Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794C.0221/1–753

No. 625
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

top secret

[Washington,] January 12, 1953.

Subject:

• Status of our work on the problem of the Ryukyus

The State–Defense Working Group on the Ryukyus has met a number of times. State Department representation has been Mr. Stelle, Mr. McClurkin, Mr. Hawley and I. Defense representation has included Charles Sullivan, Lt. Colonel Lee of G–3, Colonel Yeaman from the JCS staff and a number of people from CAMG. We had understood the function of the Working Group to be to decide exactly what purposes are served by the United States forces in the Ryukyus and then to determine to what extent those purposes could be achieved otherwise than through the continuation of the present situation. However, the Defense position has been an inflexible presentation of the JCS viewpoint. They insist that United States retention in the present status of all of the Ryukyus and Bonins is essential to our strategic interests. They suggest a Presidential statement to declare, along with miscellaneous propaganda material, that we will not seek a trusteeship but will continue our administration of the islands “until conditions of peace and security have once more been restored to the Far East.”

Our efforts in the Working Group have therefore been somewhat confined. We have attempted to explore the exact reasons for the Defense position and have had some fairly frank discussions of the question of the strategic necessity for the retention of specific islands, concentrating especially on the Amami Oshima group and the Bonins. Actually, much of the Defense position with respect to these islands rests upon the administrative inconvenience of having to negotiate for rights with a foreign government. We have also tried to persuade Defense to proceed at once with a revision of the basic directive for the Ryukyus, designed to achieve an administration which would be less of a military occupation and which would place increasing responsibilities on the local inhabitants. In this connection, the Budget Bureau letters¹ to the Defense Department and to us offer useful support, although the nature of the Defense Department response (attached)² indicates something of their inflexibility.

In the meantime we have asked for the views of the Embassy, which were given to us in a lengthy despatch, No. 871 of November 4.³ The recommendations at the conclusion of this memorandum are generally in accord with the Embassy’s views.

Our present thinking is that it will not be fruitful to explore the matter much further in the Working Group. We are consequently preparing a paper to serve as the basis for securing a Department position which can then be discussed with the JCS or with the Department of Defense. If this reopening of the question does not produce a satisfactory outcome, we believe that the question carries sufficient political importance to warrant its being presented to the President. In summary, our memorandum will probably make the following recommendations:

1. The Amami Oshima group and the Bonins should be returned to Japan at a time in the near future to be selected with an eye to achieving the maximum political advantage for the United States. The return should be preceded by an agreement with the Japanese Government guaranteeing the rights we need on the islands to be returned. We might also secure a commitment from the Japanese Government to undertake a public information campaign in support of United States purposes in retaining jurisdiction over some of the islands.

We are not convinced of the strategic necessity for the retention of the Amami Oshima group; and we understand that some people in Defense may agree with us, just as FEC representatives “reluctantly conceded that Amami Oshima and some of its surrounding islands could possibly be returned to Japanese control without serious strategic loss if political necessity required this move.” There is more question about the Bonins because of a submarine base on one of those islands; however, we think that our position should be to recommend they be returned to Japan. In any event, we should insist upon permission for the Bonin islanders to return.

2. At the time of the joint Japanese-United States announcement of the return of the Amami Oshima group and the Bonins, there should be a carefully worked out public statement by the President of the United States. This statement would announce the return, reaffirm Japanese residual sovereignty and explain in guarded fashion the basic reasons for United States retention of some of the islands.

3. Immediate steps should be taken to issue a revised directive for the Ryukyus and to increase the degree of self-government.

4. Retention of United States control over Okinawa on a longterm basis is essential to United States security requirements in the Far East. Exclusive United States right to use Okinawa also is required on a long-term basis in case Japan one day restricts United States military facilities in Japan or adopts a position of neutrality.

1. Apparently two letters of Dec. 2, neither found in Department of State files. However, the letter to the Department of Defense is quoted in Deputy Secretary Foster’s reply of Jan. 7 to Lawton, as follows: “I refer to your letter dated 2 December 1952 in which you requested ‘that the Department of Defense, with the collaboration of the Department of State, review the problems of the United States in acting as the sole administering authority over the Ryukyu Islands, and propose such measures as may be determined to be appropriate.’” In the remainder of his letter, Foster reviewed his Department’s thinking on the subject and the activity of the State–Defense Working Group. He stated that the Office of Civil Affairs and Military Government [in the Department of the Army] was preparing a revised directive for the civil administration of the Ryukyus. He concluded: “When the joint State–Defense working group has completed its study of the disposition of the Ryukyu and Bonin–Volcano Islands and the new directive for administration of the Islands is completed, I shall inform you further of progress made in resolving problems in connection with U.S. administration in the area.” (794C.0221/1–753)
2. See footnote 1 above.
3. Not printed. (794C.0221/11–452)