Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.00/7–3053

No. 665
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] July 30, 1953.

Subject:

• The Situation in the Far East with Particular Reference to Japan and Korea.

Objective:

To bring about a better understanding with President Rhee of American policy towards Japan and Japan’s place in Asia.

ROK Position:

President Rhee in his letter of July 11 to President Eisenhower (Tab A)² argues that American development of Japanese power will “be regarded by all Oriental peoples as hastening the time when they must once again prepare to resist or to be victimized by a resurgence of Japanese imperialism”. To preclude new Japanese imperialism President Rhee recommends that the United States make Korea, not Japan, the keystone of its strategic power in north Asia. Also, President Rhee in a letter to the Secretary of State of July 25 said that the Koreans are deeply concerned about the “eventual reactivation of Japan’s imperialistic designs against us, well-knowing that Japan has not abandoned the conviction that its own aggrandizement cannot be accomplished except by conquest of Korean resources and of the Korean avenue to Manchuria.”

This recent approach by President Rhee reflects the chronic, deep tension between Korea and Japan following the liberation of Korea from Japan in 1945 and is consistent with previous ROK appeals that (1) its army, air force and navy be at least as strong as their projected Japanese counterparts; that (2) United States economic aid to Korea not be used to procure goods from Japan which could be produced in Korea; and that (3) the United States guarantee the ROK against Japanese aggression.

U.S. Position:

After some forty years of severe Japanese domination of Korea, the Korean emotional reaction to Japan and the Japanese is understandable. However, it is necessary for the United States and Korea, both of which suffered from Japanese imperialism, to recognize the realities of the present-day world and look to the future. A Communist Japan would mean great danger to free Korea. It would seriously jeopardize the United States political and military position in the Far East. Everything must be done to help Japan maintain its present orientation in the free world. The United States also recognizes that an authoritarian, ultra-nationalist Japan would be a threat to the interests of free Korea, the United States and the free world.

We feel that a profitable and honorable place must be made for Japan in the free world, and that political, economic and cultural relations between Japan and the other free nations of Asia are vital if Japan is to become a full member of the community of nations.

We wish to support the responsible, forward-looking elements in Japan which have been in control since the end of the war. We oppose the revival of militarism or any form of totalitarianism in Japan. Economic support and cooperation with Japan are necessary, in order that the Japanese economy can sustain the large Japanese population which is living in an area of too few resources. If Japan goes under, we do not see how Korea can long survive.

We would be as concerned over any revival of Japanese imperialism or militarism as the Koreans or any other of our friends and allies in Asia. As we said in our aide-mémoire to President Rhee of May 27, “The United States will take a strong stand against any developments from any quarter that affect the political stability, economic progress and military security of the free countries in that area, including Korea.”³ This applies both to Japan and Korea. The Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea applies to attacks from any quarter. The stationing of U.S. forces in Japan and in Korea, as well as in other parts of the Far East, is a guarantee that the United States will make good on that statement.

At the present time we see no prospect for the revival of Japanese imperialism or Japanese militarism for many years to come. On the contrary, Japan is defenseless, the build-up of Japan’s defense forces is moving along only very slowly, and there is widespread opposition throughout Japan to militarism, to rearmament, and even to the establishment of any self-defense forces in Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese economy is basically not strong. Whatever its superficial appearances may be, only external assistance over several years will prevent its collapse and the inevitable political consequences.

The United States feels strongly that both Korea and Japan must use every effort to put their relations on a firm and friendly basis. While the United States is not going to intervene directly in any particular dispute between Korea and Japan, the United States will seek to impress upon both Governments the desirability for a complete change in the present strained relationship.

At the same time, we can assure the Koreans that we will not tolerate in the future the resumption of any aggressive or oppressive measures by the Japanese in economic, political or military fields concerning Korea. By the same token, we hope that the Koreans will give the present moderate, middle-of-the-road responsible Japanese a chance to show their good intentions both towards Korea and the free world in general.

Discussion of ROK-Japanese Issues in which U.S. has Particular Interest:

1. Military:

On the military side Rhee will probably complain that the United States is building up Japanese forces which will lead to the imperialism he fears. The present disparity between some sixteen equipped and experienced ROK divisions and four partially equipped and organized Japanese divisions of internal security forces would speak for itself. We have promised President Rhee to help build up his army to approximately twenty divisions. If necessary, we can tell him that we know that it will be a long time, if ever, before the Japanese reach any such level. However, President Rhee may complain that we have given more naval craft to Japan than to the ROK navy. This is correct. But we have also agreed to help him in supporting naval forces.

Provision of U.S. military assistance to Japan will not foster revival of Japanese militarism or aggression. Japanese forces envisaged under this program are purely of a defensive nature, directed exclusively toward contributing to the defense and internal security of the Japanese homeland.

2. Sea Defense Zone.

President Rhee may request the Secretary’s assurance that the United States will maintain the present Sea Defense Zone around the Korean peninsula. He will desire this in order to keep Japanese fishing vessels at least 50 to 100 miles away from the coast of Korea. In establishing the Sea Defense Zone in October 1952, General Clark announced that it was for military purposes in connection with the hostilities in Korea. However, the real purpose, never made public and never admitted either to the Japanese or to the Koreans, was to stop a dangerous feud from breaking out between the Japanese and Korean fishing vessels. Since October 1952 the Japanese reluctantly acquiesced in the zone and Japanese fishermen by and large have obeyed General Clark’s regulations. Now that the armistice has been signed, the Japanese have asked General Clark to lift the Sea Defense Zone as soon as possible. General Clark has stated that sooner or later this would be done, but that this would be a proper subject for his discussions during his trip to Washington.

Since CINCUNC established the Sea Defense Zone for military purposes, President Rhee should be informed, if he raises the subject that it is a matter wholly within the jurisdiction of the United Nations Command.

3. Economic.

President Rhee strongly opposes our procurement of goods and services in Japan out of U.S. aid funds for Korean rehabilitation and relief. The U.S. position is that procurement under the U.S. aid program for Korea should take place wherever it is most advantageous for Korea, in order to use the most practicable source to save time and to economize on funds.

1. Apparently prepared as background for the Secretary’s forthcoming trip to Korea. Dulles left Washington for Seoul on Aug. 2. For documentation concerning his visit there, see vol. xv, Part 2, pp. 1465 ff.
2. Copy not found attached. For text, see ibid., 1368.
3. Not printed. (795B.00/5–2753)