Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

144. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State⁰

London, January 26, 1959, 1 p.m.

3843. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Though we have not recently discussed with FonOff problem of para D Berlin contingency plan, it appears certain that Don Cook’s Jan 22 Herald Tribune story¹ based on deliberate “leak” from some Brit official, presumably following Alsop story from Washington and extreme British annoyance thereover (Paris 2694 to Dept and Embtel 3786).² Would also be our judgment that Cook story in fact very well summarizes present FonOff thinking on problem. Alsop and Cook stories already showing signs of generating attention and speculation British press and may even lead to questions in House of Commons, where Labour opposition seeking use every possible issue to needle govt in pre-election atmosphere now prevailing. Thus quite apart from question of useful information already given Soviets by Alsop and Cook stories, Labour may try and force HMG take public stand re surface use of force.

Dilemma U.S. faces re this problem also becoming increasingly clear. We agree fully with Dept’s view that most important to avoid having Soviets get impression or information (intelligence) that West would under anticipated circumstances immediately resort to airlift rather than try force issue on ground. [5 lines of source text not declassified] At same time, we doubt that British or French Govts (or also Germans when they are brought into discussions) are likely give us (or any other ally of theirs) advance commitment now to take specific course of action some months hence which might lead to world war III. Believe Brits likely continue insist on at least spelling out major lines of possible operational alternatives and having these vetted by military before considering giving advance commitment.

Further difficulty seems to be in presentation issue as clear cut “stoppage surface traffic” as suggested Deptel 2532 to Paris.³ Unless various Sov moves such as confronting us with different officials (GDR instead of Soviet), examining documents and other measures control overland passage to Berlin are recognized as stoppage, British seriously question whether their public opinion, or for that matter general Western European opinion can be brought to support “provocative” use of force by U.S. on ground, especially if Soviets set stage so we would have to shoot first. We would judge this British apprehension probably well founded, at least in terms public opinion as it seems at present. Question looms important what if anything can be done to educate and prepare opinion meanwhile re importance taking strong stand over “dealing with GDR”, something which even many Tory MP’s in Britain do not appear comprehend as yet.

Will appreciate any arguments Dept can send us to use re above points. Also trust that as soon as possible our military experts will be considering with British and French (and presumably Germans as well) not only specific details and implications of use of force on ground, but also airlift problems (including technical matter of possible Soviet interference with radar controls, and effort to persuade British that Berlin people would in fact be prepared tighten belts once again in case of crisis, on which latter point British officials here seem skeptical).

Do not believe present British reluctance over Berlin contingency planning should be taken as indication basic weakness or softness. For when chips down, we believe British Govt and people would show determination and firmness. But as we see it, what Macmillan govt now concerned about is their fear that we may be heading into situation where U.S. would be urging use force with public opinion split and possibly largely negative.

Above drafted prior receipt Deptel 6742,⁴ which will be helpful to us here. We anticipate that while British may concur point made reftel (re importance of impact on Sovs of evidence of our intention prosecute our rights of surface access), they will probably still raise other points mentioned above.

Barbour

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–2659. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.
1. Cook’s article in the European edition of the New York Herald Tribune, January 22, reviewed the differences between the United States and the United Kingdom on the use of ground force in Berlin.
2. Both dated January 22. Telegram 2694 reported that French Foreign Ministry officials deplored press speculation on Berlin. Telegram 3786 stated that the Foreign Office believed the Alsop story (see footnote 1, Document 139) was an “inspired leak,” a view that was shared by Macmillan, who “was not amused.” (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–2259)
3. Document 138.
4. Telegram 6742, January 23, informed the Embassy in London that the Department of State was transmitting summaries of the tripartite discussions on contingency planning. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–2359)