Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

243. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, March 24, 1959, 6 p.m.

2119. Paris pass USRO.

1. Saw Chancellor today. He told me Ambassador Steel had on March 17 discussed with von Brentano certain points I had raised with Steel re my meeting Adenauer March 13, and latter’s report on his private conversations with Macmillan (Embtel 2024).¹ I had been particularly interested in attempting to ascertain from Steel whether PM had in fact committed himself to (1) maintenance status quo for five years as condition precedent to summit; (2) accord summit meetings might be in stages, interspersed with FonMin and expert conferences.

2. Steel had asked London for official British FonOff transcript or memorandum on Bonn talks.

3. Memo dated March 15 had been sent by London to Chancellor, and he read it to me in its entirety. Part pertinent to questions I posed Steel were that FonOff believed understanding had been reached: a) West should seek agreement, possibly through diplomatic channels, that Soviet would not take unilateral action while conferences in progress; b) a summit meeting could lead to other summit meeting as long as no unilateral action taken by Soviets; c) Macmillan felt Soviets would never agree to five year standstill.

4. Chancellor has given instructions to tell British FonOff this memo does not properly correspond with conversations he had privately held with PM (it was evident according Adenauer, PM had not adequately informed FonOff details these talks).

5. Chancellor then read me memo prepared from his own interpreter’s notes. During my talk with him on May 13 he had spoken without notes, but there was no substantial difference between what he had then said and his exposition today, except memo disclosed that he, in conversation with PM, had stressed opposition to conferences in face of ultimatum, which would continue to exist unless stipulated that standstill had been assented to by Soviets. Such standstill period should not be limited merely to period covered by conferences, but could extend as long as five years. (Chancellor said he had conceived this idea while conferring with PM.)

Summit meeting, Adenauer told PM, has been Soviet objective for years, and would represent considerable internal success for Khrushchev.

West should not again make mistake of accepting Soviet wishes without exacting suitable counterconcessions.

6. PM had told Adenauer he considered these points constructively made, and would give them serious consideration.

7. Another subject discussed, that Chancellor had not previously mentioned to me, was British-German relations. In this connection PM dwelt on FTA troubles.

8. At conclusion above, I told Chancellor I had clearly understood during our previous interview that he believed he had obtained commitment from PM on proposals for five-year standstill and summit in stages. He was disinclined to answer this and replied with the one word “no”.

Adenauer then developed what he called part II of his conversation with me.

1. From press accounts of what had transpired at Camp David British had suggested certain freeze of military force on either side Iron Curtain. These contingents already having nuclear weapons would keep them! Those not having them would not get them.

Chancellor had asked his Ambassador Washington to see Acting Secretary and Merchant to advise him what had really taken place but so far had no answer.

2. Reports from his London Embassy had described PM as having, according to British press, achieved great triumph in bringing UK influence to bear on world policy.

3. Chancellor doubts whether US has agreed to freeze. Hopes not. Subject was never mentioned during PM Bonn visit. Has instructed Ambassador von Herwarth to ask British Foreign Office exactly what were PM’s proposals this matter on Washington trip.

4. Under no circumstances, Adenauer emphatically declared, will FedRep Govt agree to any such scheme. Proposition of this kind is senseless and would mean end of NATO. FedRep could not accept deal whereby its forces not equipped with nuclear weapons while others had them. I should at once convey such a message to Acting SecState.

5. Chancellor pessimistically remarked that it seemed to him Western powers were divided as to policy and heading for trouble. Said he had conferred yesterday with Ollenhauer, Carlo Schmid and Erler; even Erler was disturbed over position taken by Brit Govt.

6. No question whatever Adenauer thoroughly disturbed and aroused over what he considers most serious dangers freeze idea.

Bruce

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–2459. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, and Vienna.
1. See footnote 1, Document 219.