Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 397

No. 827
United States Summary Minutes of Meeting¹

secret
JAT SM–14

[Washington,] November 9, 1954—4:15 p.m.

Participants

• The United States
• John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
• Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• John M. Allison, United States Ambassador to Japan
• William J. Sebald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Robert J. G. McClurkin, Acting Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
• Japan
• Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan
• Sadao Iguchi, Ambassador of Japan to the United States

1. Anti-Communist Measures.

Prime Minister Yoshida said that he had spoken to President Eisenhower about a counter peace offensive against Communist propaganda in the Far East. He described various evidences of an intensification of Communist propaganda attacks upon Japan and the other free nations of Asia. He said that he would like tentatively to make a suggestion that to counter these Communist propaganda attacks a “high command” be set up at a central office in Singapore under Malcolm MacDonald. To this office the United States, the United Kingdom, the French and the Japanese would send representatives to exchange information and discuss means for countering Communist propaganda. He had discussed this subject with both Eden and Mendes-France. He emphasized that he was talking just about a general principle, the details of which could be worked out later.

Secretary Dulles said that it was certainly a very interesting suggestion and that he was pleased to see that the Japanese are doing creative thinking about the means of countering Communism in Asia, even though there may be reasons why the present proposal might be difficult. We will certainly consider it very seriously, although the parties to the Manila Pact may think that this kind of thing is something which should be handled within the framework of the Pact. However, we want Japan drawn into collective activities in the area because if Japan and the United States and others of like mind can work together we can learn from each other and make all our efforts much more effective.

In response to a comment by Prime Minister Yoshida, about the desirability of bringing the French into any effort of this sort, the Secretary commented on the fact that the French are over-extended in the world and having to cut their commitments. This is the fundamental reason for the dangerous situation in Indochina which has allowed the Communists to move in. The problem of adjusting French interests to the new conditions in Indochina will be very delicate and difficult. For our part, we have sent General Collins² out to try to cope with the very unsatisfactory situation in Vietnam.

Secretary Dulles asked whether there is anything additional the Japanese can do to counter Communist activity within Japan, saying that he was disturbed by reports of their moving into key positions in labor unions.

Prime Minister Yoshida said that he had recently established a special Cabinet committee to fight Communist propaganda within Japan and that this Committee is already commencing its work.

2. Reparations.

Prime Minister Yoshida reported on the recent reparations agreement with Burma. He added that he had talked privately with Laurel³ in New York and he hoped that as a result of this conversation the reparations talks with the Philippines might be opened. Secretary Dulles said that he had been very pleased to see the satisfactory agreements with Burma. He believes that these reparations agreements can be regarded as an investment for future good will and trade relations and that the Japanese can therefore afford to pay something in order to strengthen their ultimate position in Southeast Asia.

Prime Minister Yoshida then commented on the difficulty Japan would experience in meeting these commitments and suggested the possibility that the United States might guarantee the reparations settlements so that in case they proved too great a burden for the Japanese economy the claimants could be paid. He went on to say that on his trip he had found himself everywhere in the position of a bankrupted banker. Everyone he visited had claims against him—the Italians, the French and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom had pressed him hard on an Article 16 settlement.⁴ Secretary Dulles commented that he did not believe that the Prime Minister’s suggestion would be either in the Japanese interest or in ours. If all those countries with claims against Japan thought that we would guarantee Japanese payment, their claims would skyrocket. It is far better for the Japanese to settle reparations claims and the Article 16 problem now while their economic position is not too satisfactory.

3. Japanese Position in the World.

Secretary Dulles expressed his concern that Japan develop the spirit and strength to resume a place as one of the great nations of the world. He is distressed that there still seems a tendency on the part of Japan to coast along rather than a positive effort to develop the desire and ability which Japan must play if the ruptured balance of power in Asia is to be restored. Japan’s new role obviously would not be based on any vision of conquest but on what a great and industrious people can accomplish. He discussed the situation in Europe where the United States is manifesting a willingness to back the strength and determination of others to shape their own destinies. The effort by Germany has produced outstanding results. The United States is always more willing to give help under conditions of this sort. He believed that the United States and Japan could work together much better if Japan captured this vision of greatness and will to achieve. He said that the Japanese have a great store of understanding and knowledge about Asia which it is very difficult for the United States as an outsider to have. For example, there should be extensive talks between us on how best to deal with Communist China and how to reconstruct the balance of power in Asia. The Secretary concluded by saying that it was only because he felt that the Japanese know he has a real regard for the Japanese people that he had been speaking in this way.

Prime Minister Yoshida said that the Japanese have no idea of depending too much on the United States or of misusing United States generosity. However, they do state their actual situation and their difficulties. The Japanese ambition is to rebuild Japan to a secure independence, both economic and political. Secretary Dulles said that the new austerity program is a very good step in that direction and that it had a good reaction in United States public opinion. Prime Minister Yoshida said that the Japanese want to use reparations to help rebuild Southeast Asia and develop wider markets there for themselves and other nations. Secretary Dulles replied along the lines of his November 9 press conference, emphasizing the lack of absorptive capacity in Southeast Asia as contrasted with Europe at the time of the Marshall Plan and the need for careful prior planning before attempting to put huge sums of money into the area.⁵ He said that we want to work in cooperation with Japan and other countries to build expanding economies in South and Southeast Asia.

4. Trade.

Secretary Dulles emphasized that trade with Southeast Asia is probably a better prospect for Japan than trade with the United States. He showed Prime Minister Yoshida a brightly patterned flannel shirt made in Japan of cheap material exactly copying a better quality cloth made in the United States, and said that an influential Senator had discussed this subject with him. He commented that this is one of the reasons the Japanese have difficulty in expanding their trade.

5. War Criminals.

Prime Minister Yoshida said that he was not asking for a general amnesty for war criminals but that the question was a very disturbing one for the Japanese public and he hoped that the United States could speed up the consideration of the cases on which the Japanese Government had made recommendations. The Secretary commented on President Eisenhower’s interest on this subject and then referred to the recent change in the rules of the Clemency and Parole Board which allows a parole after ten years. He said that we will do our best to speed up the process of examining the individual cases.

6. GARIOA.

Secretary Dulles asked when the GARIOA settlement could be reached. Prime Minister Yoshida said that his government’s position is to pay this claim and that the question is being discussed in Tokyo. The Secretary said that we appreciate the honorable attitude of his government and that we are not going to attempt to squeeze every penny out that we can get. However, he does believe it is desirable to settle the question soon. Ambassador Allison commented that an agreement is almost reached on the figure and that perhaps people on both sides are going into too much detail. The important thing now is to reach early agreement on the amount of repayment. Secretary Dulles commented that he believes the Japanese will find that the United States is a very reasonable creditor. Prime Minister Yoshida said that he would attempt to speed up the settlement as soon as he returns to Tokyo.

7. Japanese Relations with Korea.

Secretary Dulles said that it is a very bad thing for friendly nations of the area not to be more closely knit among themselves but he was afraid that the problem of Japanese-Korean relations would take time to solve. The United States has made a number of efforts, particularly at the time President Rhee was here. We still stand ready to help improve Japanese-Korean relations and are willing to provide a mediator or an observer in any resumed mediations if both sides want such a person. At the moment, however, our efforts seem merely to have succeeded in persuading the Koreans that we are pro-Japanese. Prime Minister Yoshida said, “Time will cure this problem. We must wait.”

1. Prepared by McClurkin and circulated on Nov. 17.
2. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative of the United States in Vietnam with the personal rank of Ambassador.
3. Senator Jose Laurel, in the United States for discussions on U.S.-Philippine trade.
4. The major documents concerning these negotiations are in file 694.001 for 1952–1954.

5. The following exchange occurred during the press conference:

   “Q. Mr. Secretary, Premier Yoshida of Japan yesterday in a speech suggested a very large scale investment program and development program for Southeast Asia, saying that it was bound to go Communist if such a program were not carried out. Would you care to comment on that, sir?

   “A. Well, we are of course well aware of the economic and social problems which exist in Southeast Asia, and we desire, within limits that are practical and workable, to contribute along with others to the amelioration of those conditions. There has been a tendency, not by Mr. Yoshida himself but by others, to assimilate the Yoshida suggestion to the Marshall Plan both in terms of character and amount. It is true that Mr. Yoshida did suggest an amount which is somewhat comparable to the Marshall Plan figures.

   “I think, however, it is necessary to bear in mind that the conditions which exist in Southeast Asia are quite different from the conditions which existed in Western Europe, where you had a highly developed industrial society and the task was to rehabilitate a plant which had been in being, which had been used and which the people knew how to use, and to recreate it as against the damage and disruption which had been caused by the war. In the case of Southeast Asia you’re starting, so to speak, from scratch, and the nature of the problem is quite different. And I’m not today convinced that it would be practical to attempt to spend, on that effort, certainly at the beginning, any such figures as would compare with the Marshall Plan figures. But the whole matter is receiving the very earnest consideration of the Government and I expect to have very full talks and exchanges of views with Prime Minister Yoshida about it and with the leaders of other Southeast Asian and Western Pacific countries. That is one of the big subjects which we are exploring, have been exploring, and will continue to explore intensively over the coming months.” (Department of State, “Press Releases”, 1954, No. 634) Yoshida had delivered his speech at the National Press Club.

   For documentation concerning U.S. policy with regard to a regional economic development program, see vol. xii, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.