Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

89. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, October 23, 1955— 10 p.m.

1390. For the Secretary and Ambassador Luce.² Following is a summary of discussions during first evening of Secretary’s visit to Rome.

1. Meeting with Gronchi. At 7:30 pm Oct 22 Secretary, accompanied by Ambassador, called on Pres Gronchi for a discussion lasting one hour, which Ital press has characterized as longest any foreign statesman has ever held with President. Foreign Minister Martino was also present. Prior to this meeting, Foreign Minister Martino stressed to Amb at airport that President’s views concerning relationship of European security pact and problem of German reunification were not shared by govt. Later at official dinner, both Martino and Saragat reiterated this point and said that Gronchi had met Nenni that morning in a private meeting and had shared some of Nenni’s views on Italy’s position vis-à-vis Geneva and basic European problems.

During conversation with Gronchi, Secretary outlined basic premises of US policy in seeking establishment of international peace. He congratulated President on important role which Italy has played in developing European unity. In defining US policy he reiterated points made in speech before American Legion regarding dangers of neutralism.³

Gronchi in response developed comprehensive view of Ital foreign policy and internal problems. He made following points.

a. Need for European solidarity and unity greater now than ever before, particularly because of “new look” in international affairs.

b. He did not anticipate an early or easy agreement at Geneva because of difference of views held by European countries concerning future developments. In his view two positions existed—first, that reunification of Germany, conclusion of security pact, and limitation of armaments should be simultaneous; and [garble—second?], that German reunification should follow other steps at a specific time. He made clear he favored second position. In this connection, he told Martino earlier that reunification based on free elections might follow two or three months after conclusion of security pact and agreement on limitation of armaments, whereas he told Secretary that time lag might extend to two or three years. In any event Gronchi felt West should be prepared make concessions at Geneva re Germany because if a solution not found soon Germany likely to become neutral, oriented however probably towards West rather than East.

c. If problem of European security could be solved, Gronchi believed West could attack problem of European integration and solidarity on principles contained in Art 2 of NAT.⁴ Italy’s main problem is economic and is characterized by such questions as stability of lira, budgetary deficits, high illiteracy rate. European integration can never proceed fast enough to solve Italy’s problems. Hence, Italy required massive loans to finance badly needed economic development.

d. Development of West Eur integration would aid in controlling East-West trade. Gronchi said at present time Italy needed to sell to East basic products, such as electrical equipment. At present time, trade with East benefited only East, but it Western trading bloc were established the drive to sell in East might profit the West. Gronchi quickly affirmed that there were no leaks and diversions to East and that Italy upheld COCOM agreements.

The Secretary replied that he appreciated Gronchi’s views on problems of Germany and European security. He pointed out that US had long advocated utilization of principles of Art 2 of NAT and organization of OEEC to carry out objective of integration. He also emphasized many facets of US aid, tourism, US military expenses and private remittances which, if added together, came close to figure of 500 million dollars which Gronchi stated was necessary for Italy’s economic rehabilitation. He also pointed out that Italy had an historical and cultural responsibility to fulfill and that its true character should not be besmirched in any way by political experiments.

In a warm exchange on the views of Pres Eisenhower towards Italy and present state of his health, Secretary raised possibility of Gronchi’s visit to US as explained in Embtel 1389.⁵

2. Official dinner at Villa Madama.

At a dinner given by Segni, following Ital officials were present: Segni, Saragat, Vanoni, Taviani, Martino, Carlo Russo, Scelba, Pella, Folchi, and many officials from FonOff. There was no opportunity for any detailed discussion. During entire evening no mention was made of internal economic questions. In discussion following dinner, four main questions were raised.

a. Secretary’s trip to Yugoslavia⁶ was explained to Itals inasmuch as news of visit had reached press. Secretary said [1 line of source text not declassified]. This keeps Western Europe from facing a monolithic group and can be said to be for Italy’s sake too. He admitted, however, there was room for doubt as to Tito’s policy. He had sent Murphy to Yugoslavia⁷ to study this point and his own visit, if it materialized, would have same object.

b. Spirit of Geneva—according to US view spirit of Geneva means that though differences between East and West are recognized, they will not be resolved by war. USSR makes attempt to persuade that spirit of Geneva means differences no longer exist. Itals concurred Secretary’s analysis.

c. Internal distensione in Italian politics—in response Ambassador’s question on this subject, Segni said Italy was committed 100 percent to democratic principles though public opinion occasionally required statements or actions seemingly at variance.

d. Secretary pointed out that fact Soviets stopped at Berlin⁸ on way home from summit conference to assure East German Govt there would be no free elections was significant and proved East German Govt cannot face idea of free elections. He urged Italy to keep hitting at that point and said that under no circumstances should West agree to postponement of elections. All Italians present agreed to points a, b and d.

Jernegan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/10–2355. Secret. Repeated to Paris.
2. Luce left Italy on October 23 to accompany Dulles to Paris.
3. The text of Dulles’ October 10 speech is printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 24, 1955, p. 639.
4. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty dealt with the promotion of international understanding through the strengthening of free institutions.
5. Telegram 1389 from Rome, October 23, reported that Dulles had invited Gronchi to visit the United States, but had explained that the President’s illness and forthcoming elections made the setting of an early date for the visit impossible. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6511/10–2355)
6. Dulles visited Yugoslavia in November 1955.
7. Documentation on both Murphy’s and Dulles’ visit to Yugoslavia is printed in vol. XXVI, pp. 664 ff.
8. Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Berlin, July 24–26.