Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

222. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, March 14, 1959, 5:45–6:30 p.m.

The Secretary discussed with Governor Herter and Mr. Merchant on Saturday afternoon¹ the U.S. posture vis-à-vis a Summit meeting. He said that he had expressed to the President the previous afternoon² the thought that it is dangerous to gamble on Khrushchev, even at a Summit meeting, agreeing to anything that we could safely accept, and sticking to it. The Secretary said he had not been able to think of any matter on which Khrushchev would be prepared to deal reliably with us; he had recalled to the President the Soviet perfidy following the 1955 Summit meeting, when the Soviets had made an arrangement with the GDR³ even before the Foreign Ministers met, which arrangement effectively precluded the possibility of the Foreign Ministers carrying out the directive of the Heads of Government on German reunification. The Secretary thought that if we do get to a Summit meeting we might ask Khrushchev at the outset whether he is now prepared to stand by the 1955 agreement,⁴ and point out that unless he is so prepared there is no point in seeking to negotiate any further agreement.

The Secretary had also expressed to the President the thought that another danger of getting to the Summit is that public pressure will be very great for some kind of “agreement” however illusory. He thought it might be worth trying to find out through the Diplomatic channel, if not at a Foreign Ministers meeting, whether there is any prospect of positive accomplishment at the Summit, before we agree to go there. It might also be worth considering having the Foreign Ministers and their Deputies discuss the German problem at length, as the Deputies discussed the Austrian problem. In this connection, Governor Herter reported Adenauer’s idea of a five year moratorium in return for a Summit meeting (Bonn telegram 2024).⁵

The Secretary said that as far as the British are concerned he has no objection to Macmillan getting whatever political advantage he can at home out of the form of a “leadership” of the West, as long as we continue to control the substance of the Western position.

The Secretary said he had also told the President he thought it undesirable to let the public think that we are on the verge of war over Berlin: we are not, and if people think we are they will want the leaders to pull back from the determined positions that are essential to preserving peace. The United States has ample physical power to deter the Soviets from starting a war and must have the will and steadiness and skill to use this asset effectively. As to Berlin, our position is legally and morally unassailable, so we need not give up any of it to the Soviets except as we may get a broader settlement which meets the aspirations of the German people and the requirements of security in Europe.

JG

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/3–1459. Secret. Drafted by Greene. The conversation was held at Walter Reed Hospital.
1. March 14.
2. The President visited Dulles from 2:45 to 3:13 p.m. on March 13. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Daily Appointments Book)
3. Regarding Soviet-GDR agreements signed at Moscow On September 20, 1955, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXVI, pp. 537–538.
4. For text of the Heads of Government directive to their Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955, see ibid., vol. V, pp. 527–528.
5. See footnote 1, Document 219.