Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

694.0026/6–1754

No. 769
Memorandum by Alice L. Dunning of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Deputy Director of That Office (McClurkin)¹

confidential

[Washington,] June 17, 1954.

Subject:

• Japanese War Criminals

For your information General Snow dropped in on June 16 to discuss informally NA’s memorandum² proposing that Japanese war criminals be eligible for parole after serving 9 years and that all cases be reviewed and recommendations made to the President by the end of 1955 leaving only a hard core incarcerated.

The General indicated that he did not believe the Board would accept the 9 year proposal but would recommend to the President that eligibility for parole be set at 10 years in view of the fact that a round figure of 10 had some relationship to federal procedures while nine had nothing but political considerations to justify it. I indicated that it was my hope that the Board would see fit to accept the 9 year figure. He pointed out this would make no major difference in that the Board by the end of 1955 would have reviewed all the cases and have made recommendations to the President in all instances except those involving the most heinous crimes. If it appeared desirable to parole a person even though he was not eligible automatically for parole, the Board could always exercise clemency and reduce the sentence so as to make the person eligible. He had no idea what number would constitute the final hard core. Mr. Finn suggested a two digit figure might look good. I ventured to guess that 25 might be justified.

The General went on to say that the Army and Navy JAG’s would complete their review of the cases by the end of 1954. In reply to a question from Mr. Finn, the General indicated that the Department did not review the cases because neither the files nor the personnel were available. Later he pointed out to me that the Embassy acted for the Department in reviewing the cases. The General also pointed out that he performed the role of “advocator” of clemency and parole in opposition to the more conservative views of the Defense and Justice members. He noted that the Board maintained careful records of the cases as considered in order to justify its and the President’s decisions if ever their actions were challenged.

Mr. Finn thinks that in view of the curtain of legality surrounding all actions on war criminals, continuing informal consultations with General Snow may be the most effective way for NA to make its views known. This would of course be secondary to positive recommendations from the Embassy.

1. Routed through Finn.
2. Memorandum from McClurkin to General Snow dated June 14. In it McClurkin had reviewed the arguments for an accelerated release of war criminals and concluded: “I, therefore, suggest that you consider discussing with the [Parole and Clemency] Board the development of a procedure whereby (1) all prisoners would become eligible for parole after serving 9 years and (2) all cases will be reviewed by the end of 1955 and recommendations made to the President with respect to all but the most heinous cases.” (694.0026/6–1454)