Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

177. Despatch From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

No. 463

Saigon, June 27, 1960.

SUBJECT

• An Interpretative Review of Developments in North Viet-Nam Since January 1959²

TABLE OF CONTENTS³

Introduction and Summary

I. DRV Adoption of All Out Measures Short of War to Over-throw the GVN

II. Foreign Policy

• Laos
• DRV Efforts to Increase Its Prestige and Gain Greater Foreign Recognition
• Repatriation of Overseas Vietnamese Nationals
• Wooing the Afro-Asian Bloc
• Bloc Relations

III. Internal Developments

• DRV Leadership
• Party Reeducation and the Year of Great Events
• Collectivization of Private Business and Agriculture
• Internal Security
• Tribal Unrest
• Peasant Opposition
• Action Against the Catholic Church
• Factors of Discontent in the PAVN

IV. The Economic Picture

• Standard of Living
• Achievements and Shortcomings Under the State Plan
• Bloc Aid

Introduction and Summary

Prior to 1959 the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (DRV) was principally occupied with rehabilitating its economy and restoring its rice production following seven and one-half years of war, carrying out-agrarian reform and laying the preliminary foundations for the development of a socialist state. Externally, the DRV pursued a relatively unambitious foreign policy toward other countries, and towards South Viet-Nam has since 1956 been following a policy aimed at overthrowing the Southern regime by promoting and inspiring subversion and terror in the South probably as a consequence of the GVN’s refusal to hold elections in 1956 under the Geneva Agreements. However, the DRV’s efforts in this respect, while representing a continuing problem for the GVN, did not during 1957 and 1958 appear to be of sufficient proportion to accomplish its purpose. However, since the end of 1958 the DRV has (a) greatly intensified its pressure on the South through the adoption of a policy of all out terror and subversion supported by increased infiltration from the North in a major effort to overthrow the Republic of Viet-Nam and President Ngo dinh Diem; (b) embarked on an aggressive and extremely vigorous foreign policy which has (1) threatened the independence of Laos by giving active support to the Pathet Lao communist rebel movement probably with the intention of keeping open the routes for Viet Cong infiltration into South Viet-Nam and forcing Laos to maintain a neutral posture and (2) endeavoured to enhance the international stature of the regime through programs aimed at wooing the Afro-Asian bloc and securing the loyalty of Vietnamese residents living abroad; (c) stepped up the tempo of socialization and wrestled with the problems of economic development under an extremely ambitious three year plan.

The DRV has achieved a marked if not total success in pursuing these policies. DRV efforts to wage an all out campaign of terrorism and subversion in the South have brought about a notable deterioration of security in the delta provinces and forced the GVN to commit more of its resources to fight communist terrorism–resources which otherwise would be available for the development of its economy. Although DRV aggressive pressure against Laos last summer was checked when world attention was brought to bear through the UN Security Council, nevertheless, with strong DRV support Pathet Lao rebels have increased their activities in the provinces of Laos and have assured the DRV of a relatively unhindered route by which to infiltrate its cadres into South Viet-Nam. Furthermore, as a consequence of this pressure the Western powers and the Laotian government have decided that it would be wiser for Laos to continue its neutral policy. In August 1959 the DRV concluded an agreement with the government of Thailand to repatriate Vietnamese residents (mostly of northern origin) living in Thailand and under this agreement more than 5,000 Vietnamese residents in Thailand have actually been repatriated.⁴ Furthermore, according to available information, the DRV may shortly conclude a similar agreement with France for the repatriation of Vietnamese residents living in New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. The DRV-Thai agreement was a diplomatic and psychological victory for the DRV and may have undone some of the psychological damage suffered in 1955 when more than 800,000 refugees from North Viet-Nam fled to the South. The campaign to achieve greater recognition from the Afro-Asian bloc has already succeeded in winning the recognition of Guinea and may cause other African countries to give the DRV either full diplomatic recognition or at least recognition equal to that accorded the GVN.

In its relations with the communist bloc countries the DRV has generally supported the Soviet propaganda line despite the fact that Communist China provides North Viet-Nam with more economic aid than does the USSR and owing to geographic propinquity exercises a strong influence on DRV domestic policies. There are indications that Moscow oriented leaders of the DRV are concerned over increasing Communist Chinese influence and would like to see a greater degree of Russian interest in North Viet-Nam to balance the influence of Communist China. (See Embassy despatches 246 of February 12, 1960 and 366 of April 26, 1960.⁵)

Internally, party leaders and the government bureaucracy have continued to exert a stable and effective control. Furthermore, the regime has felt sufficiently confident of its power and control over the population and it has felt free to promulgate a new constitution written according to the precepts of communist ideology, hold elections in May, 1960 for a Second National Assembly to replace the remaining rump of the First National Assembly elected 14 years ago, and announce plans to hold a Third Party Congress in September. Although reports received indicate that ethnic minorities and Catholic elements continue to be restive and the peasant population openly resentful over increased pressure to join cooperatives, the regime is believed to be in full control of the situation and no serious challenge to its authority is anticipated. Continued efforts to tighten political control over the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam (PAVN) and the change-over from a voluntary enlistment to a military conscription system would appear to explain reports of “serious malaise” in the army.

On the economic front the regime has continued to dragoon the population into achieving the very high and often unrealistic goals of the current three year plan. While notable progress in both agricultural and industrial production has probably been achieved, the DRV, faced with the twin obstacles of unrealistic planning and a highly underdeveloped economy, has been forced to cut back the goals of the three year plan. Nevertheless, undaunted by this experience it has called for its completion three months ahead of schedule and is actively preparing the five year plan which will begin in 1961

[Here follow Parts I–IV as described in the above table of contents.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/6–2760. Secret. Drafted by William B. Grant.
2. This report was essentially completed by the end of May, and does not reflect subsequent developments. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The page numbers in the table of contents are not printed. The Introduction and Summary comprised pages 1–4; Part I pages 4–9; Part II pages 9–20; Part III pages 20–35; Part IV pages 35–47.
4. Documentation on American interest in this agreement is included with material on Thailand in a forthcoming Foreign Relations volume.
5. Neither printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.001/2–1260 and 751K.00/4–2660, respectively)