179. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Director of the Office of
Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson)1
Dear Dan: I am enclosing a copy of a Memorandum
which Sherwood M. Fine, Chief,
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand Division, ICA/W, prepared on a conversation which he had with
Wolf Ladejinsky on July 11,
1960 during Mr. Fine’s recent
visit here. Since Ladejinsky
presented a particularly gloomy picture of the present Vietnamese
political situation in this conversation, I think it is desirable for
you and anyone else who reads this Memorandum to bear in mind that
Ladejinsky was seriously ill
at the time the conversation took place, and was in fact evacuated to
Clark Field two days later with an illness which has not yet been
diagnosed. In addition to the
[Page 515]
fact that his pessimistic picture may be partly attributable to his
physical condition, I believe it also should be noted that Ladejinsky has been in a very low
emotional state of good deal of the time within recent weeks, and his
assessment, in that state, of Diem and the GVN should
be accepted with some reserve.
As you know from our reports, we are also concerned about Diem’s political position. We have
recommended various measures which we think he should take in his own
interest to improve his standing in the country. There are signs that he
is taking some of the steps we have suggested. For example, reports
reaching us (including some from Ladejinsky himself) indicate that Diem is genuinely concerned about
corruption and is taking some measures to try to improve that condition.
He also indicated in the “Double Seven” speech on July 7 his intention
to make intimate talks to explain his program to the people (our
Despatch 20, July 11, 19602). He has, in addition, slowed down on the
agroville program. Thuan has
just informed me that the GVN is drawing
up a realistic three year economic plan and is in the process of
imposing new internal taxes, both of which are additional helpful
signs.
It is true that there are other steps which we think Diem should take as well. We believe
he should compensate peasant labor on Government projects (at least to a
limited extent), and act to increase the price the peasant receives for
paddy. We would also like to see him get rid of certain government
personnel (such as Dr. Tuyen,
the head of the secret intelligence service) whose activities have
seriously damaged the prestige of the Government. We would also like to
see him at least surface the Can Lao Party. We are continuing to do what
we can to influence Diem, but
our leverage on certain of these sensitive matters is quite evidently
limited, particularly at this time when there is some question in
Diem’s mind about continued
U.S. support of him.
I am sending copies of this letter to each of the recipients of the
enclosed Memorandum3
to insure that they are aware of the above factors in reading the
Memorandum.
Sincerely yours,
[Page 516]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chief of the Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam Division, International Cooperation Administration
(Fine) and President
Diem’s Adviser
(Ladejinsky), Saigon, July
11, 1960, 9 a.m.4
Ladejinsky was ill in bed
suffering from virus pneumonia but very eager to talk. While clearly
seriously under par physically he noted sardonically that he was not
in particularly good shape psychologically either. After discussing
his health, mutual friends and the political situation in
Washington, he moved on to an assessment of the current state of
affairs in Vietnam.
Other than a brief, inconsequential talk with Ladejinsky in Washington last fall,
this was my first conversation with him since my visit to Saigon in
June 1959.5 His entire assessment and tone was so notably
in contrast with his position of last summer that I was hardly
prepared for what followed. Last June he had unburdened himself in
an unreservedly apologist statement in support of the President’s
position on political, security and economic matters. He had
expressed strenuous criticism of ICA/W and the USOM
position re Vietnam and urged that the U.S. abandon its reserved and
often critical approach toward President Diem and his Government and go all
out in supporting this embattled regime. U.S. aid was described as
grossly inadequate, our officials as incompetent meddlers and our
policy as completely lacking in appreciation that the GVN was a government on a wartime
footing that was heroically struggling for survival while State and
ICA temporized, ignored the hard
reality of the current environment and the urgent pressure of
events.
Obviously Ladejinsky had gone
through a complete metamorphosis since our last serious talk. He
expressed deep concern over the grave political deterioration since
last winter and his profound disconcertment with President Diem’s failure to come to grips
effectively with the mounting problems confronting his regime.
Ladejinsky’s forthright
indictment expressed preponderantly in a tone of sad resignation,
occasionally succeeded by imperfectly repressed indignation, was
based on the following judgements:
- (1)
- Diem was virtually
under the complete control of his brother Nhu who was characterized
as the “evil genius” dominating the scene.
- (2)
- Diem had become
progressively isolated from the real state of affairs.
Despite his frequent visits to the countryside he remained,
[Page 517]
in effect,
shielded from unpleasant facts, isolated from the people and
had virtually abandoned his claim to being a popular
leader.
- (3)
- Diem knowingly
tolerated corruption in his family and in high governmental
circles though remaining personally free of such
taint.
- (4)
- Diem, jealous of
his uncontested hold upon the reins of power, presided over
a government staffed largely by nonentities in key
positions. His concern over potential political competition
had produced a cabinet which with but two or three
exceptions was distinctly third rate, intimidated and
grossly dependent on the President’s whim.
- (5)
- There was absolutely no suggestion at this time that
Diem was likely
of his own accord to change his behavior in office. There
was small likelihood that, other than as a result of firm
outside pressure, the President would become a more
effective and representative leader. Ladejinsky bemoaned the fact
that this brilliantly talented leader had succumbed to
arrogance, love of power and conviction of his
infallibility. Ladejinsky stated that he still regularly
saw the President, though their exchanges were invariably
unharmonious. His influence had declined to virtually zero
since last March. Ladejinsky was profoundly dismayed and
unhappy and would have resigned his post soon thereafter but
for his reluctance to be criticized for “abandoning a
sinking ship”—given the low ebb of GVN affairs at that time. Ladejinsky at this point
complimented Diem
for his courage in the face of real adversity but added that
the President probably had no real notion of the true
seriousness of his position at the time.
In discussing possible alternatives to Diem on the political horizon, Ladejinsky stated that despite the
President’s greatly reduced popularity there was no alternative
individual or group at this time. Any real potential opposition had
been destroyed by the President. Ladejinsky was particularly biting in his criticism
of Diem’s refusing to
tolerate even token opposition. The Army top command continued loyal
but some criticism was to be heard from lower military officer
levels.
Vice President Tho was the
only possible alternative to Diem but he would not be willing to engage in any
contest for power with the President. However, Ladejinsky believed that he would be
willing to assume the Presidency if it were offered, in the event of
a military coup. Ladejinsky
expressed a very high regard for Tho and commiserated with him for the travail of his
position and his horribly difficult situation vis a vis a President
who refused to delegate any authority and trusted few of even
closest political associates.
The one positive conclusion developed by Ladejinsky was the need for a strong U.S. policy re
the Government of President Diem. Without such firm guidance the situation would
undoubtedly progressively deteriorate. Ladejinsky emphasized that Diem had no place else to go but
had to stick with us and retain the support of the U.S. He would
bluster and fight back but the only promise for a more
[Page 518]
constructive and
responsible course on the part of the GVN could be derived from a determined U.S. policy. We
were not using our great potential leverage effectively. This was
imperative if Vietnam was to be saved from its own errors. This was
Ladejinsky’s real
message.
We discussed the prospective resignation of Vu Van Thai, GVN Director General of the Budget and
Foreign Aid Administration. Ladejinsky averred that perhaps U.S. representatives
and he had erred in their uncritical praise and unstinting support
since Thai had become insufferably arrogant and difficult to work
with. If Thai in fact leaves the Government, Ladejinsky could not envisage any
other GVN official who could work
successfully in coordinating the planned BrookingsF–ord Economic
Advisory Project. Ladejinsky
indicated that the Government was distinctly lukewarm about the
entire project and that it was difficult to assess its prospects
without Thai. However, Ladejinsky did not dismiss the possibility of Thai
remaining in office.
Ladejinsky stated that he had
unsuccessfully repeatedly tried to convince the President that given
the formulation of serious economic development plans it probably
would be possible to secure greater U.S. assistance for
developmental projects. He complained about the difficulty in
interesting Diem in economic
matters. Ladejinsky averred
however that Vietnam’s economic prospects were bright indeed, if one
could count on an intelligent economic program. (Incidentally,
Vu Van Thai mirrored this
view in another conversation.) Ladejinsky went on to say, however, that Vietnam’s
real problems lay in the political field and that this and the
security picture were the real problem areas.
We discussed Ladejinsky’s
personal plans at some length. He has several very attractive offers
awaiting his decision upon his scheduled departure. Ladejinsky definitely plans to quit
his post at the latest by March 1961, the terminal period of his
present contract. However, he believed he would be able to leave
prior to that time even though the President had reacted to this
piece of information by castigating Ladejinsky’s intention as akin to “treachery”.
Ladejinsky plans to visit
Washington this September for a variety of personal matters.
(The writer has known Ladejinsky since 1938 and was closely associated
with him during their mutual residence in Japan throughout the
Occupation period.)
