Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

239. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

MVW USDEL MC/15

Camp David, March 21, 1959, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• German Reunification and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The President
  • The Acting Secretary
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Mr. Reinhardt
  • Ambassador Whitney
  • General Goodpaster
• UK
  • Prime Minister Macmillan
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
  • Sir Patrick Dean
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • Sir Norman Brook

There was some discussion of the plan being developed by the Working Group in Paris as well as the “personal” proposal which Ambassador Grewe had just put before the Working Group.¹ The President expressed himself in favor of the East-West study group envisaged in the American plan and was very emphatic on the impossibility of using the term “confederation” at this stage of any negotiation. It was noted that although the Grewe plan made a concession to the Soviet demand for direct negotiations between East and West Germans, it nevertheless had a built-in condition involving the reestablishment of civil liberties and human rights in the Eastern zone which would make it quite unacceptable to the communists.

Adverting to Berlin, the Prime Minister said that according to the French there were two ways to set about getting a settlement. The one was to take existing rights and make agreed adjustments to them such as establishing the “agency” plan. The other method would be to negotiate a new title to Berlin, possibly with United Nations participation. In this connection, the attitude of the Chancellor with respect to de facto recognition was of great importance. Mr. Murphy observed that the Chancellor’s reported new position on recognition should open the door to a Soviet concession on the agency issue. The Prime Minister thought that in the short-term the simplest thing might be to follow the first method but that in the long-term the position of the West would be better preserved by a new comprehensive agreement.

The President noted that the basic Soviet objective was to get rid of Berlin. He said we had sent some people over to take a look on the ground at exactly how the road, air and rail communications to Berlin looked. So far the morale in the city was good and there were weaknesses in the Soviet position that might tend to make them want to negotiate. Nevertheless, there were more than 300,000 Soviet troops surrounding the city and if we made Berlin a free city, it would be easier for the Russians to violate it than in the present situation. The Prime Minister said the object was not to weaken but to strengthen Berlin.

The President said he would have no objection to our beginning our negotiations on a broad concept for German settlement, but that the immediate objective was to get a “breathing space” and a respectable agreement for the next few years. Perhaps we should not talk too much about what East and West Germany were going to do. What we must find was the best formula to maintain the status quo and give the Soviet Union the necessary face-saving.

The Prime Minister said that everyone was in favor of reunification in principle but the curious situation was that nobody wanted it now, neither the Russians, Adenauer nor the French. (Though he did not say so, he left the clear implication that Britain too did not want it.) Therefore, he concluded, a de facto approach seemed the only feasible one. The President pointed out that when we went to Geneva, we had also been aware of the dangers inherent in the reunification of Germany. Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar thought that if one were to have a long breathing spell, then the problem was to get a settlement for Berlin.

United Nations

The Acting Secretary mentioned the United Nations aspect of the Berlin problem and the possibility of taking the issue to the International Court of Justice. He said the Department’s Legal Adviser thought this might be a very useful exercise. Mr. Lloyd observed that on the contrary the Foreign Office Legal Adviser thought we would lose on such a submission. Mr. Lloyd said he had also raised the question with Mr. Gromyko but had gotten no reaction. As far as the United Nations was concerned, Mr. Lloyd thought it best to go to the United Nations after the Russians had taken some overt action. The Acting Secretary thought that we were pretty much in agreement as to how the United Nations could best be used.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214. Top Secret. Drafted by Reinhardt. The meeting was held at Aspen Lodge. For other accounts of this conversation, see the source note, Document 238.
1. “Grewe’s Plan” had been tabled on March 19 and involved a declaration by West Germany that it would begin discussion with East Germany on reunification and an all-German government if the East German authorities restored human and political rights in East Germany. (Telegram 3462 from Paris, March 19; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/3–1959)