Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

694.95B/9–1753: Telegram

No. 688
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

secret
priority

Washington, September 17, 1953—6:36 p.m.

678. Tokyo’s 622, 636, 637 and 687. Seoul’s 200, 208, 216, 219.² Regarding effect suspension Sea Defense Zone upon Japanese-ROK relations State and Defense concur both Embassies should strongly urge both parties sit down immediately discuss outstanding problems. Rhee’s demands outlined Seoul’s 208³ do not appear impossible of solution.

Embassy Tokyo should indicate Japanese desirability of meeting Koreans half way in view probability Korean attitude will influence extent procurement in Japan of aid for economic rehabilitation Korea. Hostile Korean attitude may keep procurement in Japan to minimal point. Broad-minded approach by Japanese to whole range of outstanding questions including claims issue may make it possible reach reasonable understanding with ROK and produce tangible benefits for Japan in connection Korean aid program. Japanese may wish discuss this question in context reopened Jap-ROK negotiations.

Embassy Seoul should reiterate US inability as matter of principle support concept of fishing demarcation line in international waters not based on conservation practices and mutual agreement. Should urge attempt be made confer with Japanese establish mutually agreed conservation zone and conservation measures and say we have informal indications from Japanese they are prepared discuss such measures.

Smith

1. Drafted in NA; cleared with NA/K, and U/FW, and with the Department of Defense in draft; and also sent priority to Seoul as 182.
2. None printed. All these telegrams were sent between Sept. 2 and 15, and are in either file 694.95B, 795.00, or 795.022. All deal with a series of seizures by Korea of Japanese fishing vessels which had ventured into waters of the former Sea Defense Zone.
3. Dated Sept. 8; in it the Embassy stated that on Sept. 6 President Rhee expressed a willingness to work out a modus vivendi with Japan, provided Japan returned to Korea archives and gold reserves, accepted a fishing demarcation line, abandoned claims to Japanese property in Korea, and publicly renounced all claims on Korea. (795.00/9–853)