Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

192. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 5, 1960—1 p.m.

538. In view developments Korea, Turkey, recent coup Laos,² and attempted anti-GVN demonstration about week ago (our 432³) we believe it desirable assess possibilities for demonstration and coup here and likely outcome. Potentialities of various groups for political activities of these types given below:

1. Peasants. Various factors discontent exist such as lack of adequate protection against Communist attacks and pressures, low prices paddy, compulsory labor on agrovilles and other projects, and arbitrary methods of authorities. Diem has taken some steps to try alleviate sources of discontent (our G–79⁴) but it is important he take others because peasantry represents key to success or failure Communist guerrilla warfare in countryside and thus to gradual undermining of regime. However, any sudden demonstration or coup against GVN likely to center in Saigon and seems improbable that peasantry in view lack organization, transport problems, etc. would play significant role therein.

2. Communists. While there are indications that Commies have some strength in Saigon, they have not yet openly shown their hand in city and are much more likely operate through infiltrated, ostensibly non-Communist organizations which they will help instigate to action. Even without demonstration attempt by other groups, they may engage in hit and run tactics of violence in Saigon, and in case of any demonstration would step up such tactics during confusion and would attempt behind scenes to manipulate any demonstration which began, particularly by trying provoke GVN to take harsh measures for repression.

3. Labor. Trade unions are probably best organized non-military group in Viet-Nam and possess motives for political action. Tran Quoc Buu, head CVTC, is allied with Minister Agriculture Le Van Dong against Nhu–Tuyen faction in Can Lao party; each group is also supporting competing leadership in other main labor federation CSTV. Dong has talked privately about demonstration. Should his faction decide upon one, labor would undoubtedly be its core. Probable factors restraining Dong are fear that he would not succeed and that Communists would exploit demonstration to their advantage.

Labor also has economic and social grievances which provide fertile ground for opposition groups outside government to cultivate. Taxi and motor pousse drivers for example who live hand to mouth existence were adversely affected by increase in price gasoline until GVN quickly permitted fare rise. While non-government opposition groups might not be able organize as extensive support among labor as union leader like Buu, they could nevertheless with Communist organizational assistance probably stir up some support for demonstration.

4. Students. Previously relatively inert, lacking organization and any opposition party focus such as existed in Korea and Turkey, and living in scattered fashion rather than on campus, students have nevertheless within past few weeks begun show political ferment. This probably stimulated by developments in other countries and perhaps even, in counter productive sense, by intervening GVN efforts at political sterilization of students. While no reason at this stage believe students would initiate demonstration, probability growing that they would join one led by oppositionists either within or outside government. GVN security officials are concerned over growing influence of oppositionist and VC propaganda as well as establishment of VC cells among lycee students.

5. Catholic refugees. Dissatisfaction with regime apparently exists among some Catholics, who represent great bulk of the refugees. Paradoxically, some of this stems from what they feel is too heavily Catholic leadership of regime (with potential reaction to follow) and some to regime’s failure to bring Catholics particular benefits (e.g., schools). Some of hierarchy also has strong French background. Certain elements have spoken of necessity avoid Communist takeover by changing regime and there is evidence of Catholic refugees having been involved in abortive Aug 19 demonstration ….

6. Opposition groups and sects. While some stirrings are seen among opposition groups, such as the Dai Viets, VNQDD, and Dan Chu, these groups are not expected to display substantial organized strength and more likely will continue to appear only among intellectual class. They do, however, articulate the dissatisfaction existing in other classes. Sects have given no substantial signs of revival of force either in Saigon or elsewhere.

7. Police. Of obvious importance is strength and reliability local police and other forces which could be mustered to meet demonstration. Metropolitan police number approximately 5,760 backed by approximately 3,000 members of national police and security service under direct control of General Nguyen Van Le. Official of NPSS has commented … that police would be loyal to government and act against any type of demonstration. Operating principle in GVN’s anti-riot tactic is to smother demonstration before it can gain momentum, and while instigators can still be determined and arrested. First line of defense are several hundred Sûreté personnel mingling in crowds and reporting possible trouble. These are backed up by uniformed police department riot squad, consisting of 200 personnel plus 10–15 man command section. The 200 personnel are divided into three platoons, one of which is on duty (and another on standby) at any given time. Platoon(s) on duty sleeps dressed and is prepared to answer a call within two minutes, plus an estimated ten minutes to arrive at scene of distress. Men are practiced in 16 formations for breaking up a mob. The 200 man unit is equipped with transportation, radio communications, various submachine and riot guns, tear gas and other anti-riot material, and can call upon fire department for about 35 water trucks with hoses ….

Further armed support available are Civil Guard in area, about 7,000, and regular army forces, numbering three battalions parachutists, one battalion infantry, presidential guard brigade with authorized strength of 1,500 but with current overstrength of approximately 400, one battalion marines, one armored company and an undetermined number of partially trained recruits from Quang Trung training center on outskirts Saigon. Other forces total three battalions of infantry and are available; however they are now assigned to priority security areas and whether or not they could be pulled from their present missions would depend upon situation.

8. Army. Some discontent exists because of political promotions and favoritism throughout armed forces structure. Some disturbing indications of possible development spirit frustration and defeatism in fight against Viet Cong also received, such as statement allegedly made by General Duong Van Minh that for every Viet Cong killed by armed forces government creating ten in their rearm [?]. However indications are that generals remain imbued by non-political approach and that discontent is not of such proportions that any general is ready to take initiative in leading coup. We cannot of course exclude emergence of a “Kong Le” from ranks below general but key units in and around Saigon are commanded by officers believed to be close and loyal to Diem.

While there does not seem to be much likelihood at this time of coup led by army, picture is not so clear re reaction of army to demonstration or coup started by others. It could be clearly shown that such action was Communist-inspired no problem re army reaction would exist, but as already indicated Communists are likely to act discreetly behind scenes. If action directed against Diem, probably adequate number of police and armed forces to put it down would initially respond to call; if action directed against entourage or represented appeal for action by government, problem of putting it down might be more difficult, in either case course of developments such as revulsion at any extensive shedding of blood of non-Communists might quickly change attitude army units into one unfavorable to continuation repressive measures.

9. General. An important aspect of problem is uneasy political atmosphere itself, created by combination of continuing VC political and military gains, insufficient evidence of GVN counteraction and self correction and panicky tendencies by some elements to consider drastic measures, even a coup, to forestall Communist takeover. This latent explosive force could be touched off by an ill-advised move by sincere or opportunistic oppositionists or by unduly harsh repressive action by the GVN.

Conclusion. Real possibility demonstrations in Saigon exists. Could be instigated by Dong–Buu faction, especially if it decides risk overlooking fear of Communist exploitation. Could also be instigated by opposition elements outside government, but seems unlikely would be of any sizeable proportions unless hooked up with Communist-infiltrated group especially in labor field. Any demonstration more likely to be initially loyal protest calling for changes in policies and personnel around Diem but could develop into anti-Diem riot. While initial demonstration can probably be put down, longer term outcome would likely depend upon army attitude and Diem’s method on handling crisis. In any event VC exploitation is likely.

We are developing recommended actions which might head off developments of types envisaged above and preserve Diem as GVN leader. Shall forward them soonest.

Information addressees: above FYI and not for discussion with governments.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/9–560. Secret. Repeated for information to CINCPAC PolAd, Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, London, and Paris. Also printed in Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1302–1306.
2. Reference is to the forced resignation of President Syngman Rhee of South Korea on April 27, the military takeover in Turkey on May 27, and the Kong Le coup in Vientiane on August 9.
3. See footnote 2, Document 187.
4. See footnote 3, ibid.