Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

694.0026/12–854

No. 834
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Legal Adviser (Phleger)

confidential

[Washington,] December 8, 1954.

Subject:

• Disposition of Japanese War Criminal Problem.

I have read Mr. Snow’s memorandum to you¹ with respect to the ultimate disposal of the Japanese war criminal problem. I agree fully with the recommendation² set forth in paragraph 14 that the President be relieved of the onerous burden of considering each case personally and that this function be delegated to the Board.

On the other hand, I believe that political considerations are important in this problem and dictate a more rapid liquidation of the problem than recommended by Mr. Snow.³ The continued incarceration of Japanese war criminals is an important source of political and psychological friction between this Government and Japan, and is inconsistent with United States policies to develop a close political and security alignment with Japan. Prime Minister Yoshida in his Aide-Mémoire of November 10 to the Secretary⁴ emphasized the latent friction underlying the war criminal problem and requested favorable consideration by the United States Government.

This issue constitutes a residue of wartime and Occupation policies which it is necessary to liquidate in order to bring United States policy toward Japan in accord with existing international realities. The Japanese feel that a few persons are suffering for a guilt incurred by the nation as a whole; they are resentful of the fact that Communist atrocities in Korea have gone unpunished. Nor do they understand why the United States and other western nations persist in carrying on the war criminal program when the Chinese and Philippines who suffered most severly at Japanese hands have granted full amnesty to all war criminals sentenced by their courts. The Japanese believe that since their nation has been readmitted to international society and is being asked to assume international obligations, particularly in the field of defense, this problem should be relegated to the past as rapidly as possible. As Japan becomes more identified with the free world and this inherent incompatibility in United States policy becomes more evident, the United States will be subject to increasing pressure from the Japanese Government and people. Accordingly, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to implement other policies toward Japan in view of the highly emotional attitude which the Japanese people hold toward the question of war criminals. Moreover, a former Japanese Class “A” war criminal, Mamoru Shigemitsu, who was paroled by SCAP, may shortly become Japan’s next Foreign Minister.⁵

I therefore suggest that consideration be given to a final clearing of Sugamo by a mass parole or by expedited periodic paroles at an earlier date than that recommended in paragraph 13 by Mr. Snow. The Board is expected to have reviewed all cases by the end of 1955. In view of the political considerations mentioned above, the early part of 1956 would thus appear the appropriate time to order a mass parole.

1. This lengthy paper, dated Dec. 8, includes an extensive review of all issues connected with the subject, as well as certain recommendations. (Attached to the source text)
2. The recommendation was conditional, contingent on whether consideration of parole cases became “too onerous” for the President. Marginalia indicate that Robertson’s memorandum was revised on Dec. 13 to correct this error, but a copy of the revision has not been found in Department of State files. The version printed here was apparently not sent to Phleger.
3. In his memorandum Snow implicitly endorsed the position of the Clemency and Parole Board that no general amnesty be granted. “A general amnesty would be subject to interpretation by the Japanese and the world in general as an admission that the trials were political and that no crimes had been committed. A general amnesty would lose for civilization whatever good has come out of the war crimes trials generally in the way of ameliorating the savagery of war, with particular regard to the treatment of helpless prisoners of war.” Instead parole cases should be considered on an individual basis until substantial justice had been done and “only the hard core of bad cases” was left. “When that time has come, before the end of 1957, and all, or practically all, of the remaining war criminals are eligible for parole, it is recommended that consideration be given to a final clearing of Sugamo by a mass parole to all the war criminals convicted by American commissions then remaining in prison.”
4. Not printed. The section on war criminals reads: “The continued incarceration of war criminals is to the Japanese public a highly emotional issue as well as a social and political problem. To the families and relatives of these prisoners it is a tragic matter. To leave this problem unsolved serves only to perpetuate the bitter memories of war. Speedy action is requested.” This memorandum, in which Yoshida reiterated the Japanese position on a number of other issues, is dated Nov. 10 but was not delivered to the Department until Nov. 15, enclosed with covering note dated Nov. 12, from Shigenobu Shima, Minister at the Japanese Embassy. (033.9411/11–1254)
5. Shigemitsu became Foreign Minister on Dec. 10.