Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/9–1054

No. 799
Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Tokyo, 10 September 1954.

Subject:

• Matters of Concern to the Far East Command with Respect to Japan

This Memorandum is intended to serve as a reminder of our discussion of the items enumerated herein and as a possible basis for your position during conversations with Prime Minister Yoshida should either you or he choose to raise these subjects.

. . . . . . .

2. Failure of Japanese to Carry Out Okazaki–Allison Agreement of 6 April 1954.¹ In the matter of rearmament, I have long felt that Japan has been able to do a great deal more than she seems willing to commit herself to accomplish. I feel that a ground force consisting of 10 active divisions, backed by 5 additional reserve divisions fully organized and trained, would be adequate for the ground defense of Japan, provided this force is properly supported by air and naval elements. Japan now has 4 divisions. A 5th division is presently being formed. Japan has a commitment to raise a 6th division by 31 March 1955, a commitment made in the exchange of diplomatic notes on 6 April 1954. In that exchange, the United States agreed in good faith to a reduction of $7,000,000 in the amount of the Japanese contribution to the support of United States forces in Japan on the condition that, among other things, Japan would augment her ground forces to 6 divisions by 31 March 1955.

The present trend of events, however, indicates that Japan will probably not meet the commitment for the development of forces which she made in the agreement mentioned above. Japanese officials are now publicly stating that it will be necessary for Japan to reduce by 10% the size of the forces that will be raised this year. If this reduction is placed in effect, I believe the United States should view it as a wholly unsatisfactory degree of fulfillment of the agreement between the two countries and as a basis for possible renegotiation of the agreed reduction in the amount of the Japanese contribution to the support of United States forces in Japan.

3. Necessity for Japanese Planning Prior to United States Commitment of Support. The United States is in a difficult position with respect to the support of Japanese military forces because the United States Congress wishes to appropriate funds for assistance only after assurance is received that the Japanese will raise the specified forces for which the American assistance is required. On the other hand, the Japanese wish to make their plans only after they know what assistance the United States will provide. It would be of tremendous assistance in the common effort if the Japanese Government would approve some long range plan for its own military services and would confirm its intention of providing for their support. Admittedly, the Japanese military forces are subject to appropriations by their own government, but without a willingness on the part of the Japanese Government to program forces at least a year in advance and then support those forces, we cannot develop supply deficiencies upon which to base requests for United States appropriations. The United States Mutual Defense Assistance Programs have considerable flexibility and can usually be modified through reprogramming to meet variations in programmed Japanese military forces caused by modifications made by the Japanese Government in its legislative and appropriation processes provided the program was initially considered reasonable by our MAAG representatives.

4. Japanese National Defense Highway. The Prime Minister has sought our comments on his plan for the development of the Japanese National Defense Highway System. The United States Army engineers have furnished representation on a joint US-Japan Technical Committee which has developed a desirable Japanese defense highway network. The estimated cost is $913,552,000. So far, the Japanese have not developed a plan for financing this construction. It is probable that the Prime Minister will ask for these funds on his visit to the United States. The representatives of the Far East Command assisted in developing a plan for a desirable highway system for defense without consideration of the desirability of such a highway system to the Japanese economy. They have not committed the United States in any manner.

5. Industrial Mobilization Plan Prepared by Minister Aichi. A second method through which Japan hopes to secure a large contribution of American dollars is through an industrial mobilization plan submitted by Minister Aichi.² It has always been United States policy to utilize offshore procurement only for the valid end item requirements of forces which are either in existence or definitely programmed. Mr. Aichi visualizes United States procurement in quantities five times as great as will probably be justified by the forces that will be raised. For example, his “normal annual requirement” of the Japanese Defense Forces is stated as $207,000,000 in offshore procurement, whereas, considering valid end item requirements, we would expect to provide only on the order of 25% of that amount in offshore procurement. It is important to make clear to Mr. Yoshida that United States military aid funds will be forthcoming only in support of forces actually in existence or programmed and not for the primary purpose of economic assistance.

6. Japanese Leadership in the Far East Japan possesses many qualities, potential and otherwise, which fit her to assume a role of leadership in the Far East in the fight against Communism. Japan should be brought to the realization that the fulfillment of this leadership role should be her ultimate aim. It is my belief that the United States would like Japan to assume the leadership among anti-Communist forces in the Far East. This will require a considerable effort on the part of Japan. It has been my hope that knowledge that the US will withdraw its forces from Japan as soon as it can safely do so would inspire the Japanese to expend an adequate effort on their rearmament program. Certainly, as an interim objective, Japan must first rearm sufficiently to provide for her own defense. She must next strive to gain the confidence of her neighbors and be prepared to make a substantial contribution to the defense of the regional area of which she is a part.

J. E. Hull

General, United States Army

1. Regarding this agreement, see Document 752.
2. See telegram 235 from Tokyo, Document 782.