Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

119. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, January 2, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Berlin Contingency Plans¹

PARTICIPANTS

• The Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
• Mr. R.W. Jackling, Counselor, British Embassy
• Mr. Livingston T. Merchant—EUR
• Mr. Foy D. Kohler—EUR
• Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand—GER

The British Minister, Lord Hood, called today at his request to ascertain, as he said, whether we had any thoughts as to where we go next on Point D of the American proposals for the revision of Berlin contingency plans.² He noted that he had a preview of the British position and it was not the same as that of the United States. Military advisers were on their way from Germany by air and would be arriving in Washington tonight. This raised the question of whether British and American representatives should get together again tomorrow bilaterally before the talks on Monday with the French begin. If so, it would be probably advisable to include some representatives from the Pentagon.

He went on to say that the British feel doubts about Point D on two grounds. As Mr. Merchant has told the British Ambassador the other night, the British understood that the United States preferred a land demonstration because it brought the issue to a head in a fashion that “could not be fudged”, i.e., in a way that would really test Soviet intentions. London on the other hand, felt it to be a mistake in the cold war type of exercise involved to put your opponent immediately up to the stark choice of war or surrender, and it would be a surrender if the Soviets permitted United States tanks to go through. London preferred not to bring the issue to a head at such an early stage.

Mr. Merchant commented that the only alternative to not bringing it to a head at this stage was either to impose a blockade on oneself or to accept GDR substitution for the Soviets at the check points, which the Allies agreed they would not do. To delay only ran the risk of bringing on a total blockade of the City. It was more or less accepted that an airlift covering the needs of the entire City was not possible now, as it had been in 1948. Hence, a blockade would quickly bring economic strangulation and panic to Berlin. We may realistically assume that the Soviets will probably be aware, at least in general, of the contingency instructions issued to our people in Berlin. Any impression that we are soft would merely encourage them to take the action which we must avoid. He, Mr. Merchant, was convinced that the best way to avoid the risk of war is to determine in advance that we are prepared to accept it. Mr. Kohler added that unless we are prepared to do this at the first test the risk of war would, in his opinion, be enhanced a great deal.

Lord Hood said that we obviously must think this through. It was not in London’s mind to accept a blockade. We could resort to an airlift and suspend land operations temporarily. This would give time to see what would develop and what should be our best move. After all, our objective in any event is to get the Soviets to a conference and to have some negotiations on Germany as a whole. If five tanks were to get through that would not prove anything. We would be faced with the same problem every day.

Mr. Merchant commented that we envisaged that a conference would come precisely out of this situation. We would welcome such a conference which would give the Soviets a chance privately to get off the hook. He was troubled by what the British were saying.

Lord Hood then added that the second British objection to Point D was that the Western Powers should not embark on a land probe unless prepared to push it through to its logical consequences. We could not simply draw back. As the American military people had explained to Admiral Denny, the first test would be made say by five tanks. If this failed, then a tank battalion would take over. If this were stopped, then the Allies must issue what amounted to an ultimatum. This would require the taking of many preliminary measures before the action could go ahead. He noted that the American military were in a higher state of readiness than the British. Moreover, all of the NATO Allies were involved, and the British wondered whether they would be willing to go to these lengths.

Mr. Kohler added that there seemed to be some confusion about the time element. We were talking about what would happen if a conference with the Soviets failed. Our position in Point D was implicit in what had been agreed in Paris. We had given much thought to this situation at first when the details of our own position were still unformulated. We had arrived at the conclusion that this decision was inevitable once peaceful settlement procedures had been exhausted. Mr. Jackling said the American position seemed to assume that no solutions would be available once the Soviets had turned over their controls at the check points to GDR representatives.

Mr. Merchant commented that we were over the cliff already if we could not get tripartite agreement to react when the Soviets applied force to get us out of Berlin. The sooner we knew we could not reach such a decision the better. Lord Hood said he did not know the processes of reasoning which had led London to come to its conclusions, if they could be called conclusions. Mr. Merchant said that he had had an opportunity in Paris to talk to the British Foreign Minister,³ who expressed concern over it being clearly established who fired the first shot on the confused situation on the Autobahn. He had made the point that, if an unarmed transport were shot down in the air corridor, the whole world would know who was the aggressor. Mr. Kohler said that, if we reviewed the statements already made, one would have to come to the conclusion that a public announcement had been made of a decision not completely taken. Mr. Merchant added that it was implicit in our entire posture to say that we would fight to stay in Berlin. Lord Hood commented that we were really not faced by this problem at the present time since the garrisons could be supplied by air. Mr. Jackling said that it appeared the only real difference between us and the British was that they felt we could still negotiate if we once got to the point where the GDR took over, whereas the United States seemed to feel that the negotiating possibilities would then be exhausted. Mr. Merchant said that if, in five months, we were unsuccessful in getting the Soviets to change their position how could negotiations at this point have any chance of being successful. Lord Hood agreed this was cogent, but asked what it was hoped to accomplish then. Did we really believe the American convoy would be permitted to pass through? Mr. Merchant said that we hoped and sincerely expected that, if our firmness was communicated to the Soviets privately, they would never turn their controls over to the GDR. The more confused and divided we were on this point the greater the danger every single day.

Lord Hood asked whether we were really not in the same position if we supplied ourselves by air. Mr. Merchant said we would have surrendered a right, and an extension of the blockade to the civil population would probably be inevitable. Mr. Kohler added that, at that point, we would still have to come back to the same decision under the most painful of circumstances. Lord Hood said the difficulty is in finding a method of challenge to the Soviets which is likely to produce the desired result of changing their position.

Mr. Jackling raised the possibility that the Soviets might not wait five months, but turn over to the GDR within the next two or three weeks. In that event the land operation would not be preceded by talks with the Soviets. To this Mr. Merchant responded that one must assume the Soviets are generally familiar with the nature of present instructions in Germany. If they were aware of what was said on the subject in Paris they would actually have an increased incentive to enter into negotiations. Agreement on Point D was therefore an essential first step in getting to negotiations. If we are to leave this issue undecided until April or May, the risk would greatly be increased. If war comes, he was convinced, it would involve a miscalculation, not a deliberate choice. Mr. Kohler added that we must make a decision now so that the chance of negotiations would be increased. We really could not effectively deal with the situation unless a decision were made first.

Lord Hood said this was obviously a big decision with grave consequences. The Soviets undoubtedly hoped for a disunited Western response. Mr. Kohler noted that the Paris meetings with their firm display of resolution were probably a surprise to the Soviets. It was agreed that a further discussion of Point D with the British would take place on January 3 with military representatives present on both sides.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–259. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and initialed by Merchant and Kohler.
1. Admiral Denny discussed Berlin contingency planning with U.S. military representatives on December 24 and 29 on a preliminary basis. Memoranda for the record of these conversations are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330: FRC 62 A 1698, Germany. On December 30 Merchant held brief conversations with Ambassadors Alphand and Caccia as well. (Memoranda of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/12–3058)
2. Reference is to point D of Document 98.
3. Not further identified.