Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

No. 675
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

secret

[Washington,] August 13, 1953.

Subject:

• Various Matters Relating to Japan.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Eikichi Araki, Embassy of Japan
• Mr. Torao Ushiroku, First Secretary, Embassy of Japan
• Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

Ambassador Araki took up the following matters during his appointment with the Secretary at 4 o’clock today.

1. United States Statement on Amami Oshima. Ambassador Araki expressed the appreciation of his government and his own for the statement which the Secretary made in Tokyo on August 8 regarding the relinquishing of control to Japan over the Amami Island group. He informed the Secretary that Foreign Minister Okazaki had called on the Emperor on Tuesday, August 11, and that the Emperor had expressed his appreciation for this act by the United States and had sent his very best respects to the President and the Secretary.

The Ambassador then handed the Secretary a personal note of appreciation from Foreign Minister Okazaki.¹ The Secretary expressed his thanks for the gracious remarks of the Ambassador and said that the United States decision to relinquish control over the Amami Island group was the right one, since the islands have little strategic value and since the United States as a matter of policy does not wish to retain control over alien peoples any longer than necessary.

The Ambassador raised two questions regarding this matter. He said that his government desired clarification of exactly what islands were to be included in the change of status. With the aid of a map, the Ambassador inquired specifically of Okino Erabu and Yoron Island. He said that it was the view of his government that the delineation between the Amami group and the Okinawa group was just south of Yoron Islands. The Secretary replied that his public announcement had been made before all of the detailed arrangements on the relinquishment of control had been completed within the United States Government. Mr. Young explained that the United States would probably use the general formula that the islands which had formerly been part of the Kago Shima prefecture would be relinquished, while the islands that formerly had been part of Okinawa prefecture would not. He also informed the Ambassador that the United States Government was carefully analyzing the exact islands which would fall into these two groups and that this was a matter that would be taken up in the discussions and negotiations with the Japanese Government. In reply to the Secretary’s question, Mr. Young indicated that the Departments of State and Defense would probably complete their work on the necessary arrangements within the next few weeks.

In the second place, the Ambassador expressed the strong hope of his government that the action regarding Amami Oshima would lead to similar action regarding Okinawa and the Bonins “at an auspicious occasion”. The Secretary then cautioned the Ambassador, and through him, his government, not to press immediately for the return of control over Okinawa and the Bonins because that would confirm the very suspicions of those who had argued against even the relinquishment of control over the Amami group. The Secretary also said that it would be impossible for the United States to relinquish control over such strategic islands as the Okinawa and Bonins as long as the government and people of Japan showed such little interest and were making such small efforts in the security of the area. It would not be right for the United States to let these islands fall into a “vacuum of power” at the present time.

The Secretary said that he was very disappointed over the lack of effort and interest in Japan to develop its own defense or to contribute to the security of the area. He felt that the Japanese were content to let the United States bear the burden for Japan’s protection. He was also disappointed that there had been no revival in Japan of the spirit of sacrifice and discipline required to meet the conditions of the world as we all face them. Japan once had shown great national spirit, which he had expected to reassert itself following the war. The Secretary said he had discussed this whole question with Prime Minister Yoshida, who had given him several explanations which were quite unsatisfactory. One explanation was to the effect that increased defense measures were unpopular in the Diet. The Secretary said that no government could expect to establish a position of prestige and respect if it allowed considerations of popularity to determine its national policy. The United States Government has to request legislation from the Congress which is sometimes unpopular, including funds for defending Japan. The Congress might like to eliminate the cost of maintaining several divisions in Japan in order to economize. For his part, the Ambassador explained the Japanese slowness to develop selfdefense forces by pointing out the antipathy of the younger and older people in Japan, resulting from the effects of the war, and the concern of the Prime Minister over Japan’s economic capacity to support increased defense measures.

2. Economic Matters. In this connection the Secretary said he was aware of the Prime Minister’s concern but felt that, on the other hand, the Japanese Government was not making the most of its dollar resources to strengthen its economy for meeting defense needs. The Secretary said that he had had a discussion with Governor Ichimada, who had left with him a memorandum on Japan’s economic problems.² The Secretary believed that Japan was squandering its dollars on luxuries at a time when it could ill afford to waste the benefits derived from special procurement. He suggested that the Japanese Government should limit the imports of luxuries in order to channel its dollars into essential uses. The Ambassador conceded that he had no explanation for this matter.

3. War Criminals. The Ambassador asked the Secretary to give this question his personal attention because of its political importance to the Government and the people of Japan. The Ambassador pointed out that the United States had paroled only about 20 per cent of the Class B and C war criminals, whereas the Philippines and China had released all of this class of war criminals whom they respectively had held, which had made a wonderful impression in Japan. The Ambassador urged that the United States Government release (as soon as possible) the prisoners it had tried and convicted in order to eliminate one of the unfortunate aftermaths of the war. He said that the Japanese people wished to rid themselves of this matter because it was inconsistent with the “new Japan”. The Secretary stated that he had not been informed as to the details of this problem. Mr. Young explained the workings of the President’s Board of Clemency and Parole and said that the United States Government was processing the applications for clemency and parole just as fast as possible. He also said that, while the United States Government fully realized the political implications for Japan in this matter, it was advisable in terms of American public opinion to deal with each case carefully so as to avoid creating any incident in the United States which might be unfavorable for Japan. The Ambassador also requested prompt action on the release of the “three old men” in Sugamo Prison. Mr. Young said that the United States Government was now discussing the question of Class A war criminals with other interested governments so as to reach a decision promptly.

1. Not found in Department of State files.
2. Not found in Department of State files.