136. Memorandum of Conversation0

SUBJECT

  • U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

  • Anastas I. Mikoyan, Deputy Premier of the USSR
  • Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador
  • Oleg A. Troyanovski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR
  • Aleksandr Alekseevich Soldatov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR
  • John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
  • Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary
  • Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador to Moscow
  • Edward L. Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters; see volume X, Part 1, Document 63.]

The Secretary said that as a final point he felt he should not leave the Minister under any doubt about the Berlin situation. The Western Powers would not acquiesce in any Soviet turnover of responsibilities in the Eastern zone to the GDR. We had no way of physically compelling the Soviet Union to discharge what was referred to in the agreement of 1949 as the occupation, but our side could not be compelled to recognize the GDR as a substitute for the USSR.

Mikoyan said that the Soviets had, first of all, proposed a free city. If the proposal were accepted, with any observations and amendments suggested by us and with guarantees, this question would not arise. If the proposal did not lead anywhere they would have to carry through with their announced turnover. The Secretary said that, in this case, we would have to follow through with our announced intentions.

Mikoyan said he hoped that all this would not arise. The complications in the situation, however, depended upon us. If we prejudged the situation in advance and if nothing had changed about Berlin, the Soviets would be compelled to fulfill their commitment. They wanted no aggravation of the situation. They suggested that we consider corrections and amendments to their proposals. Adenauer apparently complicated matters as far as we were concerned and perhaps he could consider such corrections and amendments as well.

The Secretary said that he had been authorized by the United Kingdom and France to state that the United States attitude expressed by him was fully supported by them.

Mikoyan said this could all be reconsidered, but not here and now. He thought that the Secretary’s reference to the authorization of our Allies might have stemmed from some apprehension on the Secretary’s part that he had been leading them forward and that they had been hanging on his coattails.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1183. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Freers.