Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

033.9411/10–553: Telegram

No. 696
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Tokyo, October 5, 1953—7 p.m.

871. Reference Department telegram 797.¹ Following are my comments on Department telegram 797 in addition to Embassy staff comments in Embassy telegram 864.²

Department’s message seems to me to raise many important questions and to indicate that Washington agencies are thinking in terms which hitherto have not been made clear to any of us in Japan, either civil or military. In recent talks with General Clark and high ranking members his staff whole emphasis has been on necessity of informing Japanese at earliest possible opportunity of United States intention to decrease number its forces in Japan and FEC staff had prepared for Clark’s consideration announcement that United States would not request additional facilities to those they now have and in fact would look forward to increasing return of facilities to Japanese. Obviously no such statement can be made in good faith if policy of increase mentioned in Department telegram 797 is to be followed. Assume if United States forces doubled this would mean similar increase in number of dependents. Has Department considered effect this would have, not only on spread of inflation, but on generally increasing points of contact and hence irritation between relatively low living standard Japanese and high standard dependents?

I am also concerned over fact that reference telegram apparently based on assumption considerations therein can profitably be used as negotiating basis with Ikeda. Rather it seems to me policy of increase outlined in reference telegram means there must be urgent and concrete effort educate Ikeda and through him Yoshida and other key figures in Japan as to necessity for build-up of United States forces here rather than decrease.

In last two months Japanese Government has made considerable strides forward in its thinking and action regarding increasing its own defense potentiality. Most recent indication of this is Yoshida–Shigemitsu announcement of agreement on defense program and on necessity revising present legislation to permit national safety force to become in fact “defense” force and have authority to repel aggression from abroad. It is probably difficult from Washington to realize what great step forward this is but to one sitting in Tokyo it is extremely significant. Only two nights before announcement, at farewell dinner for Clarks, Yoshida took me aside and spent some time detailing his worry over creation military caste in Japan. He admitted necessity of rearmament but pleaded for patience along same lines as did Inukai³ to Parsons (paragraph 4 (b) Embassy telegram 849, October 2).⁴

If United States Government is convinced of necessity, from our own security point of view, of carrying out program generally along lines mentioned in Department telegram 797 I cannot too strongly emphasize necessity of, in some manner, making crystal clear to Japanese leaders reasons for this necessity. From things told me last night by Bullitt⁵ just arrived en route Korea, I gather there is considerable feeling in responsible quarters Washington that time is running out and speed in building worldwide defense system is essential. If that is so, I have not been given enough information to enable me to argue persuasively with Japanese leaders to this effect, other than on basis of justifiable impatience of Congress which is furnishing funds. If Yoshida should go to United States I believe he should be told most frankly what situation is and I strongly recommend I be ordered home for consultation at same time in order that I may have benefit of latest United States thinking in even greater detail so I will be in position to back up Washington more effectively. Even if Yoshida does not go to United States I suggest such consultation would be worthwhile.

Allison

1. Document 694.
2. In telegram 864, dated Oct. 5, the Embassy emphasized that the Embassy as well as the Japanese had not known of the U.S. plan to increase U.S. forces stationed in Japan to four divisions, prior to the receipt of telegram 797. “They were told in Okazaki–Kimura–Allison–Clark meeting (see telegram 767 from Tokyo, Document 690) that we thought they should go to 300,000 but were not told we would in meantime nearly double our forces here. Nothing definite been said as to exact relationship between their build-up and our withdrawal but Japanese have always assumed this would occur pari passu.” After lengthy analysis, the Embassy concluded that if this new plan was firm it would be necessary to take Japan further into U.S. confidence than had hitherto been the case, not just about purely military matters but about U.S. Far Eastern policy in general, including the problem of restraints on military initiatives by the Republic of Korea. Lastly, it would be necessary to point out that Japan would “raise sights considerably” on military matters, “not to obtain withdrawal as suggested reference telegram, but rather to deter aggression and provide security in dangerous times ahead.” (033.9411/10–553)
3. Ken Inukai, Minister of Justice and Superintendent of the National Police from May 21, 1953–Apr. 22, 1954.
4. Not printed.
5. William C. Bullitt had been Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1934–1936) and France (1936–1940).