Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

NA files, lot 58 D 184: Telegram

No. 649
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Department of the Army

top secret

Tokyo, May 20, 1953—5:24 p.m.

C 62522. UrmsgDA 939310.¹ This msg in five parts.

Part I. Fully concur in DA psn in ref.

Part II. Maintenance of status quo in Ryukyu Isls as recommended by JCS on 15 Aug 52 and concurred in by Sec Def 29 Aug 52² is as vitally important today to US security interests in the Far East as it was last Aug. I again strongly urge that such recommendations be adopted as the US Govt psn in this matter and that this psn be publicly announced in official statement re political status of the Islands which I understand is now in preparation. In my judgment it would be highly imprudent at this time for the US to concur in resumption of sovereignty, or the exercise thereof, by Japan in any part of this area. Such course of action would to large degree make the effective maintenance and opn of important US military bases and facilities in Ryukyu Islands dependent upon friendly and cooperative Japan, which cannot now be assuredly forecast for the indefinite pd of time when US security interests will remain of overriding importance. Any pos political and psychological advantages which might be developed in US-Japan relations from reversion of sovereignty to the latter would not with any certainty outlast the life of the govt in power at time the concessions were made. This consideration, therefore, appears to be tenuous ground upon which to base compromise of clear US security interests.

Part III. It is inconceivable that return of Okinawa, the very heart of our military bases in the islands, will be seriously considered. Regarding reversion to Japan of Amami Island group only, the fol comments are offered:

a. The Amami Island group consists of 5 major isls, namely, Amami Oshima including closely adjacent Kaerom-Jima, TokunoShima, Okino-Erabu Shima, Kikaiga-Shima and Yoron-Jima. The main isl of Amami totals 323 square miles and contains half the population of the group which totals aproximately 220,000 persons. The remainder of the isls encompass some 167 square miles.

b. The Amami Isls have longer historical ties with Japan and their people are racially and culturally closer to Japan than those of the remaining isls. Contacts with Japan date back to 12 century AD when large scale immigration took place from Japan pursuant to defeat of Taira faction which settled on isls. Amami group actually conquered by Japan 1609, became part of Kogeshima prefecture, while remaining Ryukyus administered from Okinawa prefecture. Amamians feel superior to their countrymen in the Southern Isls.

c. Sentiment for reversion to Japan, therefore, is considerably stronger in the Amami area than elsewhere in Ryukyu Isls. Since ratification of peace treaty with Japan reversion movement intensified because of awakened hopes for return to Japan stimulated by theory of “residual sovereignty in Japan.”

d. Economically the Amami Isls are and have always been in need of assistance. The natural resources are extremely meager. Fisheries products prosper only intermittently. Poverty-ridden peasants sustain themselves miserably with tiny patches of rice lands in valleys of the mountainous and rugged country while sweet potatoes are cultivated on terraces.

e. The Jap Govt is probably aware of fact that Amami group may become an economic liability but it may be assumed that Japan’s eagerness to increased political prestige through even minor territorial expansion will override economic considerations.

f. The present military installations on these isls consist of 2 fixed radio stations utilized in theater opns for Okinawa traffic. The potential for more intensive use of Amami group for communications, electronics installations, and Loran facilities is considered to be significant factor to this command in event of emergency.

g. The strategic importance of these isls lies in their immediate proximity to our established facilities in Okinawa. As Okinawa is an airbase, early warning svc is needed for some 200 miles in each direction. Such svc could be jammed by stations established within its periphery. In an emergency the Amami group of isls would be utilized for expansion of US controlled facilities without requirement of establishing agreements with another nation—Japan.

h. In event Japan were to evidence an unfriendly attitude toward US in a sit where subject isls were under Japanese sovereignty it would present an addtl threat to our forces and installations on Okinawa, all the more critical in sit where we might have to consider transfer of security forces from Japan to Ryukyus.

i. Return to Japan would permit Jap Govt which might be unfriendly to stir up dissatisfaction in remainder of isls through subsidies to Amami group for abnormal improvement in social, educational and economic well being of local population, and thus artificially stimulate reversion movement in isls still under US administration.

j. Partial reversion would constitute crack in US psn in Ryukyu Isls which the political opposition in Japan would seek to widen. Such action would force justification on artificial grounds between strategic value of Amami group and Southern Isls. Instead of allaying friction in US-Japan relations re status of Ryukyu Isls, partial reversion would more likely lead to further pressure and additional tension.

k. Locally, change of status in Amami group would be politically dangerous. The present composition of Ryukyuan legislature is 17 pro-American Democratic Party members, 11 Socialist Masses Party members, and 2 Ryukyu Peoples Party members. The latter 2 parties, recently acting in coalition, are leftist in character and Ryukyu Peoples Party Communist-Affiliated. One seat is at present vacant. Six of 17 Democratic Party Members are from Amami group while 2 leftist parties are represented in Amami by 1 member each. The political realignment and decrease in pro-American strength in assembly which would result from return of Amami group to Japan is obvious. In campaigns for new elections leftist parties would also try to exploit even partial reversion to Japan as their victory brought about by their anti-American propaganda and thus increase reversion pressure for remainder of isls.

1. Since present status of Ryukyu Isls is based on art 3 of peace treaty with Japan, US could not unilaterally change that status with respect to any part of isls group. Reversion of Amami Isls to Japan might well be opposed by certain signatories to peace treaty which have at various times in past stated apprehension re Japanese expansion to the south.

Part IV. Conclusions:

a. Change in status of any part of Ryukyu Isls would jeopardize our military capabilities in Far East for any future emergency.

b. If, however, US policy is determined in favor of returning Amami Isls to Japan, the fol collateral actions are considered essential:

1. Agreement in advance on part of other signatory powers to necessary revision of treaty of peace with Japan.

2. Firm high level policy announcement by US Govt that it will retain powers granted under art 3 of treaty in remainder of isls for as long as security interests of US and other free world powers require such retention.

3. Conclusion of separate base rights agreement with Japan, not tied up with present administrative agreement, stipulating clear US rights to establish and maintain such military installations in Amami Isls as are deemed necessary by US.

Part V. Recommendation:

It is urgently recommended that there be no change in political status of Ryukyu Isls and their administration by US.³

1. In this telegram, dated May 20, the Department of the Army outlined the Department of Defense position in opposition to the reversion of the Amamis to Japan, and requested the views of CINCFE, if possible in time for the NSC Planning Board meeting to be held that same day. (Department of Defense files)
2. See Foster’s letter to Acheson, Document 595.

3. In a memorandum dated May 20, entitled “Disposition of Ryukyu and Bonin Islands”, McClurkin in part stated:

   “During a conference in Honolulu May 11–14 in which Ambassador Allison; Assistant Secretary of Defense, Frank Nash; Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Orme Lewis; and Admiral Radford participated, this question was discussed. As a result of the conference, agreement was reached to recommend to the Departments concerned the retention of the Bonin Islands in their present status. It was also agreed to recommend that we should not allow the repatriation of the Bonin islanders during the present international tensions in the Far East. Ambassador Allison said that he had no hesitation about presenting this position to the Japanese. This change in position has not yet been approved by the Secretary, although steps are in process to present it to him along with the other recommendations of the conference at Honolulu.

   “In a subsequent informal discussion among the same people, the question of the Ryukyus was taken up and in particular the possibility of the return of the Amami group. Admiral Radford informally indicated that he had no opposition to the return of the Amami group, although he did not want to be quoted since he does not have responsibility for those islands. It was agreed to seek a direct expression of General Clark’s personal views on this subject. As of May 20, these views have not been received. The Pentagon has an earlier telegram from him indicating concurrence in the JCS position that all of the islands should be retained in the status quo, but Ambassador Murphy notified us in March that General Clark himself has no objection to the return of the Amami group.” (794C.0221/5–2053)

   A copy of the “Report of the Inter-U.S. Agency Pacific Security Conference”, dated May 14 and submitted to the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Interior by Allison, Nash, and Lewis, is in Tokyo Post files, 320.1 Pacific Security Conference.