Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

237. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

MVW USDEL MC/12

Camp David, March 20, 1959, 6:30–7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Reply to Soviet Note of March 2

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Prime Minister
• The Acting Secretary
• Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
• Ambassador Whitney
• Sir Norman Brook
• Mr. Merchant
• Sir Derick Hoyer-Millar

At the conclusion of a prolonged discussion between the Prime Minister and the President (with advisers present) on the form of our reply to the Soviet note, the meeting broke up at 4:40 p.m.,¹ with the President and the Prime Minister leaving for a drive.² They agreed to return at 6:30 to consider the matter further and suggested that Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Herter continue the discussion.

After a short recess Mr. Herter, Ambassador Whitney and myself met with Mr. Lloyd, Sir Norman Brook and Sir Derick Hoyer-Millar. Each side had in the interval prepared a redraft³ of the Summit language. We were unable to reach agreement.

Upon the return of the President and the Prime Minister from their drive the lack of progress was reported and the Prime Minister retired to draft personally the passage dealing with a Summit conference and agenda. When this draft was ready the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister (with advisers) resumed. The Prime Minister became exceedingly emotional. He said that we were dealing with a matter which in his judgment affected the whole future of mankind. He said that: “World War I—the war which nobody wanted—came because of the failure of the leaders at that time to meet at the Summit. Grey⁴ instead had gone fishing and the war came in which the UK lost two million young men.”

The President interjected that there had been meetings at the Summit before the outbreak of World War II and that those meetings had not prevented that war.

The Prime Minister rejoined that at that time “we were dealing with a mad man—Hitler.”

The Prime Minister continued that he could not take his people into war without trying the Summit first. If war was to result there was much that he must do. They had no civil defense worthy of the name and this must be rectified. They must mobilize and disperse a substantial part of their people to Australia and Canada. Eight bombs, the Prime Minister said, would mean 20 or 30 million Englishmen dead. Throughout the discussion he kept repeating this reference to eight bombs.

The President said in effect that we cannot consider these problems exclusively in these terms. What we must consider is the alternative of surrendering to blackmail. He reminded the Prime Minister that we would not be immune to punishment. In fact he said that the lowest level of casualties he had seen estimated in event of an all-out thermonuclear attack on this country was 67 million. He emphasized that we don’t escape war by surrendering on the installment plan, that the way to prevent war is by willingness to take the risk of standing on ground which is firm and right.

The President then went on to say that he would not “be dragooned to a Summit meeting.” He said that if there was even slight progress at the Foreign Ministers meeting then he would go but that he would not commit himself now to go under any and all circumstances.

Mr. Herter pointed out at this juncture that in the event the Foreign Ministers broke up in total failure we would obviously consider all remaining possibilities for further negotiation including a Summit meeting which might be held in the Security Council.

The Prime Minister reverted to his highly emotional mood saying that he was an old man and that he owed a duty to his people; that this question of agreement now to a Summit meeting was probably the most fateful decision he would ever have to take; that he must sleep on the matter and that he was not prepared to discuss it further that night.

The group then at 7:30 went to the table for dinner and there was no further substantive discussion that evening.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant. The meeting was held at Aspen Lodge. For the President’s account of this conversation, see Waging Peace, pp. 354—355.
1. See Document 236.
2. For the Prime Minister’s account of the conversation with President Eisenhower during their drive to Gettysburg, see Riding the Storm, p. 645.
3. None of the drafts mentioned here has been found.
4. Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary.