894.10/9–652: Telegram
No. 596
The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State
priority
841. For Allison eyes only. Yoshida, who is still in the country, sent Okazaki to see me last evening for purpose the latter said of again emphasizing the importance to success of Liberal Party in present electoral campaign of “a financial gesture” on part of US. Okazaki explained that situation required some form of public statement by some US Govt agency indicating that US is viewing with greatest sympathy financial assistance for Japan and that if Japan meets necessary conditions financial aid will be forthcoming.
I thought it well to mention to Okazaki that I had heard some doubt expressed that present govt had brought home adequately to Jap public the extent and volume of current US expenditures and financial support already extended by US to Japan. Okazaki protested that such doubt not justified by record and said that govt had taken advantage numerous occasions to indicate to public important extent US financial support and in fact that Jap public cognizant facts.
Okazaki urged insistently that I recommend that USG issue some form of suitable statement prior to Oct 1 elections and asserted that this type US support merited and necessary. Pls let me have your advice as matter priority.
I took occasion to inquire what Okazaki’s best estimate strength his party and he came up with estimate of 235 seats, the required majority being 233. Earlier last evening Aso, Yoshida son-in-law, gave me an estimate of 220. Appreciating that this is strictly guesswork reminiscent of Gallup in 1948, the flavor I get from my conversations here is that the Liberals are worried. While Okazaki tells me again that party will put up United Front, in same breath he says that factional split is widening and that group around Hatoyama (especially Mikibukichi, Ohno, Bamboku and company) are utterly reckless in their pursuit of power and patronage. He maintains they wld exercise harmful effect on Jap foreign policy. The more I see of the attitude of the Hatoyama faction as well as that of the opposition groups, the more I wonder whether our policies here wld not suffer at their hands. If we can devise in favor of Yoshida element, as imperfect as it may be a formula of support [Page 1329] which wld not be expensive, I believe it wld be in US interest to do so.1
- In telegram 642 to Tokyo, Sept. 6, marked “For the Ambassador from Allison” and drafted by Allison, the Assistant Secretary gave a personal and preliminary reply, not discussed with others in the Department. He was not convinced that an announcement of the sort suggested by the Ambassador would not boomerang against the Prime Minister in view of charges that he was a puppet of the United States. Also, at present or in the immediate future there was no economic justification for a loan or for grant aid to Japan. The Yoshida ministry should publicize existing forms of U.S. support such as maintenance of security forces, loans of heavy equipment to the JNPR and the proposed loan of coast guard vessels. However, he would consult with others to see whether any action or statement could be devised “which wld be of further advantage to Yoshida. There will obviously be difficulty in finding suitable peg upon which to hang any possible statement and your advice in this connection will be appreciated.” (110.15 AL/9–652)↩