Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

248. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

USDEL/MC/15

Washington, March 31, 1959.

TRIPARTITE-QUADRIPARTITE MEETINGS

SUBJECT

• Minutes of Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting of March 31, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The Acting Secretary
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Mr. Reinhardt
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Ambassador Burgess
  • Ambassador Bruce
  • Mr. Berding
  • Mr. Irwin
  • Mr. Knight
  • Mr. Hillenbrand
  • Mr. Timmons
  • Mr. McFarland
• France
  • Maurice Couve de Murville
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • Charles Lucet
  • Jean Laloy
  • Pierre Baraduc
  • Jacques de Beaumarchais
  • Jean-Claude Winckler
• UK
  • Selwyn Lloyd
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • Sir Frank Roberts
  • Lord Hood
  • Peter Hope
  • Anthony Rumbold
  • Patrick Hancock
  • Denis Laskey
  • John Drinkall
  • Donald Logan

The Acting Secretary opened the meeting by welcoming the British and French Foreign Ministers and their staffs. He declared that the two principal tasks of the meetings today and tomorrow would be to review the Working Group Report and to consider the responsibility of the three Foreign Ministers to report to the NATO Foreign Ministers on Contingency Planning. Contingency Planning had been the subject of much discussion. Ambassador Alphand yesterday had presented a new draft¹ which might be the subject of discussions here. There was the further problem of how to divide up the reports to be made to NATO. He asked if the other Foreign Ministers had any general remarks they wished to make.

When neither Couve nor Lloyd had indicated a desire to make such remarks the Acting Secretary said that perhaps it would be better if we start with the Contingency Planning paper to be sure we are all in agreement on the meaning of the words used and the reasoning behind them.

Couve referred to the 18 page Contingency Planning paper² considered by the Tripartite group in Washington (Deputy Under Secretary Murphy and the British and French Ambassadors) and noted that it was essential that we know what we want and what our policy is. It was a question of high and important policy. If our convoys are blocked enroute to Berlin, did we want to take action? If we want to start something then the paper must express our will to take action. He recognized that it was difficult to take a decision in advance of actual developments since we do not know exactly what our position may be at the time. The situation represents a test of our will. From that point of view the draft given us a week or two ago³ is not very clear. It says if our probe doesn’t succeed then we will suspend traffic and take certain steps which, however, will not prevent our continuing to be stopped.

He referred to paras. 9 and 10 of the contingency paper and said that we should change the wording to allow us freedom to act to restore our freedom of passage. This did not imply anything which would prevent us taking all necessary steps to inform public opinion or report to the UN. We shouldn’t say something in the paper which results in our suspending traffic and leaves us no way to resume it.

Mr. Lloyd commented that he had just seen the new wording. He agreed with the position of the French Gov’t as stated in January. He read from the French statement of that period. That statement was in complete accord with British views. The British position was still the same. If the new paper was not a departure from Alphand’s position in January the British agreed to it.

The Acting Secretary noted that Mr. Murphy had suggested changing “whether” to “when”. There was no US objection to the Alphand formula, assuming there is agreement among us all as to what it means.

Couve stated that the paper really means:

a. we want to maintain communications;

b. we will take all necessary measures to do so;

c. a final decision will be made on the foregoing basis and in accordance with existing circumstances.

Lloyd agreed with French statement.

The Acting Secretary said that we would like to see para. 9 left in.

Couve insisted that he did not like the statement in para. 9 that “allies will temporarily suspend traffic”.

The Acting Secretary agreed that the statement could be strengthened. Actually the military effect of suspension would not be important since our garrisons have plenty of supplies.

Lloyd noted that the wording looks like we are willingly accepting blockade. This, of course, was not so, but de facto we would be stopped while considering what to do next.

The Acting Secretary commented that this was understood. From a practical and military point of view, we would want to take time to get ready for future action rather than resort to shooting. We would be trying to get public opinion on our side while intensifying our military preparations. These courses of action go on independently.

Couve noted, however, that when suspension had been accepted, it became very hard to resume movement.

Lloyd asked if we needed to refer to suspension of traffic, and suggested that the phrase “will temporarily suspend traffic” be taken out. He asked Couve if this made the para, more palatable. Couve replied affirmatively. He then noted that if we go to the UN before taking action ourselves, we tie our hands. This was a very dangerous procedure.

Mr. Murphy remarked that there was nothing mandatory about going to the UN. Lloyd suggested inserting the phrase “One possibility is that . . . .” (matter could be taken to the UN). He did not in the least subscribe to the necessity of going to the UN. He didn’t like to contemplate that organization getting hold of our problems. He suggested language “perhaps to the General Assembly” …⁴ If we got a favorable vote (say 9 to 2) in the Security Council we might not find it necessary to go to the GA at all. It was not quite clear how para. 10 would read if changes to para. 9 were accepted.

Couve said it was difficult to know what to do until the time comes. It was much more difficult to take action later than on the spot. Whatever does happen will be only after a Summit Conference.

The Acting Secretary agreed. A first indication of failure will be when the Soviet Government signs a separate Peace Treaty with GDR.

Couve remarked that in any case we should make such advance preparations as we can.

Lloyd asked if he meant we should not exclude some immediate reaction? Did he feel we might be committing ourselves to endless talk? This was one thing which ought to be examined—how were we going to play out our hand?

Couve replied that the paper should provide that if our probe doesn’t succeed then the three Governments may take immediate action or act only after efforts to win over public opinion and such other intermediate steps as they may deem necessary.

Lloyd noted that the document had originally been drawn up with a May 27 deadline in mind. The situation was now somewhat different with a Foreign Ministers meeting and a Summit Conference in view which virtually everyone now regarded as inevitable. He did not wish to exclude other possibilities in the new situation.

The Acting Secretary noted that para 9 had been corrected as indicated.

Lloyd asked what the phrase in para 10 “further to” meant. Did it mean “further to 8”?

A general conference among individual delegations followed for several minutes. The Acting Secretary then resumed, raising the problem of the contingency planning report to NATO. There had been some study yesterday in our own group as to how much detail to go into with NATO in view of the very real interest of NATO in the whole matter. He noted that this was a very sensitive paper.

Lloyd declared that there were two possible ways to handle the paper, either on the basis that it was going to leak or that it wasn’t. He then made a special plea for keeping all conversations confidential if at all possible. Both the Acting Secretary and Couve agreed to the necessity for the tightest possible security measures. The Acting Secretary asked whether it was preferable not to have the report deposited in NATO.

Lloyd suggested depositing the report only with the Secretary General of NATO. The Acting Secretary suggested that with regard to taking the matter to the Council, it would be appropriate if either Lloyd or Couve made the presentation. Ambassador Bruce joined the meeting at this point.⁵ The report to the NATO Council should give some background, putting Soviet probes throughout the world in their proper context.

There was discussion at Mr. Lloyd’s initiative of the agenda of the NATO 10th anniversary meeting. It was noted that Berlin would be high on the agenda of the NATO Foreign Ministers, under the general heading of The International Situation in the Light of Current Developments.

It was decided that Mr. Lloyd would make one statement to the NATO Foreign Ministers and Couve the other, but the decision would be withheld until tomorrow as to which of the two Ministers would report on Contingency Planning and which on the Four Power Working Group agreed report.

The Acting Secretary then asked for reactions, if any, to the Soviet note. Lloyd declared that he had “reacted” to it three times at three different airports. He had said that it was satisfactory.

The Acting Secretary asked if the Soviet reply to the French note had been the same as given on the ticker. Couve replied affirmatively. The gist was that if everybody was a “good boy” everything would be all right. He handed the Acting Secretary a copy. The latter noted that the implication of the Soviet reply was that if the Foreign Ministers conference failed, there was all the more reason to have a Summit Conference. He then read aloud a brief draft statement to the press to be issued today by the three Foreign Ministers giving their reaction to the Soviet note. The statement was discussed and later agreed upon by the quadripartite meeting.⁶

Couve raised the question of participation of other countries. He noted that our last notes to the USSR had sought to exclude the Poles and Czechs from the Foreign Ministers meeting and had implied that if the Russians insisted on the Poles and Czechs participating, we obviously would want others, above all Italy to participate. He assumed therefore, that if the Russians insisted on Polish and Czech participation we would then insist on Italian participation.

The Acting Secretary noted that the Soviets would immediately counter with a demand that Rumania be included. Lloyd declared that the British view was that it would be best to have only the Four Powers with German advisers. If the Poles and Czechs attend as observers then Italy should be offered the same status and left to decide whether it wishes to accept If the Poles and Czechs attend as full members, we must have Italy even if it means bringing in Rumania.

The Acting Secretary noted that we had been approached also by the Dutch and the Belgians. Lloyd noted that this had been discussed last year with NATO which had agreed that Italy should be represented. The Italians said they are going to have IRBM’s and therefore ought to be represented. Couve noted that the Soviets already knew about Italy’s demands. Mr. Murphy stated that the Soviets didn’t seem to be pressing very hard. Lloyd remarked that perhaps we can all get off the hook. The Acting Secretary declared we should avoid a discussion again in NATO if we could. Couve remarked that this would be difficult to avoid in the NATO ministerial meeting.

The Acting Secretary asked if there was any further business to take up before the 4:45 meeting. Discussion of the wording of the statement to the press was resumed. Mr. Lloyd remarked that he hoped this would be the only “Pablum” for the press during the entire session. He asked for agreement that there not be a leak of every word to the press. The Acting Secretary remarked that a public posture of unity was one of the most essential points to be borne in mind. Lloyd didn’t want to tell anything to the press and Couve agreed. After conferring with Mr. Berding, the Acting Secretary remarked that he felt we should give the press something every day. It needn’t be substantive.

Lloyd returned to Contingency Planning. He wondered whether the para, beginning on middle of page 2 of the report to NATO⁷ with “A more crucial phase” was precisely consistent with the formulation on which there had been previous agreement? He was not quite clear as to what it meant. He asked if the reference to limited military force referred to the “Scout Car” concept (i.e. a probe with one or more lightly armored vehicles). Mr. Irwin replied that the Scout Car concept or other means might be inferred. Lloyd agreed that the Soviets (and/or GDR) must be put in the position where they have to shoot to stop us. But he did not agree to sending tanks after Scout Cars. The para, was not clear. The Acting Secretary explained that if the Soviets (GDR) closed the barrier we would open it and attempt to go through. Lloyd agreed that this interpretation was acceptable. He then referred to the question of flights over 10,000 feet. He understood the US had sent in a flight several days ago at 25,000 feet to assert our right of passage at that altitude.⁸ He understood that it had been accompanied by Soviet fighters. Was there an intention to make such flights again?

The Acting Secretary gave some background on the question. We had voluntarily refrained from flights over 10,000 feet. The Soviets have said flights over 10,000 feet are made at our own risk. When it came to planning a garrison airlift the Air Force had noted that the types of planes to be used needed to fly over 10,000 feet for maximum operating efficiency. The Air Force wanted to establish this as normal procedure, not tied exclusively to a garrison airlift. The need to fly over 10,000 feet was based on the characteristics of individual planes. Planes of other countries are flying above 10,000 with impunity.

He noted that Soviet fighters had flown within ten feet of our C–130 and that we had protested this dangerous practice.⁹ We had planned to make another such flight today. Mr. Irwin (Defense) noted that we planned to continue such flights but only under conditions of unlimited visibility.

Lloyd expressed his feeling about our preparatory measures by wondering aloud whether they shouldn’t have been cleared with our Allies. Now our right had been asserted, what was the point of going on? We have been trying to put the Soviets on the spot in negotiations. Were we now trying to create an incident which would make negotiations impossible? We have had a position of being reasonable people. Do we want to provoke an incident possibly resulting in a fatal accident? We wouldn’t want to go to a meeting if American flyers had just been killed. He was not questioning either our right to fly or to assert this right. We had accomplished this, however.

The Acting Secretary declared that he appreciated having Mr. Lloyd’s views and declared that the question was under consideration here. Couve asked about the Soviet reply to our protest in BASC. The Acting Secretary replied that the Soviets had said we had no right to fly over 10,000 feet. Couve asked if this was a military cargo plane. Would garrison airlift planes have to fly over 10,000 feet? The Acting Secretary replied affirmatively. Lloyd remarked that there may be a genuine accident but it would automatically become an incident. The Acting Secretary stated that we felt the introduction of new planes was a valid reason to make the flights. Mr. Murphy noted that the provocation was on the other side.

Couve replied that if you don’t go on you accept the Soviet position that you have no right to do so. Mr. Murphy asked if Mr. Lloyd would feel better if we sent fighter escort with planes. Lloyd replied that he did not understand the purpose of continuing the exercise. Did we want an incident or didn’t we? He thought it unwise but it is for the US to decide.

The meeting ended at 4:35.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McFarland and approved by Herter on April 15. The meeting was held at the Department of State. A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 2307, April 1. (Ibid., CF 1226)
1. See footnote 2, Document 247.
2. Not found. The agreed contingency planning paper is printed as Document 255.
3. Presumably the draft referred to in footnote 2 above.
4. Ellipses in the source text.
5. Bruce, who was in the United States March 29–April 7 for consultations, met with the President from 2:47 to 3:27 p.m. In his diary Bruce noted that the President “affirmed his belief that the determination to use nuclear power, if necessary, to maintain our position there [in Berlin], was the best way to influence the Soviets to be reasonable.” (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327)
6. For text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 639–440.
7. A copy of this four-page report, April 1, which traced contingency planning since November 1958, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1227.
8. The flight had been made on March 27. On April 4 the Soviet Union protested the use of the air corridor above 10,000 feet and on April 13 the United States rejected the protest. For texts of the Soviet note and the U.S. response, see Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1959, pp. 632–633. Additional documentation on the flight is in Department of State, Central File 762B.5411.
9. A copy of the protest, made on March 28, was transmitted in telegram 2160 from Bonn, March 28. (Ibid., 762B.5411/3–2859)