159. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Prime Minister Macmillan0
At the suggestion of the Ambassador, I referred to stories indicating that the Prime Minister’s projected trip to Moscow had been discussed in advance with me and approved by me. I said I thought that it was undesirable that his statement to the House should contain such implications since, as he knew, I had considerable reservations about the wisdom of the trip at this time. Also it would create embarrassments with our other allies. The Prime Minister said that he would merely state that we, with others, had been informed in advance and not indicate that we had been earlier informed in advance.1
[Page 323]With reference to the Berlin situation, I indicated that the program of contingency reaction which I had outlined represented in my opinion the most moderate program that the United States would find acceptable. I pointed out that it fell considerably short of what the Defense Department and the JCS had recommended. I said that if American public opinion got the impression that the Soviet Union had gained a considerable victory in Berlin as a result of pressures upon us by our allies, I thought the reaction on our European policy would be serious and it might affect our NATO posture.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1201. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles. The conversation was held at 10 Downing Street.↩
- For text of Macmillan’s statement to the House of Commons, February 5, see 599 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, cols. 577–578.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩