Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, January 9, 1959, 7:49 p.m.

1448. Murphy called in Grewe today in endeavor to stimulate German thinking re Berlin situation and related problems.¹ After explaining issues involved in current tripartite discussions on Point D proposed revision Contingency Plans,² former invited German views. In this connection Murphy noted that prevailing American thinking is that large scale airlift to supply entire civil population of Berlin not practicable under present circumstances. Grewe said response from Bonn would probably be in form of questions intended to elicit further information re relevant military facts. Murphy commented that essential point was to achieve adoption of basic principle to prosecute our right of land access by means at our disposal. If all details had to be decided in advance indefinite delay would result.

Murphy also raised hypothetical question of how Ambassador would respond to query from outsider as to why FedRep opposed to recognition East German regime. Grewe said that traditional answer his Government was that recognition of GDR would in effect legalize partition of Germany and thus create heavy political obstacle to reunification. If there were two recognized German states, only negotiation between two Governments with each exercising veto could provide road to reunification. As far as confederation idea concerned, Grewe added, it necessarily involved veto right on both sides and breakdown of effective government would be assured as long as regimes basically hostile to each other. Therefore in practice confederation would mean replacing Four Power responsibility with entity which could not operate effectively.

Murphy noted that overwhelming percentage of population East Germany would like to be consolidated with West on friendly not hostile basis. If this true, if there were only some way of getting two together, Soviets would inevitably be maneuvered out. Question was whether we were using enough imagination to achieve basic West German objective of consolidating Germany and at same time preserving general Western objectives. Western Governments should have a hard look to see if they were not missing a trick or two. Murphy said we were not clear as to Chancellor’s and Foreign Office’s thinking re possibility of working out mutually acceptable solution. We would be interested their views if possible before return of Mikoyan. Grewe said this of course raised basic issues. He was glad to note feeling that at least some re-appraisal of policy served useful purpose. He did not know whether anything would come out at end, but it was good to instigate Governments to do some thinking.

Grewe said he would pass Department basic study of traditional Germany policy towards GDR. There was some discussion of motives behind Grotewohl trip to Cairo at this time, and agreement that non-recognition policy at times tended to provide easy mechanism for use by Soviets in frustrating broader Western objectives.

Re Mikoyan aide-mémoire³ Grewe said that it appeared to indicate more clearly than ever that in Soviet opinion peace treaty would have to be signed by two Germanies. It gave impression Soviets desire discussion of peace treaty alone using Berlin as means of pressure in this direction. If crisis became more difficult it would be hard to oppose clamor of public opinion for such conference. Murphy commented that peace conference idea might be useful in giving Soviets way out of extreme Berlin demands.

Agreed talks would continue after Grewe had received word from Bonn.

Dulles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–959. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hillenbrand, cleared by Jandrey, and approved by Murphy.
1. No other record of this conversation has been found.
2. Regarding point D, see Document 98.
3. See footnote 3, Document 121.