Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794C.022/10–1352: Telegram

No. 604
The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State

top secret

Tokyo, October 13, 1952—7 p.m.

1204. Eyes only Alexis Johnson, no distribution outside Dept. Deptel 849¹ and mytel 1135² as well as mail instruction No. 25, of Sept. 11.³

(1) Bonin Islands. As suggested by Deptel 643⁴ and responsive to Admiral Radford’s invitation I accompanied him on an inspection tour of the Bonins Oct 2 to 6. In addition to members of Radford’s staff we were accompanied by Admirals … and Litch⁵ as well as my Naval Attaché,⁶ FSS Conroy⁷ and Col. Hensey G–5 FEC. Flying to Iwo Jima we thereafter proceeded by USS Toledo and helicopter for visits to Haha Jima, Chichi Jima returning to Tokyo on the Toledo so that there was ample opportunity for exchange of views.

I had been led to believe that perhaps Radford and Navy authorities were coming round to Dept’s viewpoint re return of Islands to Jap control. Instead I found Radford sympathetic but adamant in his determination to maintain status quo. COMNAVFE⁸ had warned of this prior to departure. I had hoped at least to persuade Radford to accept compromise arrangement which wld permit starting Jap control of Haha Jima.…

Radford’s justification of his unwillingness to agree to return of islands to Jap control is basically strategic. In essence he asserts that in light of danger of Soviet aggression and his own responsibilities as CINCPACFLT complete US control of Iwo Jima as an air base and Chichi Jima as submarine base is essential. He maintains that Yokosuka and Okinawa are both highly vulnerable in event of an all-out Sov attack and that Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima are vitally necessary as auxiliary bases should US forces be driven out of first two mentioned. On that assumption he is unwilling to increase responsibilities of security and supply inherent in presence of larger foreign civilian population on these islands. He is willing to permit present colony of 141 persons residing on Chichi Jima to remain there. There is no population of any sort on Haha Jima and only inhabitants on Iwo Jima are US military and occasional Jap workman employed by contractors.

As far as I am able to ascertain Chichi Jima provides ideal submarine and naval base with super natural harbor Jap underground construction gun emplacements storage radio and other installations which were built over period many years immensely valuable. Practically all civilian housing was destroyed during war and small farms and pastures returned to jungle growth. About 3,000 civilians lived there pre-war supporting themselves principally by fishing. Smaller Haha Jima has little or no naval interest and the several tiny islands represent no practical importance.…

I took great pains to explain Dept’s position in detail to Adm Radford who several times said he was surprised as he had been led to believe that Dept had come round to his point of view:

Adm Radford and I explored number of possible alternative solutions for consideration in event JCS firm on this as Radford says they are. One solution which occurred to us is bilateral arrangement for a form of leasehold along lines of wartime agreement covering bases at places like Bermuda, Trinidad or Argentina.

On our return to Tokyo we had long talk with Okazaki to whom Radford stated his viewpoint. Okazaki of course was most disappointed over Navy’s attitude. He reviewed Jap position which is familiar to Dept stressing point that it is difficult for Jap Govt to understand discrimination between small Jap colony descendants of European stock now permitted on Chichi Jima while ordinary Jap evacuees are barred stating that this could only be viewed as racial discrimination. Radford vehemently denied this saying it was the first suggestion he had ever heard of such a thing and pointing out that permission is being granted to about 25 present residents to marry Jap Nationals in Jap and take them to island. Radford declared opposition based solely on strategic necessity which Jap Govt should understand as it had removed civilian population for same reason in 1944.

We mentioned idea of lease arrangement as a personal and unofficial thought referring to charter party negotiations for 18 US frigates and 50 LSSLs to Jap Govt which Radford thought wld be easy to adjust to a different basis plus possible additional compensation in one form or another. While this idea appeals to me as a possibility I made it quite clear to Okazaki that Dept had not authorized suggestion. Okazaki seemed to grasp at the idea and said it was worth careful study.

Throughout it was evident that Navy is not thinking in terms of trusteeship or any return to Jap control. Its planning for development Chichi Jima as submarine base apparently had progressed in important measure.

(2) Ryukyus. Gen Clark tells me that he is under strict injunction from JCS to make no concession re political control of any of these islands and states that JCS insists on maintenance status quo. Personally he, as do some officers his command, favors release Amami Oshima and possibly other of the northern islands of this group to Jap political control but he says matter now frozen by JCS directive. There has been no reference to this question by Jap Govt during past few days. There is only mild public interest manifest at moment concerning either Bonins or Ryukyus. Of course this could mount easily if Jap Govt sees fit to stimulate it.

Conclusions. Foregoing essentially is position re islands. Navy’s viewpoint strategic situation and present danger together with its idea of its own responsibilities and needs difficult to dispute. Conception is new to me that Yokusuka and Okinawa highly vulnerable but if true I can well understand Navy’s unwillingness to assume additional security risk and supply responsibilities inherent in larger civilian population in Bonins. …Question of lease arrangement and compensation for Bonin refugees could be explored. Perhaps this kind of solution might be feasible and acceptable to Jap. It is always hard to assess size to which a political issue of this type might be blown but large scale agitation on this score is not visible on present horizon.⁹

On his return from Korea Radford at his request and I will have talk with Yoshida if latter can emerge long enough from domestic political arena for meeting. Radford expresses wish to explain his views personally to PriMin.

Murphy

1. Dated Oct. 1, not printed. (794C.022/10–152)
2. Dated Oct. 6, not printed. (794C.022/10–652)
3. In this instruction the Department had summarized State and Defense Department controversy over the disposition of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and had requested detailed comment from the Embassy on the entire question. (794C.0221/8–2952)
4. In this telegram, dated Sept. 6, marked “For the Ambassador from Allison”, the latter stated in part: “While as you know I had originally hoped to be with you and Radford to discuss this problem and to go to Bonins with you, I do not believe this essential. …I think you and Radford shld be able to work out solution.” (794C.022/9–652)
5. Rear Adm. Ernest Wheeler Litch, COMNAV, Marianas.
6. Capt. Ethelbert Watts.
7. John J. Conroy, Attaché at the Embassy in Japan.
8. Vice Adm. R. P. Briscoe.
9. The Embassy set forth its views on the topics treated here at much greater length in despatch 871 from Tokyo, Nov. 4, not printed. (794C.0221/11–452)