Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/8–2554: Telegram

No. 796
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State

confidential

Tokyo, August 25, 1954—7 p.m.

463. Reference Embtel 365.¹ Ikeda’s statements are only the latest and most official of a long series of incidents which shed light on the true intentions and position of the Yoshida Government. The attitude displayed, which, in brutal terms, is that Japan is for sale to the highest bidder, is not one which can commend itself to us as praiseworthy in any ally.

We have been assuming that Japan is potentially a strong ally and that the Japanese want to assume this role as soon as their economic and political situation permits. The present government has given lip service to this idea but many of its actions prove otherwise. These actions indicate that Japan does not consider itself an ally or partner of the United States but rather a nation which for the time being is forced by circumstances to cooperate with the United States but which intends while doing so, to wring out of this relationship every possible advantage at the minimum cost.

I do not believe we should conclude that Japan is hopeless. Rather we should realize that the Japanese in spite of their modern buildings, their TV sets and English-speaking leaders are still Japanese—just one hundred years from feudalism. We should remember that Japanese have no abstract sense of right or wrong—their guide to conduct is situational and specific rather than general and ideal. As a shrewd American scholar has said: “In the West we tend to build up a universalistic ethic which equates all individuals in their relationship to God or to society. In the Far East relationships tend to be specific”. In Japan, this same author points out, “proper conduct depends upon the specific status of the one man and his particular relationship to the other”.

For the United States this means, I believe, that we must realize Japan has no basic convictions for or against the free world or communism. The attitude toward either at any particular time depends upon specific situations and upon whether in the eyes of Japanese leaders cooperation with the one or the other will advance Japanese interests. It follows Japanese must be convinced that ours is winning side, that any setbacks in Europe or SEA do not affect this fundamental fact, and that only in free world can Japanese work out truly national destiny. And we must also persuade them that we recognize that they are primarily an Asian power and that we desire to assist them in working out their position in Asia just as we have sought to recreate a position for Germany in Europe.

Finally if it is true that Japanese leaders will cooperate with us only if in their eyes cooperation will advance specific Japanese interests, it is essential that we develop some method of making clear to the Japanese that they need us at least as much if not more than we need them and that this situation will continue for some time to come. Recent press stories from the United States detailing the concern of the American Government and people lest Japan’s economic situation force it into the Communist camp have given the opposite impression. We must also at all times emphasize that any aid we give Japan in the political, economic or military field is forthcoming only to make up the extra margin needed after Japan has done all she can for herself.

Further comments and specific suggestions for action will be forwarded in response to Department’s 369.²

Allison

1. Document 790.
2. In this telegram, dated Aug. 18, the Department asked for résumés of current issues to aid in briefing the Secretary for his projected stopover in Japan following the Manila Conference. (396.1 MA/8–1854) Dulles was in Japan Sept. 9–10, 1954.