Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5/8–752

No. 589
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)

top secret

[Washington,] August 7, 1952.

Subject:

• Loan of Heavy Equipment to Japan

Participants:

• Mr. David W. McNicol, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
• Mr. R. Hunter Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
• Mr. Peter G. R. Campbell, Second Secretary, Canadian Embassy
• Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy
• Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Director, NA

I asked Mr. McNicol, Mr. Wade, Mr. Campbell and Mr. Tomlinson to come in on August 6 and 7 respectively, to bring them up to date on developments regarding the equipping of the Japanese Maritime Security Agency and the National Police Reserve.

I referred to the conversations of November 14 and 15 which Mr. Allison had held with them on the same subject¹ at which time he informed the representatives of these governments, the U.K., France and the Philippines, of the United States plan to bring personnel of the National Police Reserve to American bases in Japan on a rotation basis for basic training in the use of heavy military equipment under direct American supervision, and the plan to permit Japanese crews to operate Coastal Patrol craft under American control. At that time none of these governments had any objections. The time has now come, I stated, to move into the next phase of this limited rearmament program in order to make it possible for the Japanese to use light naval and heavy ground force equipment themselves. I summarized the legislation authorizing the loan of 18 PF’s and 50 LSSL’s to Japan² and informed the above representatives that this program is now being implemented. They had all read of it and believed their governments had the necessary details. Mr. Wade inquired as to whether or not these vessels were in addition to the ships referred to in the conversations of last November. I informed him that these were not in addition but constituted the total number of naval craft which the United States is now in the process of loaning to the Japanese Government.

As to the loan of heavy equipment to the Police Reserve, I explained that the United States Government has no statutory authority to undertake a grant aid program in Japan. Therefore, the President has decided to make a loan of such equipment to the Japanese Government as a temporary measure. I informed them that the total number of heavy guns and light tanks would be approximately 500 of both categories. I emphasized at the same time that the total number of such heavy equipment would not be turned over in toto to the Japanese Government but rather would be loaned gradually in small lots. I pointed out that the Japanese Police Reserve is still far from organized on a divisional basis and that much training was necessary. I explained that the system of training at American bases had worked satisfactorily as far as it went but that it left much to be desired in developing Japanese defensive capabilities since it prevented artillery and tank units from training on a coordinated basis with the infantry.

The reason for the decision to make direct loans to the Japanese, I said, was to build up Japan’s capacity for self-defense in view of the increasingly hostile and threatening security situation in the Far East. The United States Government views this loan as a logical development in the normal course of implementing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which provides that Japan will increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against aggression.

I took particular pains to point out that the United States Government would make no public announcement of this loan of heavy equipment and would attempt to limit publicity on it in Japan and in the United States to the greatest extent possible within the powers of this government. I also noted that the loan of this heavy equipment eventually would reach public attention at which time the United States would say as little as possible but explain that such loan was a normal implementation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and that it was relatively small in size. Mr. Campbell strongly approved of this course of action on public information aspects. Mr. McNicol and Mr. Wade each indicated that the less publicity the better from the point of view of their own countries.

I also indicated to these four representatives that the Department of State was fully aware of the repercussions which this loan of heavy equipment might have in other countries of the Pacific and Far East when it became public knowledge, and that we hoped that the governments and peoples of friendly countries of this area would understand the urgent necessity for this limited program. I mentioned that there are many limitations on Japan’s ability to rearm—so many that in the view of the United States, Japan cannot become an aggressive threat to any nation in the Far East. On the contrary, the United States Government is concerned lest Japan’s military weakness provoke aggression or create conditions of instability.

Mr. Wade acknowledged the logic of this position but pointed out that in New Zealand people are still apprehensive of any resurgence of militarism in Japan. They wish to be assured that Japan’s growing military power will be under control. Mr. McNicol forcefully bespoke the fears and apprehensions of the Australian people in this respect.

I informed Mr. McNicol and Mr. Wade that this subject probably would be mentioned at the ANZUS meeting in Honolulu, although I did not know whether the matter would be discussed in any detail.

All four representatives expressed appreciation for the Department of State’s consideration in informing their respective governments confidentially and in advance regarding this matter. Mr. McNicol emphasized the desirability of such consultation. Mr. Tomlinson told me that it would be of great help to his government in combatting adverse public opinion in various parts of the world with respect to Japanese rearmament if the United States Government would provide the U.K. with as much information on the expected development of Japanese defense forces as possible. Shortly after the conversations in mid-November with Mr. Allison, Mr. Tomlinson took up this point with him on instructions from London.

1. For an outline of the presentation which may have been made by Allison at these meetings, see the attachment to the memorandum by McClurkin dated Nov. 8, 1951, to Dean Rusk, then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 1396.

2. For P. L. 467, approved July 8, 1952, authorizing the President to loan to Japan 18 patrol frigates and 50 landing craft provided prior agreement with Japan for their return was negotiated, see 66 Stat. 443.

   For the agreement for the loan of U.S. naval vessels to Japan, with annex, signed at Tokyo May 14, 1954, see 5 UST 1014.