233. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Acting Secretary of State Herter0
Washington,
March 19,
1959.
We asked Bob Bowie1 down on Wednesday2 to give us his views on Berlin and Germany. I thought you might be interested in a brief summary.
I. Berlin
- 1.
- To preserve our position in Berlin, we must be prepared to use whatever force is necessary—to and including general war. There is a good chance that force will be required; at least, we must act on this assumption.
- 2.
- We should, therefore, draw the issue in terms which will seem, to our own people and our allies, to warrant the use of force. This means not drawing the issue in terms of substitution of GDR for Soviet officials. Such a position will command neither allied nor domestic support, but rather cloud the essential issue: our free access to Berlin.
- 3.
- To avoid making our acceptance of GDR officials seem like a backdown, we should begin now to de-emphasize this issue, emphasizing that the GDR are Soviet puppets and that we hold the Soviets responsible for their actions. This will no more involve GDR recognition that our dealings with ChiComs involve their recognition. We should stress that physical interference is the real sticking point rather than who carries it out.
- 4.
- If GDR officials proceed to
increased restriction on our traffic, we should:
- (a)
- Suspend surface military movement to Berlin, and keep flying in essential garrison supplies without calling it an airlift.
- (b)
- If our planes are interfered with, resort to whatever military action is necessary to maintain access.
- (c)
- At some point, be prepared to apply countermeasures elsewhere (e.g., mining the Dardanelles).
- (d)
- If these actions do not maintain our access, resort to a large-scale ground operation designed to seize and maintain control of the autobahn, recognizing that this is very likely to lead to general war (and being prepared to go to general war rather than accept a local defeat).
- 5.
- To create maximum deterrence we should now repeat the firm note struck in the President’s speech in a Congressional resolution and drop any pretense of business as usual in our military posture. This is the most serious crisis since World War II and we should act accordingly.
II. Germany and Europe
- 6.
- We should make a respectable offer to the USSR on unity, but we should recognize that it will probably be turned down and we should not allow the Soviets to fuzz that turn-down by ourselves agreeing to any loose confederal relation between the two Germanies.
- 7.
- In the European security field, we should not agree to restrictions which would weaken Germany’s attachment to the West, by making it look as though the US and USSR were ganging up on the Federal Republic
- 8.
- We should try to use the present crisis to promote European unity. We might make a bold proposal to this end, e.g., US assistance in the creation of genuinely integrated missile-nuclear strategic capability controlled by WEU or the Community of Six.
III. Questions
- 1.
- Asked if substitution would not be the first step on a slippery slope: We are on that slippery slope already, since the GDR now controls civilian traffic, and could take action against it at any time.
- 2.
- Asked if it would not be very difficult to get support for resisting any minor increase in present traffic procedures: The principle involved (that of physical interference with free access) could be made convincing here, as it could not be made convincing on substitution.
- 3.
- Asked if it would not be useful to hold on to the substitution issue for bargaining purposes: On the contrary, this would make its eventual concession a symbol of weakness. The sooner we got rid of this issue, the better position we would be to threaten force convincingly on the issue of no increased interference. If then there was no interference after the turn-over, our firmness would have seemed to pay off. Whereas, if we entered the turn-over period with a concession (having held to “no substitution” right up to the turn-over), the Soviets would be encouraged to press on, as they would not if we now started to play down this question.
- 4.
- Asked about “disengagement”: Mutual withdrawals would not reduce the danger and might increase it.
- 5.
- Asked about a separate GDR treaty: He did not think this would do such damage to our position in Germany that we should make any significant concessions to the Soviets to avoid it.
- 6.
- In further discussion, Bob repeated this basic point: We must be prepared to face up to general war, recognizing that it may well come to that. All the more reason, he thought, to draw the issue with great care, to make our firmness clear from the very start, and to exhaust every military measure before proceeding to general war.