor. To some extent Adenauer is gambling. Deputies will be aware that their future election will not depend on Adenauer and his power over faction will be correspondingly lessened. Although as President Adenauer may make first proposal for new Chancellor it not certain he can then still command faction support.

When several weeks ago Chancellor tried shelve Erhard by pushing him into presidency, he was publicly overridden by CDU Bundestag faction and an unprecedented expression popular desire to keep Erhard in active politics. This rebuff was taken bitterly by Chancellor and is another element of discouragement which may have influenced his present decision. More importantly, incident is generally evaluated as a mandate for Erhard and his economic policies from general public and CDU Bundestag faction and is evidence that if Etzel wants chancellorship he may be able marshal overwhelming support against possible efforts by Adenauer to name another. It seems doubtful to us that Adenauer would risk such a showdown and we expect he will, therefore, have to reckon with Erhard in question of forming next government.

Under either Etzel or Erhard, strength of CDU dissidents (such as Gerstenmaier and Gradl, with their emphasis on greater tactical flexibility in seeking reunification) in Bundestag faction will probably increase to certain extent once Chancellor’s personal control of CDU removed when he assumes presidency. If Etzel becomes Chancellor, we may expect continuation basic elements Chancellor’s policies; and in period before next election unlikely that CDU dissidents would bring about any significant alterations foreign policy. If Erhard becomes Chancellor there might be some change—most notably there would probably be less emphasis on European integration, Common Market and special alignment with France than under Adenauer. Furthermore, Erhard’s good friend Gerstenmaier may have more influence foreign affairs. Under either Etzel or Erhard FedRep’s close relations with and reliance on US and its firm support of NATO should remain unchanged. It worth emphasizing that CDU headed not only by Adenauer but by great number strong men who broadly share his views and that an important element of Adenauer’s power has been popularity his policies. There accordingly little reason expect any upheaval FedRep’s policies. Over longer run those who advocate greater flexibility may gain influence but they will have to fight for it.

Adenauer may also have been oversold on powers presidency. Legally they very limited indeed and real power rests in chancellorship. If Adenauer’s man in that job then potential considerable but with an opponent as Chancellor, President is hamstrung. Adenauer may be shocked to see how fast his star falls once real power out of his hand and others run cabinet, Bundestag faction and party. However, would be misleading underestimate Adenauer’s cleverness, and by appeals to public, personal influence and use of representative nature of office to deal with foreign powers he might make it very influential position. It will certainly be different from situation under Heuss.

At present stage feel following conclusions justified:

1. Adenauer seems sure be elected President July. His enemies are so delighted see him leave office Chancellor and probably fearful that he might remain Chancellor if defeated as President, that many may vote for him as enthusiastically as his friends: (Carlo Schmid as SPD opponent has already quipped that he will vote for Adenauer.)

2. Regardless either Chancellor’s or party’s motives prior event, decision will probably make transition from Adenauer to CDU successor smoother than confused results his sudden death while in office Chancellor would have permitted.

3. We have assumed on basis evidence presently available that Chancellor prefers Etzel as his successor. We know Erhard has many supporters for job including very active Gerstenmaier busily promoting his own ambitions by pushing Erhard. If Erhard does not wish step aside to make things easy for Chancellor and Etzel, we can expect at least severe struggle within CDU in coming months which would not bode well for “smooth transition” from Chancellor to successor.

4. From now until September, however, Adenauer will be Chancellor and will probably have only slightly diminished control over foreign policy, specifically such matters as instructing working group representatives, Brentano, and FedRep observer at Foreign Ministers and possibly summit meetings, and we see in present circumstances no reason for him to be less rigid than previously.

5. It seems most unrealistic for US assume that Adenauer, after becoming President and surrendering leadership party (required by constitution) will have anywhere near power and influence which he has today or even that amount which his supporters now claim he will have.

6. Although there every indication that any responsible CDU successor will have same general outlook on relations to, and on position in, Western world of FedRep, we cannot count on there being no change. In effect, diverse groups within rather ill-disciplined German Foreign Office and vari-colored ideas which spring from them are but reflection in microcosm of nervous stirrings of politically and foreign affair-conscious non-socialist groups throughout country. Under Adenauer until very recently these people and such ideas which might in any way, in his opinion, conflict with or even distantly threaten his fundamental view of basis of FedRep’s security and rock-like policy for which he personally has always stood, have been ruthlessly squashed. No possible successor to Adenauer will wield such authority in such a way. What this may mean for our relations with FedRep under new Chancellor is that although we will continue to have staunch ally, we shall probably have less predictable one.

Bruce

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762A.13/4–1159. Secret; Priority; Noforn. Transmitted in three sections and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Rome, Berlin, and Vienna.
1. Adenauer announced his candidacy for President on April 7; for his account of the background to this decision, see Erinnerungen, pp. 489 ff. A shorter discussion of the party factors involved was transmitted in telegram 2251 from Bonn, April 9. (Ibid., 762A.13/4–959)
2. See Documents 165–169.
3. A copy of this address is in Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327.
4. President Heuss’ term was due to expire in September 1959.