63. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Prochnow) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)1

SUBJECT

  • OTC Legislation

As you know, Mr. John Leddy has charge in the E Area of handling all OTC matters. Mr. Leddy prepared a comprehensive and thorough program for the advancement of this legislation and has pursued it aggressively. There have been many comments that the presentation by the Administration has been exceptionally good. We [Page 187] are getting strong press support. We expect to continue in the weeks ahead to seek every means of advancing the legislation.

The E Staff has also analyzed the question of what course to pursue if it became a serious question of whether the legislation would pass. The analysis of the E Staff, as well as the position recommended by the Staff, is found in the attached memorandum from Mr. Thibodeaux.

[Enclosure]

OTC LEGISLATION

You have asked whether, if an analysis of Congressional opinion is unfavorable to OTC, it would be wiser to hold it up this session in the hope of obtaining passage of the legislation next year. For the following reasons I believe that delay would mean just as certain defeat as a prospective adverse vote in this session of the Congress.

I do not think that we can again mobilize public support for OTC next year. That support is strong now and is reflected in public opinion polls. Much of this favorable sentiment has been developed by public groups who have worked hard on the basis of assurances that the Administration would carry through. We also have a favorable vote from Ways and Means (18 to 7) and a strong committee report. If OTC is delayed the whole hearing procedure would have to be repeated, and probably without as favorable a result. I believe, therefore, that the OTC project could not survive a postponement.

Since the OTC has already been deferred for a year (it was first introduced in 1955) I believe that both foreign governments and domestic supporters would consider another delay, with the acquiescence of the President, as a euphemism for defeat. An important part of the strategy of the opposition has been to cast doubt on the firmness of the President’s intentions despite his strong statements favoring OTC. If the President now backs down, he will in effect be conceding the opposition case and open the Administration to an even wider and more intense attack, not only on U.S. participation in the GATT but on the Administration’s trade program generally. That this is the opposition strategy is evident from several bills already introduced which are designed to sweep away the entire framework of our trade agreements program.

On balance, I think we would not be as badly off, internationally, if the OTC were defeated in Congress than if it were postponed with the consent of the Administration. The OTC was negotiated on [Page 188] the initiative of the United States, and foreign governments agreed to this negotiation on the assumption that the Administration would press for its adoption. They would view deferral as an Administration decision to reject. An adverse Congressional vote would at least allow us to work with other governments in improving the administration of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on the assumption of no OTC. If OTC is deferred, this will paralyze any forward movement for a considerable period. Finally, there are certain substantive amendments to the General Agreement, designed to speed up removal of restrictions of American goods, that other governments have not yet ratified pending action on OTC. If OTC were definitely out of the way (even though rejected) we could press for getting these amendments into force.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 394.41/5–856. Confidential. A note on the source text reads: “Noted JFD.”