Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/11–2354

No. 832
Memorandum by Alice L. Dunning of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Acting Director of That Office (McClurkin)

secret

[Washington,] November 23, 1954.

Subject:

• Critique of Embassy Reappraisal of US Policy toward Japan.¹

While agreeing with the basic theme set forth in the Embassy’s reappraisal of US policy toward Japan—that the defense question should be deemphasized. I have serious questions with respect to the hypothesis on which this conclusion is based as well as certain courses of action presented as alternatives to our present policy. While the following comments highlight a few broad points of disagreement, this memorandum was intended in no way to depreciate the outstanding paper prepared by the Embassy.

I. Divergence of National Interests as Basic Impediment US-Japan Coordinated Political and Economic Activity

The Embassy takes the defense relationship between the US and Japan as the cardinal issue between the United States and Japan impeding coordination of political and economic activity in Japan and the construction of a durable basis for US-Japan cooperation. This hypothesis, on which the Embassy conclusion, recommendations, and exposition is based, is open to serious question. We have recognized for some time that Japan could be expected to follow a more independent policy within the framework of the US-Japan alignment. It would appear that it is this general trend in US-Japan relations rather than the specific issue of defense that is responsible for US-Japan misunderstandings. The question of trade and other relations with Communist China and the implications of such intercourse for future Japanese alignment with the US would have offered an equally vulnerable jumping-off place for a new look at Japan policy. Furthermore, it would appear that the Bikini experiment, subsequent developments and public hysteria have done more to prejudice US-Japanese relations than any negotiation on defense matters. The continuation of the series of tests in the Pacific offers the prospects of other accidents resulting in a series of compensation claims and prejudicing good will between the US and Japan. European reaction to the Bikini tests indicates that Japanese sentiment is neither unique nor isolated. Hanson Baldwin’s article in the November 7 edition of the New York Times on the potential danger of radioactive ash can not be considered hysterical or uninformed.

Is it not probable that strong US pressure on any number of issues where US-Japanese interest diverge will affect constructive US-Japan relations?

II. Embassy Subjectivity

It would appear that the Embassy in Tokyo has fallen victim to the same “provincialism” which is apparently prevalent among large segments of the Japanese People—fear of Japan’s safety in the event of nuclear warfare; attraction to neutralism; and psychological nihilism. It is recognized that the only effective policy is one based on the realities of the situation and courses of action that can become operable. On the other hand, such policy must take into account the many factors affecting US national interests and may, therefore, have to reach beyond a simple adjustment to the psychoses and fears of certain elements of the Japanese population and perhaps the US Embassy.

It is possible that the Embassy has overlooked the basic relationship between Japan’s search for nuclear safety and its desire to pursue more independent avenues of action. The continuance of Japan’s alignment with the US in the past has been in part attributable to the fact that confronted with the danger of hot war, the lack of opportunity to pursue a more independent policy has counterbalanced Japanese phobias with respect to nuclear weapons. Should Japan become convinced—as present Communist strategy intends—that an era of “peaceful coexistence” is possible, the US will be less able to control Japan’s search for independence, particularly in light of its fears of becoming involved in the middle of a nuclear war. Herein lies the crux of US-Japanese difficulties—the necessity of convincing Japan that its future lies with the United States.

III. Magnitude of Defense Issue

It is slightly startling some several months after the Japanese Government has received Diet approval of important defense legislation, the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the Agreement for the Loan of Naval Vessels² and several months after many segments within the US have reconciled themselves to travelling at Japanese speed with respect to defense measures, to receive a proposed new policy toward Japan revolving so highly around an issue relative to which substantial agreement based on a mutual moderation of views, has been reached between the US and Japanese Governments. It is recognized that the Japanese may not be aware of these developing attitudes in the US and that there may be strong resistance in certain military quarters to any relaxation of US pressure. It is also recognized that future negotiations on this subject will be delicate and that any action will be interpreted as “pressure”, but presently the US appears willing to follow a reasonable approach. nevertheless, it is a good idea to write this new approach in a revised NSC paper.

IV. US pressures for Internal Security Measures Equally Explosive

It is recognized that initial US post treaty policy toward Japan over-estimated Japan’s desire and capacity to increase its defense forces. As indicated above out of a review of the situation there is developing a moderate and flexible position. The Embassy now proposes a new “cause celebre”—that of internal security measures. Unfortunately, widely shared Japanese opinions and emotional reactions, such as fear of nuclear warfare and tests, a desire to reach a modus vivendi with mainland China, and a drive to act independently—are easily tagged as Communist inspired rather than recognized simply as characteristic Japanese attitudes which unfortunately are readily susceptible to Communist exploitation.

The theme of Communists in government, labor and education is thus to be exported to Tokyo. The merits of a program of internal security are recognized, but so is the danger of the imposition of such a program from the outside. Again we are forced to the conclusion that the Japanese will move at their own pace. It is noted in this connection that the Yoshida Government has moved in the right direction even though slowly. Perhaps a more important concern to moderate conservatism in Japan is to walk a very careful path between the maintenance of civil liberties and democratic prerogatives on one side and the imposition of controls that touch of [on] totalitarianism on the other. The balance is more delicate in Japan than in the United States. Perhaps the Yoshida Government has attuned its actions to what is politically feasible.

Furthermore, the Embassy speaks of “internal security measures” in rather broad vague terms. Taking into consideration various sections of the present despatches as well as earlier ones it is possible to conclude that the Embassy is driving at such problems as protection of classified material, removal of Communists from Government positions, refusal of the Government to grant Communist dominated trade unions the rights of collective bargaining, prohibition of Communist activities among teachers, and outlawing of the Japanese Communist party. It is questionable to what extent implementation of the foregoing, even if possible, would counteract the present tendency among most Japanese intellectuals and students to think in Marxist terms. It is these students who will become the bureaucrats and teachers of tomorrow. Whatever steps the US decides it is advisable to take on the narrow aspects of this problem must be supplemented by a more subtle approach in terms of undermining the influence of the Marxist interpretation of history which contains not only its own fallacies (for example the Surplus Labor Theory of Value) but also all the pitfalls of 19th century German metaphysics, particularly as set forth in the Hegelian dialectic.

V. Embassy Conditions to US Reduction under Article XXV

The Embassy would make US agreement to a reduction in Japan’s contribution to the support of US forces in Japan dependent on Japanese measures in the field of economic austerity and internal security. Such linkage would undoubtedly create another negotiating impasse and prejudice even the minimum expansion indicated by the Japanese Government. The proposed establishment of a joint US-Japan Council which would be empowered to require and receive specific reports and to make recommendations for appropriate action contains shades of the occupation. It is doubtful if a suggestion of this nature would constitute an effective basis for US-Japanese relations. The Embassy implies that it is within United States capabilities to influence internal political developments in Japan. It is questionable whether US efforts directed toward any of the avenues where US-Japan interests diverge are likely to be more productive than in the field of defense.

VI. Japan’s role in US Strategy in Far East

The Embassy questions the strategic importance of Japan to the US and suggests a review of the existing estimate in the light of new weapons developments etc. However, while raising this challenge, the Embassy accepts the present estimate in suggesting that the Security Treaty be converted into a Mutual Defense Treaty on condition that Japan agree to long term US occupancy of air and naval bases and US use of special weapons in Japan. In other words the US would condition its aid to Japanese forces on Japan’s taking certain austerity and internal security measures (the accomplishment of this is seriously questioned) and would withdraw its marginal forces from Japan at the same time committing ourselves even more fully to the defense of Japan through a Mutual Defense Treaty and recognizing Japan’s strategic importance through long term US occupancy of air and navy bases and the use of special weapons. What does the Embassy envisage that Japan will do in terms of its own defense? Should not a US guarantee of this nature require some contribution from Japan, however moderate? In this connection is not a possible solution that of recognizing Japan’s own interest in its new defense forces, rather than trying to impose on Japan arbitrary force goals and US standards and methods. The rapid overturn in ground forces is recognized by the Japanese as an unprofitable investment. Therein lies one motivation in building up their air and naval forces. Moreover, Japan recognizes the overwhelming necessity of air and naval defense and would deemphasize ground forces for the same reason that the Embassy has suggested that the United States retain long term air and naval bases in Japan.

However, aside from the minor point of whether or not the Embassy practices what it preaches, the core of the Embassy paper is the question of the importance of Japan to United States security. The answer to this question in the light of the hard realities of the political and economic problems of Japan is prerequisite to determining the price we are willing to pay to achieve existing objectives in terms of military and economic assistance, and security commitments.

VIII. Conservatism-Leftism in Japan

The Embassy paints conservatism and leftism in Japan in rather arbitrary tones. The conservatives can be relied upon and should therefore be supported even though they haven’t done very well so far. Whatever is anti-American is leftism. It is interesting to recall in this context two of the few resolutions unanimously approved by the Japanese Diet—trade with mainland China and postponement of further thermonuclear tests. These two issues were raised earlier as indications of Japan’s interest in following a more independent policy. These issues cut across all groups and cannot be simply identified as leftist. The Embassy points out that the information media in Japan is largely in the hands of leftists. Is this based on the assumption that antiYoshida, anti-rearmament and anti-American themes are necessarily leftist? The Embassy has itself highlighted the possibility that a lot of anti-Americanism stems from anti-Yoshidaism.

IX. Economic Austerity Program

The economic wisdom of pressuring Japan into a program of economic austerity should be explored in the light of the effect of such program on investment, modernization of industry, unemployment, etc.

X. Deficits

This paper has limited itself to general areas of interpretation and has not necessarily directed itself to commenting on such specifics as the wisdom of outlawing the Communist Party in Japan, the method of supporting Japanese membership in international organizations, enlargement of the exchange of persons program, etc.

1. The first page of this paper bears two handwritten marginal notations. The first reads: “Very good. N[oel] H[emmendinger]”. The second reads: “I agree that it is very good, and I also agree with most of what it says. However, to make the points. I think you may have overstated the Embassy case somewhat just as a prelude to arguing against it. On the whole, there is not a great deal of disagreement about what we actually should do. R[obert] J. G. M[cClurkin]”.
2. For text of the Agreement for the Loan of United States Naval Vessels to Japan, with Annex, signed at Tokyo on May 14, 1954, see TIAS 2985; 5 UST 1014.