Office of the Historian

694.95B/8–2053

No. 678
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret
[Washington,] August 20, 1953.

Subject:

  • Suspension of the Sea Defense Zone Around Korea

Discussion:

President Rhee in February 1952 unilaterally declared large areas of the high seas surrounding Korea to be Korean territorial waters for the purpose of excluding Japanese and other foreign fishermen from those waters. The validity of this “Rhee Line” was never recognized by any foreign nation. In 1952 a number of armed [Page 1487] clashes occurred in this area between Korean vessels and Japanese fishing boats. Under the guise of protecting the Korean coasts and our lines of communication against hostile activity, but in reality principally to avoid further Korean-Japanese incidents during the Korean hostilities, CINCUNC on September 27, 1952 established the Sea Defense Zone, which included substantial high seas areas bordering on the ROK. (Tab A).1 Now that there is an armistice, there is no real military justification for a continuance of the Zone, and General Clark favors its removal.

Immediately after the armistice the Japanese Government made a formal request for its removal.2 The fishing industry has great political influence in Japan, and the Japanese Government has been under increasing domestic political pressure on this subject. The ROK will resent any lifting of the Zone, but may object less if it is suspended rather than abolished.

While the Japanese and Koreans have conducted sporadic discussions in an effort to solve mutual problems, including fisheries, these discussions have not been broken off. We have consistently refused to be drawn into the negotiations. Continuance of the Zone would clearly appear to be a device to keep the Koreans and Japanese from clashing over fisheries. Thus we would, in effect, be intervening in the dispute and lending implied support to the principle of the Rhee Line. The longer we delay in suspending the Zone the more involved we become.

Even at the risk of further incidents it is the belief of FE that the operation of the Zone ought now to be suspended. It seems better to do it now. Prompt action will help us in Japan, and the Korean annoyance may be somewhat tempered by the time the political conference starts. The Embassy at Tokyo favors abolition of the Zone. The Embassy at Pusan believes that if the status of the Zone is to be modified, it should be suspended rather than abolished.3

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached telegram to Tokyo and Seoul.4

  1. See footnote 2, Document 603.↩
  2. On July 29.↩
  3. In telegram 138 from Seoul, Aug. 11, the Embassy supported this position as follows: “Since any action to abolish sea defense zone can be expected arouse very strong opposition on part President Rhee, it is urged that if such action regarded as necessary from viewpoint our relations with Japan or for other reasons it be taken as inconspicuously as possible and preferably in form of ‘suspension’ rather than ‘abolition’. Latter formula would in any event appear more consistent with fact that armistice represents merely suspension rather than definitive termination of hostilities.” (Attached to the source text)↩

  4. Not found attached; sent as telegram 452 to Tokyo, repeated to Seoul as 133, Aug. 21. (694.95B/7–3053) Telegram drafted in NA on Aug. 18, cleared with FE, L/FE, and U/FW, and approved for transmission by the Acting Secretary. In it, the Department agreed to suspension of the zone and made various suggestions concerning timing and coordination.

    CINCFE issued orders suspending the zone on Aug. 25. (Telegram 517 from Tokyo, Aug. 26, 694.95B/8–2653) This action was announced on Aug. 27 in Tokyo. (Telegram 529 from Tokyo, Aug. 27, 694.95B/8–2753)

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