Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

400.949/5–2852

No. 568
Memorandum by the Acting Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Chinese Affairs (Hope) to the Acting Director of That Office (Perkins)

secret

[Washington,] June 3, 1952.

Subject:

• Murphy’s views on COCOM¹ Membership for Japan

Upon receipt of the attached information copy of Tokyo’s 289 of May 28,² I telephoned NA to inquire as to their reaction and planned handling. I reached Ed Cronk³ on the afternoon of May 29. He stated that there was some division in opinion within NA about the matter, and that he would keep us informed of developments. I gather, in general, that Thayer White and some others generally agree with Murphy’s view that the Japanese should be extended an invitation to join COCOM, but Cronk and others are not convinced of the wisdom or feasibility of this course.

Personally, although heretofore we have avoided taking sides on just which multilateral organization Japan should join, I can see very good reasons for accepting Murphy’s view since Japanese membership in COCOM would presumably satisfy Japan’s desire to be recognized as an important sovereign nation and, from the point of view of export controls, it should result immediately in the Japanese adopting the China List and moving forward with whatever progress is being made in COCOM on charters, shipping controls, etc. The alternative to an early subscription by Japan to a multilateral organization would appear to be soon a more substantial relaxation of Japanese controls over China trade.

I know that Barnett⁴ had very strong feelings, based upon his experience both with Japanese and Chinese problems, that Japan should be invited to join COCOM. RA has appeared as the chief resistor of such a theory, on the ground that NATO and COCOM are coming closer together as a sort of European club, with Pacific partners not desired. I find this RA view unjustified, in view of the importance of such places as Singapore and Hong Kong in the COCOM structure, the special character of Japan as the only real industrial supplier to China in the Far East, and the presence in COCOM of Japan’s principal competitors in Far Eastern trade. I see no valid geographical reason for the exclusion of Japan from COCOM, since both that organization and NATO have in the past extended membership to countries which are certainly outside of the original orbit.⁵

I hope, therefore, that CA can support Murphy’s opinion.⁶

1. For documentation on the Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group, see vol. i, Part 2, pp. 817 ff.

2. In this telegram Murphy had stated in part:

   “In view marked business polit interest Jap–Chi trade, believe most desirable secure at earliest practicable date Jap adherence multilat engagement export control program. Because early commitment JG believed urgent, suggest membership COCOM most feasible solution with subsequent consideration possible formation subcomite dealing special problems Chi trade. If later COCOM more closely identified with NATO and Jap membership considered inappropriate, equiv pacific org cld then be estab.” (400.949/5–2852)

3. Chief of the Japanese finance and trade section in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.
4. Robert W. Barnett, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Western European Affairs.

5. In a memorandum to Perkins dated June 9, Hope commented further on the positions developing on the issue:

   “NA, FE (Gay), BNA (Kilcoin), seem agreed that COCOM membership is desirable. RA (Camp) and EDS (Wright) preferred the Pacific group type: RA on negative grounds (COCOM is expected someday to become closer in NATO than it now is, and thereby to become more ‘effective’), EDS on the ground that Defense, Commerce, and the Battle Act people hope to get a strong, well-knit Pacific group exercising sterner controls than Europe will agree to.” (400.949/6–952)

6. The following note is handwritten in the margin: “We should. I think we should avoid treating FE area as insulated insofar as economic controls go, especially in time of hostilities. Moreover, a separate FECOM wld be full of fishhooks, politically—T[roy] L P[erkins]”.