794.00/12–3153: Telegram
No. 727
The Ambassador in the Philippines
(Spruance) to the Department of State1
1433. Personal for Secretary from Allison. Greatly appreciate receiving your thoughts as given your 15352 which arrived just before I left for Manila. While I agree Japanese performance to date in both defense and economic fields leaves much to be desired, there has been considerable progress in last few months. This is in large part due to frank presentation by you to Yoshida of situation as you saw it. Senator Knowland’s forthright statements also had good long-run effect although there was originally some bitterness.
If I may be permitted to be the Devil’s disciple for a moment, I should like to review the situation in Japan as I see it. What follows is dictated without benefit of my files in Tokyo but I believe it to be substantially correct.
Japanese reluctance to rearm is at least in part due to American policy and pressures during first years of occupation. This reluctance has been widespread and Japanese Government has only recently been in a position to carry majority of Diet with it in advocating hitherto unpopular defense and economic measures.
With return to Liberal fold of majority of Hatoyama party and with agreement reached with sufficient members of Progressive [Page 1574] Party to ensure Yoshida carry through his policies, I look for increasing tempo in carrying out defense measures and in enacting more austere economic measures. Yoshida is now in a position somewhat similar to that of Woodrow Wilson late 1916. He knows what should be done but is only now beginning to get sufficient support both in the Diet and throughout the country to carry out his intentions. Yoshida’s 1917 should come within the next year.
Within past four months, there has been considerable change in thinking of people. This has been reflected in agreement reached by Yoshida with his principal opposition to a revision of National Safety Agency Law to make possible use of NSA to repel direct aggression as well as put down internal subversion. Okazaki told us last week that after considerable argument he has now obtained agreement that resistance of external aggression would have equal status with combatting subversion as objectives of NSA. Opposition had held out for first place going to latter while government advocated former as chief ends of NSA. Equality was the compromise but it is a step ahead. Yoshida, Ikeda and Okazaki over protests of other Cabinet Ministers have now obtained Cabinet agreement that defense portion of new year’s budget will be only one to be increased. All others will be reduced. This in face of great popular demand for increase in flood relief appropriation and the 20 percent decline in rice crop with the consequent necessity of importing far larger amounts from abroad than planned.
Anti-American propaganda is definitely on the decline—it never was as bad as the American press made out. The non-Communist Labor leaders are slowly gaining influence—and the Bank of Japan is beginning to put the brakes on wasteful spending. While much remains to be done, there has been progress.
Okazaki’s distress at the Okinawa statement was, I believe, the instinctive emotional response to being told large number of Japanese would remain indefinitely under foreign rule. As I pointed out, however, he soon calmed down and recognized the realities of the situation—and there have been no further recriminations of any kind. Japanese Government leaders do, I believe, recognize their obligations for helping create security in Asia but they cannot act without consent of people’s representatives in Diet. To date, majority of people have been saying “America disarmed us and told us anything military was bad—now America wants us to rearm—all right, let the Americans arm us”. Government leadership has been woefully weak and slow in bringing about a change in this attitude—but again a beginning is being made. In this connection, it should be recalled that our detailed exposition to Ikeda in Washington last fall was the first time any Japanese leader had been given a real insight into the reasons back of our belief in the [Page 1575] necessity of speedy Japanese rearmament. Since then, both General Hull and I have attempted to follow this up in Tokyo and we are just now beginning to get results. Japanese pace is naturally slow and they do not move in straight lines but if a graph were drawn, the curve would be seen to tend upward.
In my opinion, Yoshida and his government offer the best hope for the immediate and mid-term future. Yoshida is getting stronger—to some extent he gets stronger as people believe he is not an American puppet. My understanding of your policy, with which I heartily agree, is that we want allies, not satellites. The fact that Japanese are talking back and not immediately saying “yes” to every American request is indicative of a resurgence of the old Japanese spirit—if we can continue to work with that and guide it, in the right direction, which I believe we are now doing—we will have an ally with spirit, and eventually strength, on whom we can rely.
The task will require firmness, when we think they are wrong, but above all patience. The potential for good of the 85 million Japanese is so great that I believe the task is well worth while.
May success continue to come to you and the President in your great endeavors over the coming year.