Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

105. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

USDel/MC/7

Paris, December 13, 1958, 6:20 p.m.

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Paris, France, December 16–18, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

• Department of State
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Burgess
  • Ambassador Bruce
  • Ambassador Houghton
  • Mr. Reinhardt
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Greene
  • Mr. Timmons
  • Mr. Smith
  • Mr. Becker
  • Mr. Hillenbrand
• Defense
  • Mr. McElroy
  • General Twining
  • General Norstad
  • General Guthrie
  • Admiral Boone
  • Mr. Irwin
  • Mr. Haskell
• Treasury
  • Mr. Scribner

SUBJECT

• Berlin

The Secretary began by noting that the Germans were anxious to have a strong substantive communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers after their meeting on December 14. Spaak was opposed to this, and there was some reason for his opposition. However, the Secretary observed, it seems likely that the Foreign Ministers will have to say something. Spaak had already prepared a draft communiqué which might be issued by the NATO Council.

The Secretary said that his own disposition was to be rather tough in responding to the Soviets. Their proposal struck him as outrageous both in tone and substance. We had made an arrangement with them giving up Saxony and Thuringia in exchange for entry into the three Western sectors of Berlin. They had consolidated their position in the area which we had relinquished; now they want us to move out of Berlin. The Soviets talk of negotiating new agreements in the same breath as, they denounce the old agreements. What is the point of arriving at agreements if they are going to be subject to unilateral denunciation when they no longer serve the purpose of one of the parties?

The Secretary noted that there was some difference of view as to whether or not a proposal for general negotiations should be included in the same document replying to the Soviet note. The Germans were apparently opposed to this, particularly Adenauer. Ambassador Bruce said that it was necessary to distinguish between the position of the Chancellor now, and the position which he might take a little later. He thought that the Chancellor would eventually accept, under pressure of public and party opinion in Germany, the idea of a proposal for negotiations. We would know this a little more clearly when the Germans stated their views on December 14.

The Secretary commented that the difficult thing is to find the point at which physically there would be a break with the Soviets. If our new contingency paper were to be accepted, that would establish the point, but it was doubtful that it would be accepted. The Secretary said he was convinced that the Soviets did not want general war with us and will not consciously get into one. The problem is to make the issue sufficiently clear-cut. Otherwise, a little shooting might grow into big shooting. The issue in this instance is elusive, and it is not clear how it will be posed.

Ambassador Bruce said that we must be prepared to be tough from the beginning, assuming the analysis of the Soviet intentions made by the Secretary were correct. If we do not have a firm position on our part, we will not get even a comparatively firm position from our Allies. The Secretary said that this was true enough, but did not really meet the basic problem he had just mentioned. We are prepared to be strong and tough, but how does this work out in specific terms? He referred to the case of a convoyed truck and the decision which would have to be made to shoot or not, but that would not accomplish much. Ambassador Bruce said that, if we told the Soviets we are going to maintain our access by surface and where, there may be incidents and we might be faced by a crisis, but we will never know this unless we take such a stand. The British are inclined to temporize and to accept facto recognition of the GDR [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. However, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the British, [less than 1 line of source text not declassfied] are prepared to be relatively tough on Berlin. The West Germans know that the U.S. Government is determined and ready to employ force if necessary to maintain our access to Berlin. But the problem of how to deal with the other Allies who want to take a weaker position faces them.

Mr. Merchant said that the decision which we may be faced with next week is whether, if the British and French refuse to accept our proposals for revision of contingency plans, we are prepared to go it alone. If such a decision is taken, the sooner we tell the Russians this, the less possibility there would be of incidents. He was opposed to changing the point at which we would be prepared to use force.

General Norstad said that, if we took a strong position on Berlin, we should also propose a conference related to this firm position to give the Soviets a way out. Such a simultaneous proposal of a conference might also make it easier for the British and French to take a firm position. Going it alone would cost the West a great deal. Ambassador Bruce commented that, as soon as Adenauer is certain of the firmness of our own position, he will agree to anything. He would also therefore accept the idea of a meeting.

Mr. Smith said he thought that the time when we should plan to resort to force would be that point where it would be credible to the Soviets that we would do so. This point did not seem to be that where GDR officials would require credentials of our official travelers. A better point would be the clear blockage of our rights. The Secretary commented that there would not be any such clear blockage of our rights. Rather there would be a slow process of strangulation. The principles are elusive. The GDR officials will say that certainly they will let us go through if we comply. Ambassador Bruce noted that, in the air, there may be incidents of a real war-like nature.

General Twining said that we certainly have to stop this somewhere. We must ignore the fear of general war. It is coming anyway. Therefore we should force the issue on a point we think is right and stand on it. Khrushchev is trying to scare people. If he succeeds, we are through.

Ambassador Bruce mentioned a dinner given recently by the President of the Bundestag, Dr. Gerstenmaier, at which political leaders of all parties were present. They were unanimous in stressing that the U.S. must, if necessary, use force to maintain its position in Germany, even when illogically the same leaders were opposed to arming the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons. This was true also of German trade union leaders with whom the Ambassador had recently met in Dusseldorf.

The Secretary said that there was no doubt in anybody’s mind that, if we give way, it would be a disaster, and that we would face the same threat later under even worse conditions. We all know what the problem is, but grappling with it in specific terms is difficult.

Mr. McElroy said that, as he saw it, it was difficult to find the point where force could be applied. Berlin was isolated and some better way of securing our access thereto should be our limited objective in the present exercise. Therefore, there should be a conference on this subject. There was no doubt in the Defense Department about the necessity of taking a firm position.

The Secretary mentioned that the 1949 Paris Conference reached agreement on access to Berlin, but that had not stuck. Ambassador Bruce noted that nothing would really satisfy the Berliners except the continuance of the American guarantee. If we get over the present situation, the same problem will still be with us.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand on December 15. The meeting was held at the Embassy residence.