Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

INR-NIE files

No. 785
National Intelligence Estimate

[Extract]

¹

secret
NIE–41–54

Washington, August 10, 1954.

Probable Developments in Japan Through 1957²

the problem

To analyze the factors determining Japan’s present strength, stability, and orientation, and to assess probable developments in Japan through 1957, with particular respect to Japan’s future role in Asia.

conclusions

1. Through 1957, Japan will not be in a position to play a leading or stabilizing role in Asian affairs. Assuming a continuation of US assistance, however, we believe that Japan will slowly gain in strength.

2. Japan will almost certainly continue to be economically and militarily dependent on the US. It will therefore continue to avoid any action that might seriously jeopardize its alignment with the US, in spite of numerous frictions arising out of its condition of dependence.

3. Within these limitations, Japan will attempt to pursue a more independent foreign policy, notably in terms of establishing more active and extensive economic and political relations with Communist China and the USSR. There will probably be some growth in neutralist sentiment, an increasing spirit of nationalism, and a continuing critical appraisal of US policy.

4. Japan’s economic situation will continue to be precarious. Import requirements will remain high and even with the probable increase in trade with Communist China, exports will not be expanded sufficiently to avoid continuing balance of payments difficulties. Therefore, Japan will remain dependent on a continued high level of US expenditures and other financial assistance.

5. Moderate conservative elements will probably continue to dominate Japanese government and politics, although factional rivalry among the conservative elements will probably hamper governmental effectiveness. Conservative tenure is likely to be assisted by further increases in the powers of the central government.

6. Although the Japanese Communist Party is not likely to gain substantial parliamentary strength, it will continue to exercise an important influence through its ability to aggravate popular grievances and to exploit and infiltrate mass organizations of the non-Communist left. The Communists will probably be able to maintain their underground organization but not to increase significantly their potentialities for sabotage and subversion.

7. Assuming US military assistance, the Japanese Government will continue to rearm gradually during this period. By the end of the period, we believe Japan will have military forces capable of making a substantial contribution to its defense, but by no means adequate to assume full responsibility therefor. Japan will be reluctant to accept military commitments beyond the immediate defense of Japanese territory and will hesitate to join any regional defense system.

. . . . . . .

1. The section titled “Conclusions” is printed in full. The omitted portions comprise the section entitled “Discussion” and a map.
2. A note on the cover sheet reads: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 10 August 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Director of Intelligence, AEC, and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction.”