Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

183. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Chairman, National Board of Estimates (Kent)¹

Washington, August 10, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Approaching Crisis in South Vietnam?

Your memo to the DCI on the above subject 28 July 1960,² deserves some comment in terms of its being the basis for developing an SNIE.³ The following are some personal views of mine, for your consideration.

It seems probable that a crisis is developing in Vietnam. If so, then it would be desirable to have an accurate estimate available to those U.S. officials who will have to make decisions concerning Vietnam, I am sure that you will agree with me that such an estimate should contain of honest a portrayal of the situation in Vietnam as possible. It is to this regard that I am gravely concerned about the use of your memo to the DCI as a basis for an SNIE.

Essentially, the problems presented in your memo are:

a. Increased guerrilla action and terrorism by the Communist Vietcong, and

b. Poor administration by a willful President Diem who is rapidly losing popular support.

The U.S. might well resolve the problems you have presented, only to discover that it still hadn’t resolved the real problems in Vietnam, which appear to have been ignored in your memo. I admit that there are and have been a number of U.S. observers in Vietnam who seem to be subjectively emotional about Diem and the military, and apparently permit this bias to color and guide their reporting. However, we must not permit this to misdirect our attention from the problems which must be recognized, described honestly, and understood before the United States can consider how to help in solving them. The task of recognizing and describing the actual current problems in Vietnam, in a manner which permits understanding of them by the reader, is the real task of U.S. national estimators in the proposed SNIE.

As a start towards reality in this SNIE, I recommend that you strive for a truer picture of the Communist enemy in Vietnam today. He is far more formidable than some guerrillas and terrorists skulking about the swamps and jungles. These are only the more overt or obvious Communist assets, which the enemy expects the U.S. to see. But, they are only one segment of the total enemy in Free Vietnam today. There are also many skilled, organized, and dedicated political, psychological, and economic Communist actionists in Vietnam right now, apparently achieving some success in denigrating the Diem government, in exploiting the discontent of some intellectuals, in sowing disaffection among the populace, in disrupting the effective administration of government, and is promoting economic breakdowns.

A few moments of reflection will show that this picture of a skilled enemy at work in fields other than the paramilitary is not an idle one. The Vietminh had 8 years of war against the French, in what is now Free Vietnam, to perfect their covert organizations and techniques in these very fields of political, psychological and economic action. It is known that the Vietminh left stay-behinds during the Vietminh withdrawals of 1954–55. There is evidence of the training and introduction of additional Communist personnel into Free Vietnam in the 5 years since then. Certainly, it is to be expected that the Communists must have an effective organization now in place and operating in Vietnam as the result of 14 years of dedicated, professional work by them. We would be damn fools to ignore this just because we are bemused by some exciting shooting and by some personalities who haven’t conformed exactly to our every wish, bemused by a picture of a situation in Vietnam which is strangely similar to the one portrayed in propaganda broadcasts from Radio Hanoi and Radio Peking.

I recommend that the descriptions of governmental administration, popular support, economic problems, and security measures and needs be placed in the proper context of Vietnam today, with its Communist enemy actively at work to disrupt or destroy what we are trying to build up. Adding this constant negative strain of Communist action to a governmental mechanism which is already subject to the strain of too many inexperienced or faltering officials, will provide a more accurate and useful estimate of a situation which U.S. officials actually face. The sooner this situation is accurately recognized and described, the sooner the U.S. can act wisely and constructively.

Consideration also should be given to:

a. First-hand observations of American, Vietnamese, and other acceptable observers who have actually gone out into the countryside among the people, talked to them, lived among them, looked at the current scene. (I get a disturbingly different picture of the situation than the one portrayed in your memo, from such observers known to me.)

b. Other Vietnamese groups ambitious for power in Vietnam, and whether their activities are contributing to insecurity and instability or are performances of constructive political opposition in the face of a national emergency.

c. The actual, on the ground and now operating, status of operations to counter the acts of Communists and others to destroy the stability of the government in Vietnam and to destroy the friendly status of the U.S. as a worthy ally; for example, how strong is the propaganda attack against us on these points and how strong are the Vietnamese counter-measures; have we ever provided the radio broadcast faculties we have had on paper for so many years; are current—not months old—security operations successful or not; is the national police force, the Guard Civile, an effective organization or not, and if not what is needed?

d. The complex problem of the Cambodian border, a more realistic appraisal of its vulnerabilities and meaning, as well as the true nature of the Free Khmer activities which have too long been accepted as a Diem–Nhu plot; also, what effects, if any, have Chinese Communist activities in Cambodia, which include the donation of large sums of cash money to provincial governors in border regions, had upon the security of Vietnam?

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 092 Vietnam. Secret. Attached to the source text was a covering note from Lansdale to Irwin, August 10, which reads as follows: “Knowing your personal interest in Vietnam, I thought the attached would be worth a quick reading. You might like to pass to Adm. O’Donnell and others on your staff. Ed Lansdale.”
2. Not found.
3. Reference to Document 185.