Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794.5/7–2452: Telegram

No. 581
The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Tokyo, July 24, 1952—3 p.m.

329. Eyes only for Allison. No distribution outside Dept. Clark and I had an informal talk with Yoshida and Okazaki evening 23 July and outlined US concern over lack of clear-cut understanding re combined command of Jap and US forces in case of emergency and need for immediate organize planning for training and equipment of NPRJ and coordination between US and Jap forces.

As result of my conversation with Okazaki last week he had briefed Yoshida on problems so that latter expressed immediate assent on both points.¹Yoshida said that former Gen Tatsumi wld be designated as point of contact with FEC for planning and coordination.

On third point which concerns housing for US mil adviser personnel at camps on battalion level which has been bothering Japs, Clark offered to make any reasonable arrangements to avoid local embarrassment. This seemed to satisfy Okazaki who had raised question in our conversation last week.

Later on in evening Okazaki stressed he had taken pains to explain command and planning problems very carefully to Yoshida who said he understood them fully and is in agreement. I said also that as Yoshida had never told me frankly how he felt about Art 9 of Jap Constitution I wondered what he planned to do about it. Okazaki replied that after elections and depending on circumstances Yoshida is determined to work for and will accomplish a Constitutional amendment. As a matter of fact he said as things now stand only JCP and left-wing Socialists are opposed to Jap rearmament; country at large realizes it must assume responsibility for its security. It is according to Okazaki a matter of timing and if Liberal Party is successful at polls as he believes it will be Jap Govt will take necessary action.

This was a most satisfactory and unequivocal conversation which terminated by Clark giving an outline of position at Panmunjom in which both Yoshida and Okazaki manifested keen interest.² Clark also referred to his recent conversation with Syngman Rhee in which Clark mentioned Jap desire to repatriate about 5,000 North Koreans, quoting Rhee as offering to receive them, intimation being that he wld know how to dispose of them.

Murphy

1. In telegram 1937 from Tokyo, Feb. 8, 1954, Allison reported on a conversation with Yoshida. (Allison had succeeded Ambassador Murphy on May 28, 1953.) The section on command arrangements follows: “Yoshida reaffirmed intention of Japanese Government that in case of emergency involving use of military forces in Japan, Supreme Commander would be US General. He explained necessity of keeping this confidential at present but there was no hesitation in his affirmation on this point.” (794.5/2–854)
2. For documentation on the truce talks at Panmunjom, see volume xv.