Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5/12–3052: Telegram

No. 622
The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State

top secret

Tokyo, December 30, 1952—7 p.m.

2078. In accordance with plan General Clark and I met yesterday at Embassy residence with Yoshida who was accompanied by Okazaki for general discussion regarding Jap rearmament.¹ By prearrangement with General Clark I opened conversation by referring to our reluctance during these past weeks of Jap political difficulties and Prime Minister’s preoccupation with many problems to burden him with this matter during Diet session. I explained that it is necessary for reasons both relating to US legislation and planning as well as international situation that there be closest understanding and harmony of view between Japanese Government and US regarding important question of Jap defense. I said that in view of some statement made by Cabinet members including Prime Minister on subject of Jap rearmament and Finance Minister Mukai’s reference to tax reduction I was confused as to Prime Minister’s basic thinking and program regarding article nine of Jap constitution; buildup of national security forces; expenditure of funds; military production, etc.

I referred to Shirasu’s recent conversation with Dulles² and former’s reference to pressures on Japanese Government to rearm suggesting that we here had not understood that any pressure had been exerted but to contrary an effort had been made to refrain from anything which might be interpreted as pressure. Yoshida said that we, of course, would appreciate that basic attitude of Japanese Government, regarding rearmament is of necessity delicate state secret; Japanese people still under impact of US occupational policy of demilitarization and destruction of war potential. He referred to General MacArthur’s earlier policies against payment of pensions to veterans, SCAP’s policy regarding educational program in schools and universities having objective elimination military ideas and influences, policy to stamp out Jap militarism, etc. Obviously Japanese people need time for adjustment to later conception and awakening to need of defense organization as inherent right of independent state.

He made no reference to necessity military program keeping pace with economic limitations. He referred to plan which he said had been referred to Chief of Staff FEC informally for study relating to Japanese military production and Japanese Government desire to utilize former arsenals and other equipment for earlier production of military items. Okazaki amplified latter point by referring to additional thought of providing other areas such as Indochina with military equipment possibly under head of reparations. Okazaki also explained that Shirasu’s reference to pressures no doubt related to tactics of parliamentary opposition in Diet which continually charged that Japanese Government under US pressure to rearm. Okazaki said it was not intended to convey impression that US was actually exerting any pressure. He also referred to US Presidential campaign references to Asiatics fighting Asiatics.

General Clark then reviewed situation relating to NSF ground force pointing to lack of Japanese coordination on lower echelons re planning and operations as well as to long delay which has occurred in bringing ground force to ceiling of 110,000. He also expressed his concern over unnecessary delay by agencies of the Japeseanese Government primarily Finance Ministry, National Safety Agency, and National Safety Force, in obligating appropriated funds for procurement of essential equipment and training areas and for construction of necessary schools and installations. He referred to fact that we are prepared to support the present four-division force with the additional equipment required from US sources. He also stated that today such equipment is in great demand especially in view of pressure to equip more ROK divisions and even, for example, to meet demands from Chinese Nationalist Government for equipment. He explained that to meet need to equip additional ROK divisions he dipped into his theater reserve rather than divert equipment held for Japanese forces which is still top priority under our present policy. However, it is difficult to justify such retention in absence of earnest effort on part of Japanese Government to build up its force even to primary target of 110,000. He pointed to fact that US Forces in Japan proper counted only 2⅓ divisions and that ⅓ of division had been allocated to Korean theater. We would like to transfer responsibility for ground force defense of Hokkaido to Japanese Government at earliest opportunity, if possible this summer.

Both Yoshida and Okazaki seemed to be visibly impressed with this part of General Clark’s remarks. Yoshida expressed surprise regarding General Clark’s point on lack of understanding at NSA and NSF level of authority for coordination with SASJ in development of combined plans, saying that it was his understanding that he had given orders for close cooperation. He said this would be rectified immediately and Okazaki also assured General Clark that word would go down immediately to insure that there would be complete understanding at divisional level which has not been case up to now. Okazaki also said that recruiting had not lived up to expectations but that he could assure General Clark that ceiling of 110,000 would be reached shortly. Present recruiting plan has increased figure from recent 77,000 to approximately 99,000.

I referred to our problems in Washington as added reason why frank discussion is necessary at this time mentioning General Vandenberg’s comment during his recent visit³ as example of United States budgetary planning necessary if funds are to be appropriated for fiscal year 1954. I said with advent new Congress no doubt numerous questions would be raised not only regarding Japan but contributions to collective security free nations being made by individual countries including Japan. It had been difficult to answer recent questions put by some of our visiting Senators regarding Japan’s rearmament program for reasons which Yoshida would fully understand. I expressed opinion that we would be faced by numerous questions on this subject during coming months.

Neither Yoshida nor Okazaki seemed prepared to give any indication regarding Cabinet’s plans for military portion of 1953 budget which Cabinet has now under consideration and about which it meets December 31. Okazaki stated however regarding unexpended balance in current budget that Japanese Government planned to commit entire 56 billion yen reserve fund. He said that delay in such commitment is not entirely due Japanese causes but due in part to past indecision on United States side regarding purposes for which expenditures should be made. I intimated that non-use of this fund for defense purposes might raise question whether Japan ought contribute more yen to support United States forces. It was apparent that prior to Cabinet consideration new budget Yoshida and Okazaki were not prepared to clarify Japanese intentions but it is believed that this talk with General Clark and myself was very timely because it was evident that Yoshida had not fully understood some practical considerations relating to planning and budget.

General Clark then described situation relating to flights of Soviet aircraft over Hokkaido providing full detailed information of 47 illegal flights which have occurred since October 9. Both Yoshida and Okazaki manifested intense interest. I explained at this point that we felt that Japanese Government should consider carefully (1) whether it desired to make some form of protest to USSR regarding past overflights and if so, what form that protest or statement would take, and (2) give urgent consideration to question of form of protest which should be made in event incident involving forced landing or shooting down of Soviet aircraft on Japanese territory. General Clark explained that during past weeks his command was not prepared to take type of action now planned because of unavailability of F–86 (it was necessary to explain what this meant) and under those circumstances it was not felt desirable to announce our purpose or to give warning because we were not in position to implement it. Our aircraft also had been stationed in southern part of Hokkaido so that we were not technically in position to prevent overflights over northern part of island. An air strip is now being provided in northern Hokkaido for that purpose. Yoshida at first seemed to think that this was matter of coordination between NSF forces in Hokkaido and USAF but General Clark explained that this was matter which would have to be handled by USAF as Japan had no equipment or air force to cope with it. At Yoshida’s request General Clark also agreed to provide full data re past overflights in writing and Yoshida and Okazaki said that this question would be given urgent consideration and study and that they would inform us regarding their formal reaction. General Clark also explained that procedure we contemplated in event of future incident involving forced landing or shooting down of Soviet aircraft would be immediate notification Japanese Government by Embassy informing Okazaki to be followed by bare factual public announcement by FEAF. General Clark said we hope that Japanese Government would be informed of incident within matter of minutes after its occurrence. This seemed to be satisfactory to both Yoshida and Okazaki.

Meeting terminated on most cordial note with Okazaki again assuring General Clark regarding closest coordination between NSF and SAASJ as well as build-up of NSF to 110,000 ceiling.

Both General Clark and I consider this conversation most timely and constructive. We believe Yoshida especially now possesses much better knowledge of practical considerations involved. Both he and Okazaki indicated general desire to make progress and to cooperate.

General Clark has read and concurred in this message.

Murphy

1. A long summary of action and planning on this question on the part of both governments is in a memorandum dated Dec. 18, from Young to Allison. (794.5/12–1852)
2. See Dulles’ memorandum of this conversation, Document 619.

3. Possibly a reference to some of the points raised by General Vandenberg in the course of a conversation held on Nov. 19 with Murphy and other U.S. officials. One section of the memorandum of the conversation reads:

   “5. Concerning budgetary justification that he would have to present to the Congress, General Vandenberg pointed out that:

   • “a. The allocation would have to be in the Fiscal Year 1954 budget or no results would be apparent until 1956.
   • “b. If the beginnings of an air establishment were made under the present Congress, a moral obligation would exist for the incoming one.
   • “c. If possible, the request for financial and material aid should come directly from the Japanese Government. A go ahead from Premier Yoshida and Foreign Minister Okazaki on a confidential basis would be sufficient.” (Memorandum for the record by Lt. Col. William A. Larsen and Maj. Alston L. Brown, both of FEAF, enclosed with a brief covering letter dated Nov. 20 from Murphy to Allison, 794.5/11–2052.)