194. Memorandum of Discussion at the 262d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 20, 19551
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1–3.]
4. Psychological Implications of Geneva for U.S. Information Programs
(Memorandum for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 2, 1955; NSC Action No. 1426–b2)
Mr. Streibert explained that the guidance set forth in the reference report had already been put into effect and that the results showed that the paper had been effective and realistic. He pointed out that he had checked with the President at Denver and had secured his approval of the proposed guidance before the President’s illness.3 The President had been inclined to feel that we should take a more positive attitude toward the Soviet Union than the original draft had suggested and had, accordingly, dictated himself the second paragraph of Section III which, as changed by the President, read as follows: “On the other hand, at this moment in history, we cannot afford to appear, in the eyes of the world, as condemning all offers of the Soviet Union even before testing for sincerity. We should emphasize the positive aspects of U.S. policy. We should not emphasize the direct charges and allegations against the Soviet Union, but rather we should make such points by indirection.”
[Page 561]Mr. Streibert then went on to say that the meat of his paper was to be found in the sections in which we continued to restate our basic U.S. position on the satellites and our continued offensive against international Communism. After summarizing the appropriate paragraphs, Mr. Streibert pointed out that there had been no letup in our continued offensive against international Communism. We also continued to connect this movement with the Kremlin itself.
Since Mr. Allen Dulles was co-author of this paper, Mr. Streibert suggested that he might have a few comments to make.
Mr. Allen Dulles said that he was inclined to fear that current Soviet activities were more insidious and more difficult to combat than they had been before the Geneva Heads-of-Government meeting last July. He was accordingly somewhat concerned about the line taken in the paragraph referred to earlier which had been dictated by the President. Mr. Dulles also pointed out that there was a covert annex to the present paper which, if the Vice President agreed, he would present to the Operations Coordinating Board next week. The line followed in the covert report was harsher than the line to be used in overt media.4
Mr. Nelson Rockefeller strongly supported the views of Mr. Allen Dulles as to the increasing danger of Soviet propaganda and inquired why we could not ourselves use the Soviet method of charging that certain actions taken by the United States were contrary to the “Spirit of Geneva”.
The Vice President said that of course the Soviet aim was to try to force us to change our policies by invoking the “Spirit of Geneva”. It might, accordingly, be a wise move to see whether in point of fact we are making changes in our policies to suit the convenience of the Soviet Union.
The National Security Council:
Noted and discussed the report by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, U.S. Information Agency, transmitted by the reference memorandum.
[Here follows discussion of other matters.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 191.↩
- The President had suffered a heart attack.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩