Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Foreign Economic Policy; Foreign Information Program, Volume IX

161. Report on the 24th Session of the Economic and Social Council by the Representative (Jacoby)¹

Geneva, July 31, 1957.

Supplementing the regular report of my delegation,² I am transmitting in confidence the following personal observations of the Twenty-Fourth Session of ECOSOC in Geneva. I hope these reflections will be of use in the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

1. U.S. Interest in ECOSOC.

My outstanding impression is that the ECOSOC is potentially a powerful organ for communicating sound economic and social thought and policy throughout the world; but that its full potential is not now being utilized. I sounded out the Heads of many Delegations on the role of ECOSOC, and was asked to luncheon by Secretary-General Hammarskjold to discuss the future of ECOSOC. It is generally agreed by the Secretary-General and those who have worked with ECOSOC for a number of years that the time has come for setting it on a new course. Many state their opinion that the organization has become sterile, receives little attention in the press, and is not influencing public policy in the economic and social fields. In Latin metaphor, the Brazilian delegate³ said it “has become the wailing wall of lost illusions!” The United States, which had such a prominent part in the creation of ECOSOC, has been playing a negative role, and the Soviet Delegation has been taking the initiative. Thus Mr. Zakharov⁴ chided me by saying: “My country has brought forward many proposals for world economic and social development; where are the proposals of your country?” I responded by pointing out that $2.8 billion of net foreign investments made by American business in 1956, the World Bank, The International Finance Corporation, and other U.S.-sponsored activities. Yet this answer is not satisfactory to other countries. They look to the United States for new ideas, and for vigorous leadership.

The unfortunate consequences of U.S. negativism are illustrated by our currently weak strategic position on SUNFED. We are unable to argue that a multilateral development fund is unnecessary or undesirable, because the Presidential statement of April 1953 commits the U.S. to participate in such a fund. We are also debarred from arguing that the UN should not go ahead to establish SUNFED on the ground that the nature of the fund is vague and indefinite, because the U.S. has so far refused even to set forth its own ideas regarding the Fund. Therefore, we are driven back to the argument that establishment of such a fund now is untimely. (See my statement on Financing Economic Development attached.)⁵ I recommend that, in the interest of showing the undeveloped countries that the U.S. is moving ahead with the SUNFED idea, we begin formulating U.S. concepts of the nature and method of operation of a SUNFED.

More and more countries are becoming critical of U.S. negativism. We must take the lead in guiding ECOSOC into a more useful function, if the organ is not to become a positive danger to us. For this reason I made a start by sponsoring and pushing through a resolution—which received unanimous support—calling upon the Secretariat for a thorough study of the extent and causes of inflation and the measures used or contemplated by various Governments for combating inflation (see attached). This study should provide the basis for a discussion in depth of one crucial problem of public policy in the next ECOSOC session.

2. Methods of Revitalizing ECOSOC

Secretary-General Hammarskjold asked my suggestions for increasing the vitality of the Council. I suggested several reforms. First, the Agenda should be limited to no more than 5 or 6 items representing major questions of economic and social policy. The means of combating price inflation is an illustration of a major policy issue that should be on the Agenda. All minor technical questions should be left to the decisions of committees. Second, several days or a week should be reserved for a true debate in depth on each of these major issues. Third, the Secretariat should produce basic factual analyses of each such issue and circulate them well in advance of meetings. Fourth, delegations should prepare for these debates well in advance. Fifth, sessions should be held to a maximum of two weeks in order to attract top technical personnel and officers of Cabinet rank.

Admittedly, this would bring ECOSOC into the realm of policy discussion, which would involve some hazards. However, the risks are well worth running in the interests of giving the work of ECOSOC a definite bearing on public policies throughout the world. There are many economic and social problems of worldwide interest for which no other forum than ECOSOC exists.

3. How Can the U.S. Take Leadership?

I believe that it would be wise to establish an ECOSOC Policy Planning Group within the U.S. Government, and to assign it the specific task of producing a long-range U.S. policy and program for ECOSOC. Such a Group might include a number of qualified persons from outside the Government, such as a representative of the Committee for Economic Development, and one from an important American business corporation with international interests. The Group should meet regularly until a course has been plotted that can be transmitted to higher authorities for review and adoption. The U.S. should come to eachECOSOC meeting with at least one new, significant proposal.

4. Peaceful Co-existence with the Soviets.

An outstanding impression of the session is the attitude of conciliation and cooperation displayed by the Soviet Delegation. The Soviets introduced the following six principal resolutions: a) ECE to study the effect of the European Common Market, b) the Secretary-General to study the effects of Euratom on world cooperation, c) the Regional Economic Commissions to study the peaceful uses of atomic energy, d) create a world trade organization, e) each nation to reduce defense expenditure by 10–15 percent next year, f) hold a world conference of economists.

The United States was, however successful in “watering down” or causing the withdrawal of all these proposals. Right up to the end of the meeting the Soviet representatives were obviously eager to find a means of reaching agreement, and did not display their accustomed truculence. It is evident that grave mistakes in central economic planning have created internal difficulties from which the Soviet Bloc countries are seeking escape through wider trade. The Soviets have a deep fear of the economic integration of Western Europe through the Common Market and Euratom. Although my speeches on The World Economic and Social Situations (copies attached)⁶ took sharp issue with Soviet ideology at a number of points, the Soviet statements stressed peaceful cooperation and “co-existence”.

As a method of defining issues, I invited the three principal Soviet representatives to take lunch with Mr. Kotschnig, Mr. Stibravy, and myself. Later, they returned our hospitality by inviting a small group of us to luncheon. They appeared to talk freely and to be at ease with us and with each other, and repeatedly emphasized the desirability of broader exchange of personnel and ideas between our countries. We advised them that most of their proposals involved the establishment of new machinery and it was better to use present international machinery more intensively.

5. ECOSOC Control over the Secretariat and the Specialized Agencies.

Another impression is that the Council succeeded in this session in gaining a firmer control of the activities of the Secretariat and of the Specialized Agencies, in the face of determined opposition by the latter. This resistance to control was manifested in the request by the Council to the Secretariat to study means of combating inflation as a major subject in the next World Economic Survey. Initially, there was resistance by the Secretariat to any direction whatever of its research activities, but this resistance abated later on. It was also manifest in a resolution calling upon the Secretary General for a five-year forecast of expenditures under present programs, and calling upon the Heads of UNESCO, WHO, FAO, and ILO for similar statements.—Again there was some opposition. However, the Charter of the United Nations not only permits but requires ECOSOC to give general direction, which is obviously necessary and desirable if the Council is to carry out its responsibilities to act as a coordinating agency in social and economic policy. What appears to have been a somewhat lax and timid attitude by the Council now is in process of correction.

6. Impressions of Other Delegations.

I was impressed by the efforts of the Representatives of Poland⁷ and Yugoslavia⁸ to emphasize to me, in private conversations, the distinctions between their countries and the USSR. There was an obvious effort to convince me that their countries pursue as independent courses as they are able to follow, and are eager to expand their cultural and trading relations with the U.S. It was evident also that, as a result of the new drive for “peaceful co-existence”, the Soviets are using Poland and Yugoslavia as a “front” for many of their own proposals.

The Dutch sent a strong Delegation headed by their Foreign Minister, Luns.⁹ Mr. Luns made a frankly political speech supporting international investment in housing and schools and “a more equal sharing of the world’s supplies”. While his share-the-wealth philosophy made a strong appeal to the less-developed countries, it seems to be quite at variance with the very conservative financial policy pursued by the Dutch Government.

The Canadian Delegation seemed to be playing a political game in that they took a lead in protecting the UN Secretariat against the firmer control by the Council to which I have previously referred above. Their representative, Dr. MacKay,¹⁰ did not appear personally to take an active part and their most dynamic representative was Dr. O.J. Firestone, of the Canadian Department of Trade and Commerce.

Mr. Sinbel,¹¹ the representative of Egypt, told me privately of his country’s gratitude for U.S. intervention in behalf of Egypt at the time of the Suez crisis. However, a member of his delegation, who obviously followed the Party line, was sharply critical of my address on the World Economic Situation, on the ground that the gap between American living standards and those of the rest of the world would create “mental and social isolation” for the United States.

France sent a huge delegation, and hardly the same man sat in the Chair on two successive days.

In the middle of the session, the representative of the USSR, Mr. Zakharov, was suddenly “withdrawn”. I asked his successor, Chernyshev,¹² for an explanation and was informed that Zakharov was the only one of six Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs available to conduct the King of Afghanistan on a tour of the Soviets.

7. In Summary.

Veteran participants in ECOSOC meetings volunteered to me the opinion that this session had been a more useful one than many preceding sessions. Whether or not this is the case, I believe that the output of the organ in the form of economic policy and social guidance and coordination must be increased, if it is to justify the present very large input of time and money.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 340.7–3157. Confidential. Five copies of the report were sent to Assistant Secretary Wilcox under cover of a letter from Jacoby, July 31. Additional copies were forwarded to Deputy Under Secretary Dillon, Ambassador Lodge, Presidential Assistant Gabriel Hauge, and Dr. R. J. Saulnier, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Dr. Neil H. Jacoby succeeded John C. Baker as U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council in June 1957.
2. Not found in Department of State files. However, ECOSOC despatches 7, 15, 23, 35, and 43, dated July 5, 12, 19, 25, and August 5, respectively, provide in-depth coverage of the 24th session. (Ibid., 340/7–557; 340/7–1257; 340/7–1957; 340/7–2557; 340/8–557)
3. Henrique de Souza Gomes, head of the Brazilian Delegation and Permanent Representative to International Organizations at Geneva.
4. Aleksey Zakharov, head of the Soviet Delegation and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, USSR.
5. Jacoby’s statement, delivered July 30, 1957, at the 24th session of the Economic and Social Council, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, September 23, 1957, p. 502.
6. Not printed.
7. Jerzy Michalowski, Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
8. Joza Brilej, Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
9. J. Luns, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Netherlands.
10. R. MacKay, Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
11. El Attafi Sinbel, Under Secretary of State and Minister of Finance and Economy, Egypt.
12. Pavel Chernyshev, an alternate representative in the original Soviet Delegation, and Director of the Department of International Economic Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, USSR.