Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

033.9411/10–953: Telegram

No. 698
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

secret
priority

Washington, October 9, 1953—6:31 p.m.

854. Following summary second meeting Ikeda October 7 [8].² Nash³ explained strategic situation Far East and U.S. thinking re Japanese force goals. From military viewpoint Soviet-Communist Chinese military Japan extremely serious. Japan most important prize in Far East. Our forces there protect Japan until it can do so. Soviets alone at least 500,000 ground troops in Eastern Siberia with airborne and amphibious potential; 5 to 6,000 war planes (jets, two-engine bombers with thousand-mile radius, and equivalent B–29’s). Fighters could reach heart Japan only from South Korea. Light bombers have thousand-mile radius, heavy could range over whole Japan. Soviet problem for air attack would be fighter escort. For this reason aggression Korea great importance Japan. Threat temporarily halted but wherever power vacuum exists Soviets can be expected press. In June 1950 we thought Soviet time table short. It was interrupted and we now consider and European allies agree, time table extended and necessary maintain strength over long period. Japan cannot expect U.S. carry burden over long period with forces world over. We want withdraw forces from Japan just soon as Japan can take care own security. We will remain available to help.

Have concluded necessary force protect Japanese island 10 divisions 325,000. Believe attack would be airborne and amphibious on Hokkaido and northern Honshu, establishing bridgehead through which ground forces could enter. After bridgehead air strips for fighter cover whole Japan. Indicates Japan needs not only ground force but small and highly modern jet interceptors, elaborate radar screen, anti-aircraft batteries and in time guided missile stations. Naval craft should be destroyer, destroyer escort and patrol craft appropriate attack on amphibious force. Soviet submarine real threat, indicate Japan needs minesweeping capacity.

Reply questions Nash stated deployment Soviet ground forces indicates availability forces for attack in Far East while maintaining defensive posture Europe. Taking Chinese Communists forces into account joint potential exists possibly overrun Korean and utilize 500,000 for attack on Japan. In this event would be double pronged attack from north and directly against Kyushu. This means 325,000 men strategically deployed among Japanese islands minimum. Jets should be all-weather fighter interceptors. Agree Ikeda suggestion aircraft carriers inappropriate at this time. Command Tokyo prepared discusses precise composition Japanese forces and other details. Would expect Japanese financial contribution U.S. forces would be reduced as rapidly as justified in light buildup Japanese forces and expenditures connected therewith. U.S. has been planning some time and prepared render assistance military end items.

FOA representative⁴ made following statement military assistance:

Subject congressional authorization U.S. prepared assist Japan develop forces to goals stated by Nash, and to be set forth more detail October 11 [12] meeting.⁵ Referred to loan 68 vessels. Re Air Force, funds available U.S. FY54 MSP make start. View time element involved production such aircraft (particularly jets) most such aircraft probably not available two years. However some, including trainers, can be made available as soon Japanese personnel prepared use them. Hope possible initiate program pilot training soon MDAA becomes effective. Funds available U.S. FY54 MSP such training. Re ground forces matériel available earlier Defense appropriations complete initial equipping present force and go long way equipping two additional divisions. Draft legislation would authorize Secretary Defense transfer legal title this equipment Japan forces in being. Under proposed legislation transfer would have take place before June 30, 1954. Extensions this period have to be examined relation U.S. FY55 MSP. Preliminary discussions under way re U.S. FY55 military assistance program. In order include recommendations re Japan to Congress Executive Branch needs be able state understanding reached with Japan on plans defense buildup and Japan’s financial contribution. Intention this Government grants military assistance Japan same type considerations as determine grant assistance European countries. Force plans these countries reviewed in detail each year view establishing maximum annual force goals each country consistent its capability support such effort. Review includes analysis national defense budget, proportion GNP devoted defense, level taxation, inflationary pressures and capacity military production. Want deal with Japan comparable basis. Review coming year should take place soon as possible Tokyo in relation Japanese defense plans. General and Congressional reaction in Washington is Japan’s contribution its defense not satisfactory. Actual level Japanese expenditures during past year about 100 billion yen, less than 2 percent Japanese GNP. Understand such expenditures this year will not be appreciably higher. View this Government Japan contribution can be approximately doubled under present economic circumstances. Increased industrial activity and resulting tax potential should mean greater share this income can be devoted defense. Congressional appropriations for military assistance Japan will quite properly depend Japanese making maximum feasible effort secure own defense.

Reply questions it was emphasized U.S. in general not planning defend support or economic aid for future, expect programs respective countries within own capacity support with only U.S. military end item assistance. Offshore procurement military end items definite possibility which we want develops with Japan. Recognize percentage GNP not absolute standard but taking all factors into account believe present Japanese difficulty more political than economic. Reference made also flow U.S. special expenditures.

Ikeda pressed questions re discrimination against Japan and was assured U.S. policy against economic aid of general application and no discrimination. Robertson explained U.S. also has budget problem and limited resources must be used wherever needed resist Communist aggression.

Robertson explained Korean situation, agreements with Rhee, fact U.S. reserves full freedom action re Korea if political conference fails, and not committed renew military action. ROKs have 17 divisions and want more with 20 million population. Problem exactly opposite that with Japan.

Ikeda referred fisheries dispute, Robertson emphasized not impossible deal with Rhee and U.S. belief both countries must negotiate issues good faith. U.S. cannot take responsibility for adjusting issues world over.

Next meeting October 12. Will reply Japanese questions re U.S. strategic deployment and continue discussion Jap defense plans. Ikeda is reported to have plan discussed with Yoshida and believe may present next meeting. Understand Jap reaction yesterday session was that basis understanding exists. They will want reach understanding here primarily on costs and phasing. No discussion yet U.S. troop strength in Japan or precise future plans these forces.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Hemmendinger.
2. The First Session of the Ikeda talks was held on Oct. 5. According to the U.S. Minutes drawn up by Hemmendinger on Oct. 9, the session was devoted principally to Ikeda’s exposition of the Japanese position on the major agenda items. Hemmendinger also drew up the U.S. Minutes of the Second Session, held Oct. 8. (Both in FE files, lot 55 D 388, “Ikeda Talks”)

3. According to the U.S. Minutes of this session, Nash opened his talk with a review of his recent trip to Europe. He is then recorded as saying:

   “More important than anything else is the fact that it is now clear to the Soviets by virtue of the NATO alliance that if Western Europe is attacked, that means World War III. The actual forces in being, plus the U.S. strategic air force make clear that that is not a mere bluff. It is significant, I think, that the outbreak of aggressive war took place in the Far East just when the NATO alliance came into effect. Soviet power has a tendency to flow wherever there is a power vacuum and there was such a vacuum in the Far East. It had been indicated that Korea was not of strategic importance to the U.S. and Korea was weak. So the forces of aggression struck there rather than in Europe. In sum, I am convinced that the collective security effort has been paying off with great success. I cannot say that the threat is a thing of the past but it is by no means the matter of serious concern that it was three years ago.” (Although these Minutes were written in the first person, they were intended to be summaries rather than verbatim transcripts.)

4. Richard N. Johnson, Deputy Director.
5. For U.S. Minutes of the Third Session, held Oct. 12, see infra.